GENERAL THOMAS J. JACKSON (Stonewall).
On the 25th, Jackson was ordered to pull away from our main force with the left wing, march by the crossings of the upper tributaries through Thoroughfare Gap, and strike the railway in the enemy’s rear at Manassas Junction, his supply depot. Stuart’s cavalry was ordered to follow during the night.
By a rapid march Jackson crossed the fords of the upper streams and made his bivouac near Salem. Forcing his march on the 26th, he passed Thoroughfare Gap to Gainesville, where Stuart joined him with all of his cavalry. From Gainesville he inclined to the right for Bristoe Station, the cavalry holding the curtain between his column and Pope’s. A little after sunset he reached the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, a march of thirty miles. Approaching the station, trains were heard on the rails. General Ewell divided his force and took two points on the rails, so as to cut off the trains. Munford’s cavalry assisted in the job. Two trains and a number of prisoners were taken, the greater part of the detachment at the station making safe retreat. His plans against General Lee’s right cut off by the high water, General Pope extended his right, under Sigel, Banks, and Reno, in search of Jackson up the river, who meanwhile had spirited himself away looking towards Pope’s rear. I was left on the river bank in front, the reserve infantry, R. H. Anderson’s division, and artillery near at hand.
Although the night of the 26th was very dark, and his troops were severely worn, to be sure of his opportunity, Jackson sent a detachment to Manassas Junction (seven miles). The gallant Trimble, with five hundred of his men, volunteered for the service, and set out at once on the march. Stuart was afterwards ordered to join Trimble with his cavalry, and as ranking officer to command the operations of the entire force. The infantry advanced and attacked the enemy as soon as it could be formed for work, captured three hundred prisoners, an eight-gun battery complete, and immense quantities of army supplies.
Feeling the main force of his adversary in his front awaiting opportunity, General Pope became anxious about his left and rear, and was further hampered by instructions from the Washington authorities to hold his Fredericksburg connections and “fight like the devil.” (It may have been fortunate for the Confederates that he was not instructed to fight like Jackson.) On the 23d he was informed of strong reinforcements to reach him at Warrenton Junction on the next day, and that larger forces would be shipped him on the 24th, to join him on the 25th.
Nevertheless, he began to realize, as he felt Jackson’s march to his right, that he must abandon the line of the Rappahannock and attend on the movements of that command gone astray by the mountains. He concentrated the Army of Virginia, to which Reynolds’s division had been assigned, at and near Warrenton under McDowell; Reno east of Warrenton about three miles, on the turnpike; Porter’s (Fifth) corps near Bealton, ordered to join Reno, and Heintzelman’s (Third) corps, ten thousand strong, at Warrenton Junction. The Sixth (Franklin’s) Corps, ten thousand strong, Army of the Potomac, was at Alexandria awaiting transportation, as were the divisions of Sturgis, ten thousand, and Cox, seven thousand,—the latter from West Virginia. General Pope asked to have Franklin’s corps march by the Warrenton turnpike to join him, and sent instructions to different parties to see that the guards in his rear were strengthened; that at Manassas Junction by a division.
Under assurances from Washington of the prompt arrival of forces from that quarter, he looked for the approach of Franklin as far as Gainesville, marching by the Warrenton turnpike, and a division to reinforce the command at Manassas Junction, so that when Jackson cut in on his rear and captured the detachment at the Junction, he was not a little surprised. He was in position for grand tactics, however, midway between the right and left wings of his adversary’s forces, that in his rear worn by severe marches and some fighting, that in his front behind a river, the crossings of which were difficult, and the lines of march to bring the distant wings to co-operation over routes that could be defended by small commands.
Communication with Washington being severed, the forces at and near Alexandria were thrown in the dark. To move by rail they were liable to run into the wrong camps, and the rapid change by water to the new position left them short of land transportation.
Pope stood on the evening of the 27th: McDowell’s corps, including Reynolds’s division, 15,500; Sigel’s corps, 9000; Banks’s, 5000; Reno’s, 7000; Heintzelman’s and Porter’s corps, 18,000,—in all 54,500 men, with 4000 cavalry; Platt’s brigade, Sturgis’s division, which joined him on the 26th, not included. In his rear was Jackson, 20,000; in front on the Rappahannock was my 25,000; R. H. Anderson’s reserve division, 5000; total, 50,000, with 3000 of cavalry under Stuart.
On the 26th I moved up to and crossed at Hinson’s Mill Ford, leaving Anderson’s division on the Warrenton Sulphur Springs route.