Since reading the accounts of General Poe, the engineer in charge of the works, I am convinced that the wires were far from being the serious obstacle reported, and that we could have gone in without the use of axes; and from other accounts it appears that most of the troops had retired from the fort, leaving about a hundred and fifty infantry with Benjamin’s battery. Our muskets from the outside of the parapet could have kept the infantry down, and the artillery practice, except the few hand-grenades, prepared at the time by the artillerists. Johnson’s brigades would have been at the ditch with me in ten minutes, when we would have passed over the works. Hence it seems conclusive that the failure was due to the order of recall. It is not a part of my nature to listen to reports that always come when stunning blows are felt, but confidence in the conduct of the war was broken, and with it the tone and spirit for battle further impaired by the efforts of those in authority to damage, if not prevent, the success of work ordered in their own vital interest: a poor excuse for want of golden equipoise in one who presumes to hold the lives of his soldiers, but better than to look for ways to shift the responsibility of a wavering spirit that sometimes comes unawares.

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THE ASSAULT ON FORT SANDERS, KNOXVILLE.

After the repulse, General Burnside was so considerate as to offer a “flag of truce” for time to remove our killed and wounded about his lines.

About half an hour after the repulse, and while yet on the slope leading up to the fort, Major Branch, of Major-General Ransom’s staff, came with a telegram from the President informing me that General Bragg had been forced back by superior numbers, and ordering me to proceed to co-operate with his army.

Orders were issued at once for our trains to move south, and preparations were begun for a move of the troops after nightfall. In the afternoon word came from General Wheeler, authorized by General Bragg, that I should join him, if practicable, at Ringgold. But our first step was to be relieved of the threatening from the direction of Cumberland Gap. General Martin was sent to reinforce General Jones, with orders to hurry his operations, and return in time to cover anticipated movements. His brigades which had done their clever work on the south side were withdrawn to go with him. When he came up with Jones, the latter was severely engaged, but it was then night, too late for other operations.

Their arrangements were made during the night and battle renewed at early dawn and severely contested, the Union troops giving from point to point until they crossed the ford at Walker’s and were beyond further threatening. They lost some fifty killed and wounded and one company captured at Colonel Graham’s camp.

Generals Martin and Jones joined us in good season after their affair of the morning. Their loss was slight, but not detailed in separate reports.

Confederate loss in the assault 822
Union loss in the assault 673
Confederate losses during the campaign 1296
Union losses during the campaign 1481