CHAPTER XXXI.
THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.
The first question which comes before us when considering the government of India is, What right have we to govern it? For an answer to this question we must betake ourselves to the history of our connexion with India. This history cannot have for us the interest and fascination of the history of our own country; but it has strong claims on us as the subjects of the British Crown, contains much that deserves and repays perusal, and must be known by us in order to the right understanding of the position we have obtained.
My reading of Indian history leads me to the conclusion that in all likelihood we should never have been rulers in India had we not been grievously injured as traders, in violation of rights accorded to us by the native powers. All know the story of the black hole of Calcutta, which led to our waging war on the Nawab. We had previously fought with the French and French allies in the south, we had contended with other European rivals, but our rule began with the victory of Plassey. After that victory our only alternative was either to leave the country altogether, or to go on conquering till we should become the supreme power over the whole of the continent. If we had retired from the land we had conquered, and had sought to remain as traders, our retirement would have been attributed to weakness, and demands would have been made on us which would have made trading impossible. If we had determined not to advance, but simply to retain what we had acquired, and had satisfied ourselves with repelling attacks, these attacks would have been continued till we had either gone forward, or resigned our conquest altogether.
We can understand the course pursued by the founders of the British Empire in India only when we look on them as placed between the alternative mentioned. The Directors of the East India Company did not seek the government of India. They deprecated it. By it commerce was disorganized and dividends lowered. Some of their servants in India made enormous fortunes by the new state of things, but this was no comfort to them. Order after order was sent out against the extension of territory. Governor after governor was commissioned to carry out the peaceful views of the home authorities, but still conquest went on under the direction of these very governors.
THE POLICY OF THE MARQUESS OF HASTINGS.
I am far from vindicating all that was done; deeds were committed which deserve severe condemnation; but it would be a travesty of history to say that the governors, who set out with peaceful intentions, succumbed to the lust of conquest. They were often forced to adopt war measures. Many instances might be adduced. I give only one. The Marquess of Hastings had denounced the conquering career of the Marquess of Wellesley. He was selected for the very purpose of reversing his policy, so far as it could be reversed. If any person could be trusted for giving peace to India he was the man. Shortly after his arrival our connexion with the Ghoorkhas, the ruling body in Nepal, became strained. They made raids into our territory beneath the hills, and murdered and robbed our subjects. The Marquess was extremely desirous to avoid a rupture with them. Remonstrances were addressed to them, and proposals made to settle differences by the better defining of the boundaries between their country and ours. These proposals were regarded as a proof of weakness, and the bold demand was made we should give up to them the great fertile region north of the Ganges. There was no further hesitation. To yield to this demand, for which there was not the pretext of right, would have been to announce to all the potentates of India that we were unable to defend ourselves, and would have led them to assail us. War was declared, which, after two campaigns and a severe struggle, ended in the discomfiture of the Ghoorkhas, and in their cession to us of the large territory they had conquered a few years previously. Ought the Governor-General to have yielded to the Ghoorkha demand? Yes, if we were prepared to leave the country altogether, but otherwise not.
No sooner had the Marquess of Hastings landed in India than he began to doubt the policy he had formerly advocated, and events soon compelled him to abandon it. The policy on which he acted was declared by him in unmistakable terms: "Our object in India ought to be to render the British Government paramount in effect, if not declaredly so ... and to oblige the other states to perform the two great feudal duties of supporting our rule with all their forces, and submitting their mutual differences to our arbitration."
Till we became confessedly supreme we were not for any length of time allowed to remain at peace. There were two main reasons for the unrest, which prepared the way for war. One reason was that the native powers hated and dreaded us, and were eager for our overthrow even when they professed the greatest friendliness. When we were involved in difficulties they were ready to rise against us. Every indication of our desire to avoid hostilities was interpreted as a sign of weakness, and thus became an incentive to the renewal of the struggle. Another reason for the fresh outbreak of war was the treachery of the native princes. I cannot say that in the matter of treaty keeping we had clean hands. The gross deceit played on Omichund, as described by Macaulay in his Essay on Lord Clive, stands nearly alone in our public conduct in India, but other transactions have been unworthy of our character for high-minded integrity. It may, however, be confidently affirmed, that looking at our governing conduct as a whole, it presents by its faithfulness to engagements a marked contrast to the conduct of those who had entered into treaty with us. Many of our Indian wars would have been prevented had there not been on their part the violation of engagements in a manner which showed they never intended to keep them an hour longer than they were compelled by circumstances.