General Meade got his army together near Warrenton on the 31st of July, and ordered a detachment of artillery, cavalry, and infantry across the Rappahannock at Kelly’s Ford and the railroad bridge. The command drove our cavalry back till it was reinforced by infantry, when the enemy was pushed back beyond Brandy Station.
General Ewell was called down from Madison Court-House, behind the Rapidan, and the First and Third Corps were marched into position behind the river on the 3d of August, leaving the cavalry at Culpeper Court-House.
General Lee suffered during the campaign from his old trouble, sciatica, and as soon as he found rest for his army applied to the authorities for a change of commanders. The President refused, pleading that he had no one to take his place. At the time he had two generals of his own choosing who were not in authority adequate to their rank,—Joseph E. Johnston, the foremost soldier of the South, who had commanded the army from its organization until he was wounded at Seven Pines, and G. T. Beauregard, the hero of Sumter and the first Bull Run, well equipped and qualified for high command. But the President was jealous of Johnston, and nourished prejudice against Beauregard.
CHAPTER XXX.
LONGSTREET MOVES TO GEORGIA.
The Author reverts to the Perils and Opportunities in the West—Proposes to the Secretary of War to reinforce against Rosecrans from the Army of Northern Virginia—Makes Plan known to General Lee—The Move finally effected—Difficulties of Transportation—A Roundabout Route—General Longstreet narrowly escapes capture when seeking Bragg’s Head-quarters—General Bragg assigns Longstreet to Command of the Left—Instructions for the Battle of Chickamauga—The Armies in Position—Federals in Command of Generals Rosecrans, Crittenden, McCook, and George H. Thomas.
While the army was lying idle on the south bank of the Rapidan my mind reverted to affairs in the West, and especially to the progressive work of the Union army in Tennessee towards the northern borders of Georgia. Other armies of the South were, apparently, spectators, viewing those tremendous threatenings without thought of turning minds or forces to arrest the march of Rosecrans.
To me the emergency seemed so grave that I decided to write the Honorable Secretary of War (excusing the informality under the privilege given in his request in May) expressing my opinion of affairs in that military zone. I said that the successful march of General Rosecrans’s army through Georgia would virtually be the finishing stroke of the war; that in the fall of Vicksburg and the free flow of the Mississippi River the lungs of the Confederacy were lost; that the impending march would cut through the heart of the South, and leave but little time for the dissolution; that to my mind the remedy was to order the Army of Northern Virginia to defensive work, and send detachments to reinforce the army in Tennessee; to call detachments of other commands to the same service, and strike a crushing blow against General Rosecrans before he could receive reinforcing help; that our interior lines gave the opportunity, and it was only by the skilful use of them that we could reasonably hope to equalize our power to that of the better-equipped adversary; that the subject had not been mentioned to my commander, because like all others he was opposed to having important detachments of his army so far beyond his reach; that all must realize that our affairs were languishing, and that the only hope of reviving the waning cause was through the advantage of interior lines.