The answer he received was to throw back his right and take position a little nearer to the New Bridge fork of the Nine Miles road,[23] thus swinging the pivot farther back. General Smith complained that the enemy was getting into the interval between our lines, but position between two fires was not the place the enemy wanted; he could not know that Smith wouldn’t shoot. Under this long and severe infantry fight there was no point on my part of the field upon which we could post a single gun. Part of Armistead’s new troops gave way, but the gallant brigadier maintained his ground and soon collected his other regiments. Before this I had reported ready, and awaiting a guide, the brigade that was to be sent over to the Nine Miles road. At half after ten o’clock, General Smith sent word that he had heard nothing of the brigade expected to come to his support, and renewed his reports of the enemy crossing over and concentrating against us on the Williamsburg road. He repeated, too, his wish to have his cavalry keep close communication between the wings of the army. This close communication had been established early in the morning and was maintained through the day, and the reports of the enemy’s crossing were all false, but our new commander seemed to forget. At the same time he wrote me,—
“I have directed Whiting to take close defensive relations with Magruder. At any rate, that was absolutely necessary to enable a good defence to be made whilst you are pivoting on Whiting’s position.”[24]
Whiting’s position, instead of being pivotal, began its rearward move at the opening fire at daybreak, and continued in that line of conduct until it reached a point of quiet. General Smith was informed that the brigade called for by him would not be sent over; that his troops were doing nothing, while all of mine were in severe battle, except a single brigade, and the enemy was massing his fighting force against me; that the grounds were so flooded that it was difficult to keep up our supply of ammunition; that with the aid of his troops the battle would be ours.
But just then he held a council with Generals McLaws and Whiting and Chief Engineer Stevens, and submitted the question, “Must the troops be withdrawn, or the attack continued?”
All voted in favor of the former except McLaws. In a letter, since written, he has said,—
“I alone urged that you be reinforced and the attack continued, and the question was reconsidered, and I was sent to learn your views.”[25]
Before General McLaws found me, I wrote General Smith,—
“Can you reinforce me? The entire enemy seems to be opposed to me. We cannot hold out unless we get help. If we can fight together, we can finish the work to-day, and Mac’s time will be up. If I cannot get help, I fear that I must fall back.”
General McLaws reported of his ride to my lines,—
“I went and found you with J. E. B. Stuart. You were in favor of resuming the assault, and wanted five thousand men.”[26]