Before greetings and congratulations upon the success had passed it was night, and the mild beams of the quartering moon were more suggestive of Venus than of Mars. The haversacks and ammunition supplies were ordered replenished, and the Confederate army made its bivouac on the ground it had gained in the first pronounced victory in the West, and one of the most stubbornly contested battles of the war.
Our cavalry had failed to close McFarland Gap, and through that General Thomas made his march for the stand at Rossville Gap.
It has been stated that this retreat was made under the orders of the Union commander. General Thomas did, in fact, receive a message from his chief a little after four o’clock, saying that he was riding to Chattanooga to view the position there; that he, General Thomas, was left in command of all of the organized forces, and should seek strong and threatening position at Rossville, and send the other men back to Chattanooga to be reorganized. This was a suggestion more than an order, given under the conviction that the Confederates, having the Dry Valley road, would pass the ridge to the west side, cut General Thomas off, and strike his rear at pleasure. The order to command of the troops in action, and the conditions referring to duties at Chattanooga, carried inferential discretion. That General Thomas so construed it was evidenced by his decision to hold “until nightfall if possible.” But directly, under the practice of our enfilading battery, he became convinced that it was not possible, changed his purpose, and at 5.30 gave orders for his commanders to prepare to retire, and called Reynolds’s division from its trenches to be posted as rear-guard to cover the retreat.
General Granger was then engaged in severe contention against my left at Snodgrass Hill. His march along the front of our cavalry and right wing suggested the advance of Liddell’s division to the Chattanooga road to try to check it. The withdrawal of Reynolds’s division was in season to aid in driving Liddell’s division back to its former ground. Reynolds was posted on eminent ground as rear-guard, and organized retreat followed. It was not until after sunset that Rosecrans’s order for retreat was issued, as appears from the letter written from Rossville by General James A. Garfield, chief of staff, dated 8.40, three hours and more after the move was taken up, viz.:
“Your order to retire to this place was received a little after sunset and communicated to Generals Thomas and Granger. The troops are now moving back, and will be here in good shape and strong position before morning.”[181]
So events and the evidence seem conclusive that it was our artillery practice that made the confusion of Chickamauga forests unbearable, and enforced retreat before Rosecrans order was issued.
The Union army and reserve had been fought, and by united efforts we held the position at Snodgrass Hill, which covered McFarland Gap and the retreat. There were yet five brigades of Confederates that had not been in active battle. The Confederate commander was not present, and his next in rank thought night pursuit without authority a heavy, unprofitable labor, while a flank move, after a night’s rest, seemed promising of more important results. The Confederate chief did not even know of his victory until the morning of the 21st, when, upon riding to his extreme right, he found his commander at that point seeking the enemy in his immediate front, and commended the officer upon his vigilance,—twelve hours after the retreat of the enemy’s forces.
The forces engaged and their respective casualties follow:
| General Bragg’s returns of the 20th of August—the last of record—reported his aggregate of all arms | 43,866 | |
| Reinforced from J. E. Johnston’s army in August | 9,000 | |
| Reinforced from J. E. Johnston’s army in September (Gregg and McNair) | 2,500 | |
| Reinforced from General Lee’s army, September 18 and 19 (a large estimate) | 5,000 | |
| Total | 60,366 | |
| Losses on the 18th and 19th | 1,124 | |
| Aggregate for battle on the 20th | 59,242 | |
| General Rosecrans’s return of September 20, 1863, showed: Aggregate of infantry, equipped | 46,561 | |
| Aggregate of cavalry, equipped | 10,114 | |
| Aggregate of artillery, equipped | 4,192 | |
| Total | 60,867 | |
| Confederate losses (estimated; returns imperfect) | 17,800 | |
| Union losses by returns (infantry, artillery, and cavalry) | 16,550 |
The exceeding heaviness of these losses will be better understood, and the desperate and bloody character of the Chickamauga battle more fully appreciated, upon a little analysis. The battle, viewed from the stand-point of the Union losses, was the fifth greatest of the war, Gettysburg, Spottsylvania, the Wilderness, and Chancellorsville alone exceeding it, but each of these battles were of much longer time. Viewed by comparison of Confederate losses, Chickamauga occupies similar place—fifth—in the scale of magnitude among the battles of the war.