Orders had been sent for provisions to meet us at the Court-House, but they were not there, so we lost the greater part of a day gathering supplies from the farmers.
Our purpose had been to march through Burkeville to join our forces to those of General J. E. Johnston in North Carolina, but at Jetersville, on the 5th, we found the enemy square across the route in force and intrenching, where our cavalry under General W. H. F. Lee engaged him. General Field put out a strong line of skirmishers to support the cavalry. Field’s, Heth’s, and Wilcox’s divisions and artillery were prepared for action and awaited orders. General Meade was in front of us with the Second and Fifth Corps and Sheridan’s cavalry, but his Sixth Corps was not up. General Fitzhugh Lee had been sent by the Painesville road with the balance of his cavalry to guard the trains raided by detachments of the enemy, which latter made some important captures.
General Lee was with us at Jetersville, and, after careful reconnoissance, thought the enemy’s position too strong to warrant aggressive battle. He sent for some of the farmers to get more definite information of the country and the strength of the position in front of us, but they knew nothing beyond the roads and by-roads from place to place. General Meade, finding that his Sixth Corps could not join him till a late hour, decided to wait till next morning for his attack. General Ord rested his column for the night at Burkeville. The enemy was quiet at Jetersville, except for a light exchange of cavalry fire. No orders came, the afternoon was passing, further delay seemed perilous. I drew the command off and filed to the right to cross Flat Creek to march for Farmville. The other infantry and trains and artillery followed and kept the march until a late hour, halting for a short rest before daylight.
Early on the 6th, General Meade advanced for battle, and, not finding us at Jetersville, started towards Amelia Court-House to look for us, but General Humphreys, of his Second Corps, learned that our rear-guard was on the north side of Flat Creek on the westward march. General Griffin, of the Fifth Corps, also had information of troops in march west, and General Meade, therefore, changed direction to pursue with his Second and Sixth Corps, putting the Fifth on the Painesville road. General Sheridan despatched General Ord that we had broken away from him and were marching direct for Burkeville. The latter prepared to receive us, but soon learned that we had taken another route. He had previously detached two regiments of infantry (five hundred men), under Colonel Washburn, with orders to make rapid march and burn High Bridge. To this force he afterwards sent eighty cavalrymen, under Brigadier-General Theodore Reed, of his staff, who conducted the column, and put his command in march to follow by the road through Rice’s Station.
After repairing the bridge at Flat Creek, General Humphreys marched in hot pursuit of our rear-guard, followed by the Sixth Corps, Merritt’s and Crook’s cavalry moving on the left of our column as we marched. General Humphreys, in his account of the pursuit, says,—
“A sharp and running fight commenced at once with Gordon’s corps which was continued over a distance of fourteen miles, during which several partially-intrenched positions were carried.”[210]
My column marched before daylight on the 6th. The design from the night we left Petersburg was that its service should be to head off and prevent the enemy’s infantry columns passing us and standing across our march.
At Sailor’s Creek the road “forks,”—one road to the High Bridge crossing of Appomattox River, the other by Rice’s Station to Farmville. We had information of Ord’s column moving towards Rice’s Station, and I was ordered to that point to meet it, the other columns to follow the trains over the bridge. At Rice’s Station the command was prepared for action,—Field’s division across the road of Ord’s march, Wilcox on Field’s right; both ordered to intrench, artillery in battery. Heth’s division was put in support of Wilcox, Mahone to support Field. Just then I learned that Ord’s detachment of bridge-burners had passed out of sight when the head of my command arrived. I had no cavalry, and the head of Ord’s command was approaching in sight; but directly General Rosser reported with his division of cavalry. He was ordered to follow after the bridge-burners and capture or destroy the detachment, if it took the last man of his command to do it. General Ord came on and drove in my line of skirmishers, but I rode to meet them, marched them back to the line, with orders to hold it till called in. Ord’s force proved to be the head of his column, and he was not prepared to press for general engagement.
General T. T. Mumford reported with his cavalry and was ordered to follow Rosser, with similar directions. Gary’s cavalry came and reported to me. High Bridge was a vital point, for over it the trains were to pass, and I was under the impression that General Lee was there, passing with the rest of his army, but hearing our troops engaged at Rice’s Station, he had ridden to us and was waiting near Mahone’s division. Ord’s command was not up till near night, and he only engaged with desultory fire of skirmishers and occasional exchange of battery practice, arranging to make his attack the next morning.
General Ewell’s column was up when we left Amelia Court-House, and followed Anderson’s by Amelia Springs, where he was detained some little time defending trains threatened by cavalry; at the same time our rear-guard was near him, followed by the enemy. Near Deatonville Crook’s cavalry got in on our trains and caused delay of several hours to Anderson’s march. Crook was joined by part of Merritt’s cavalry and repeated the attack on the trains, but Ewell was up in time to aid in repelling the attack, and the march was resumed, the enemy’s cavalry moving on their left flank.