| Army of the Potomac: | ||
| Infantry present for duty, equipped (aggregate) | 73,390 | |
| Cavalry (aggregate) | 12,424 | |
| Artillery and engineers | 2,764 | |
| Quartermaster’s, subsistence, and medical departments, extra-duty men, and engineer brigade | 19,183 | |
| Ninth Corps, present for duty, equipped | 19,486 | |
| Total | 127,247 | |
| But deducting extra-duty men, claimed as non-combatants | 19,183 | |
| Leaves | 108,064 |
These figures are from Major-General A. A. Humphreys, chief of staff of the Army of the Potomac. But General Badeau, in his “Military History of U. S. Grant,” p. 94, gives as the exact numbers put into battle (after deducting a division of colored troops, not then used for battle service) the following:
| Army of the Potomac | 97,273 | |
| Ninth Corps | 22,708 | |
| Total | 119,981 | |
| From which he deducts the division of colored troops | 3,095 | |
| Leaving | 116,886 |
The Army of Northern Virginia stood on the west side of Rapidan River, Mine Run on its right, extending north, the left division, R. H. Anderson’s, looking towards Madison Court-House; the Second and Third Corps, commanded by Lieutenant-Generals R. S. Ewell and A. P. Hill; two divisions and Alexander’s artillery of Longstreet’s (First) corps being held at Mechanicsville.
Colonel Taylor, chief of staff with the Army of Northern Virginia, gives the strength of the army at the opening of the campaign, from the returns of April 20, the latest up to date, as follows:[195]
| Second Corps | 17,093 | |
| Third Corps | 22,199 | |
| Unattached commands, Maryland Line, etc. | 1,125 | |
| “A liberal estimate,” as he calls it, of my command | 10,000 | |
| Total | 50,417 | |
| Cavalry | 8,727 | |
| Artillery corps | 4,854 | |
| Making a total of | 63,998 |
But General Badeau objects, on authority of a letter from General Bragg to General Joseph E. Johnston, stating that I had fourteen thousand men in my command. If General Bragg’s letter referred to my command in East Tennessee it was accurate enough. But Buckner’s division of that command, the cavalry, and other detachments were left in East Tennessee. General Badeau claims, besides, six thousand furloughed men and conscripts as joining the army between the 20th of April and the 4th of May. Of this there is no official record, and it is more than probable that new cases of sick and furloughed men of that interval were as many at least as the fragmentary parties that joined us. General Humphreys reported me as having fifteen thousand men. If he intended those figures as the strength of the First Corps, he is accurate enough, but Pickett’s division of that corps was not with it, nor did it return to the Army of Northern Virginia until late in the campaign. So I find no good reason for changing the figures of Colonel Taylor, except so far as to add Johnson’s brigade of Rodes’s division, which is reported to have joined the Second Corps on the 6th of May,—estimated at 1500, which, added to 63,998, would make the total 65,498. But General Ewell’s official account of numbers on the morning of the 6th of May puts his force at 15,500, which is better authority than Colonel Taylor’s from the return of April 20, or General Badeau’s computation. To these figures should be added Johnson’s brigade, that reported later of the day, estimated by General Badeau at 1500, which makes the aggregate of the Second Corps 17,000, and brings that of the Army of Northern Virginia back to 65,405.
However, the numerical strength of armies should not be considered as of exclusive bearing upon the merits of the campaign. The commanders had chosen their battle after mature deliberation. They knew of each other’s numbers and resources before they laid their plans, and they had even known each other personally for more than twenty years. Each had the undivided support and confidence of his government and his army, and it was time now to leave the past and give attention to the future.
General Lee had acquired fame as a strategist in his two years’ service in the Army of Northern Virginia, and General Grant, by his three years’ service in the West, had come to be known as an all-round soldier, seldom if ever surpassed; but the biggest part of him was his heart. They were equally pugnacious and plucky,—Grant the more deliberate.
Six months before the opening of the impending campaign, in November, 1863, General Meade, essaying a blow at the Army of Northern Virginia, crossed the Rapidan below General Lee’s right, and deployed along the south side of Mine Run, but found Lee’s line so strong and so improved by field-works that he felt constrained to withdraw without making battle.