General Armstrong crossed pending these operations and received the enemy’s attack on the 28th. General B. R. Johnson’s infantry division had been ordered near Dandridge, and crossed while Armstrong’s command held the enemy. The latter was caught in battle from which there was no escape but to fight it out. Johnson’s infantry crossed in time to march towards the enemy’s rear before he could dislodge Armstrong. I rode a little in advance of Johnson’s command. The enemy, advised of the approach of infantry, made his final charge and retired south towards Marysville. In his last effort one of his most reckless troopers rode in upon head-quarters, but Colonel Fairfax put spurs into his horse, dashed up against him, had his pistol at his head, and called “surrender” before the man could level his gun. The trooper was agreeably surprised to find it no worse. The enemy’s move to Marysville left us in possession of the foraging grounds.
On the 30th, General Grant urged General Foster’s army to the offensive, and called for the cavalry raid through the Powell River Valley and Cumberland Gap towards our rear, and General Foster called on General Thomas for a force of ten thousand infantry and working details to repair the railroad and bridges between Knoxville and Chattanooga. General Thomas was willing to respond to the call for troops, but asked timely notice so that he could call Sherman’s forces from Mississippi to replace those to be sent and make a co-operative move against General Johnston at Dalton. At the same time General Foster called for a pontoon bridge to make his crossing of the Holston at Strawberry Plains, which was ordered.
General Sturgis could not approve the ride through Powell River Valley, and expressed preference for a route through the mountains of North Carolina towards Asheville, to find our rear. General Grant had suggested raids from both these points on the 24th of January, but General Foster decided against the raid from Cumberland Gap, explaining that General Jones was at Little War Gap to intercept a column that might ride from that point. He found, too, upon counting his effectives for the raid, that he could only mount fifteen hundred men, and that our guards at weak points had been doubled.
Our railroad was in working order on the 26th of January, and the part of the pontoon bridge ordered for us was on the road. General Jenkins was ordered with the leading division down towards Strawberry Plains to collect such material as he could, and be prepared to throw the bridge across the Holston as soon as it was up and ready for us. Notice was given General A. E. Jackson of indications of raids; to Captain Osborn, commanding scouts; to General Wharton; to Rucker’s Cavalry Legion and Jones’s cavalry; and General Vaughn was ordered to collect his command at Rogersville, to be prepared to threaten Cumberland Gap if the forces there should be reduced.
Due notice was sent our outlying parties and scouts to be on the watch for the reported raiding parties, and the guards of bridges in our rear were reinforced.
On the 6th of February, General Grant reported from Nashville,—
“Major-General H. W. Halleck,
“General-in-Chief:
“I am making every effort to get supplies to Knoxville for the support of a large force—large enough to drive Longstreet out. The enemy have evidently fallen back with most of their force from General Thomas’s front, some going to Mobile. Has there been any movement in that direction by our troops?
“U. S. Grant,
“Major-General, Commanding.”
“Major-General Thomas: