As long as the armies were linked to Harper’s Ferry, the heights in front of Sharpsburg offered a formidable defensive line, and in view of possible operations from Harper’s Ferry, through the river pass, east of South Mountain, formed a beautiful point of strategic diversion. But when it transpired that Harper’s Ferry was surrendered and the position was not to be utilized, that the troops there were to join us by a march on the south side, its charms were changed to perplexities. The threatening attitude towards the enemy’s rear vanished, his line of communication was open and free of further care, and his army, relieved of entanglements, was at liberty to cross the Antietam by the upper fords and bridges, and approach from vantage-ground General Lee’s left. At the same time the Federal left was reasonably secured from aggression by cramped and rugged ground along the Confederate right. Thus the altered circumstances changed all of the features of the position in favor of the Federals.
Approaching Crampton’s Gap on the morning of the 14th, Hampton’s cavalry encountered the enemy’s and made a dashing charge, which opened his way to Munford’s, both parties losing valuable officers and men. When General Stuart rode up, he saw nothing seriously threatening, and ordered Hampton south to the river pass; thinking that there might be something more important at that point, he rode himself to Maryland Heights to see General McLaws, and to witness the operations at Harper’s Ferry, posting Colonel Munford with two regiments of cavalry, two regiments of Mahone’s brigade under Colonel Parham, part of the Tenth Georgia Infantry, Chew’s battery of four guns, and a section of navy howitzers, to guard the pass. The infantry regiments were posted behind stone walls at the base of the mountain, the cavalry dismounted on the flanks acting as sharp-shooters.
At noon General Franklin marched through Burkittsville with his leading division under General Slocum, holding the division under General W. F. Smith in reserve. His orders were to wait until Couch’s division joined him, but he judged that the wait might be more favorable to the other side. Slocum deployed his brigades, Bartlett’s, Newton’s, and Torbert’s, from right to left, posted Wolcott’s battery of six guns on his left and rear, and followed the advance of his skirmish line, the right brigade leading. When the Confederate position was well developed, the skirmishers were retired, and the order to assault followed,—the right regiments of Newton’s brigade supporting Bartlett’s assault, the regiments on the left supporting Torbert’s. The Confederates made a bold effort to hold, but the attack was too well organized and too cleverly pushed to leave the matter long in doubt. Their flanks, being severely crowded upon, soon began to drop off, when a sweeping charge of Slocum’s line gained the position. The brigades of General Brooks and Colonel Irwin of General Smith’s division were advanced to Slocum’s left and joined in pursuit, which was so rapid that the Confederates were not able to rally a good line; the entire mountain was abandoned to the Federals, and the pursuit ended. Some four hundred prisoners, seven hundred stand of arms, and one gun were their trophies in this affair. General Franklin’s total loss was five hundred and thirty-three.[61]
General McLaws had ordered General Cobb’s brigade and the other regiments of Mahone’s to reinforce the troops at the gap, but they only came up as the Federals were making their sweeping charge, and were driven back with their discomfited comrades. General Semmes’s brigade at the Brownsville Pass, a mile south, with five or six guns, attempted to relieve their comrades, but the range was too great for effective work. That McLaws was not prepared for the sudden onslaught is evident from the assurances made him by the cavalry commander. His orders for Cobb were severe enough, but Franklin was too prompt to allow Cobb to get to work. Upon hearing the noise of battle, he followed his orders, riding with General Stuart, but the game was played before he could take part in it. Night came and gave him time to organize his forces for the next day. Had the defenders been posted at the crest of the mountain it is probable they could have delayed the assaulting forces until reinforced. But cavalry commanders do not always post artillery and infantry to greatest advantage.
General Cobb made worthy effort to arrest the retreat and reorganize the forces, but was not able to fix a rallying-point till after the pass was lost and the troops were well out of fire of the pursuers. General Semmes came to his aid, with his staff, but could accomplish nothing until he drew two of his regiments from Brownsville Pass and established them with a battery as a rallying-point. General McLaws reformed his line about a mile and a half south of the lost gap, and drew all of his force not necessary to the bombardment at Harper’s Ferry to that line during the night.
Commanding First Division, First Army Corps, Army of Northern Virginia.
Under cover of the night, Lieutenant-Colonel H. Davis, at the head of the Union cavalry, left Harper’s Ferry, crossed the Potomac, marched up the left bank, through Sharpsburg, and made good his escape, capturing some forty or fifty Confederate wagons as they were moving south from Hagerstown.
We left McLaws in possession of Maryland Heights, on the 14th, with his best guns planted against the garrison at Harper’s Ferry. The Potomac River was between his and Jackson’s and Walker’s forces, and the Shenandoah divided Jackson’s and Walker’s commands. Walker posted his division to defend against the escape from Harper’s Ferry, and planted three Parrott guns of Captain French’s battery and two rifle pieces of Captain Branch’s on Loudoun Heights, having effective fire along Bolivar Heights. General Jackson sent word to McLaws and Walker that the batteries were not to open till all were ready, but the latter, hearing the engagement along South Mountain drawing nearer, and becoming impatient lest delay should prove fatal, ordered his guns to open against the batteries along Bolivar Heights, and silenced those under range.
General Jackson ordered A. P. Hill’s division along the left bank of the Shenandoah to turn the enemy’s left, the division under Lawton down the turnpike in support of Hill, and his own division to threaten against the enemy’s right. Hill’s division did its work in good style, securing eligible positions on the enemy’s left and left rear of Bolivar Heights, and planted a number of batteries upon them during the night; and Jackson had some of his best guns passed over the Shenandoah to commanding points near the base of Loudoun Heights. At daylight Lawton’s command moved up close to the enemy. At the same time the batteries of Hill’s division opened fire, and a little later all the batteries, including those of McLaws and Walker. The signal ordered for the storming columns was to be the cessation of artillery fire. In about one hour the enemy’s fire ceased, when Jackson commanded silence upon his side. Pender’s brigade started, when the enemy opened again with his artillery. The batteries of Pegram and Crenshaw dashed forward and renewed rapid fire, when the signal of distress was raised.