but added that if Russia did this it would in effect challenge the integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and that Russia would therefore alone
bear the responsibility if a European war arises from the Austro-Servian question, which all the rest of the great European Powers wish to localize.
In this significant confidential communication the German Chancellor declares the strong interest which Germany had in the punishment of Servia by Austria. He says, “our closest interests therefore summon us to the side of Austria-Hungary,” and he adds that
if contrary to hope, the trouble should spread, owing to the intervention of Russia, then, true to our duty as an Ally, we should have to support the neighboring monarchy with the entire might of the German Empire.[13]
It staggers ordinary credulity to believe that this portentous warning to the constituents of the German Empire to prepare for “the Day” should not have been written with advance knowledge of the Austrian ultimatum, which had only been issued on July 23d and only reached the other capitals of Europe on July 24th. The subsequent naïve disclaimer by the German Foreign Office of any expectation that Austria’s attack upon Servia could possibly have any interest to other European Powers is hardly consistent with its assertion that Germany’s “closest interests” were involved in the question, or the portentous warnings to the States of the Empire to prepare for eventualities.
The German Ambassador to the United States who attempted early in the controversy and with disastrous results, to allay the rising storm of indignation in that country, formally admitted in an article in the Independent of September 7, 1914, that Germany “did approve in advance the Austrian ultimatum to Servia.”
Why then was Germany guilty of duplicity in disclaiming, concurrently with its issuance, any such responsibility? The answer is obvious. This was necessary to support its contention that the quarrel between Austria and Servia was purely “local.”
Note.—In Chapter [VII] it will appear from the French Yellow Book that the Prime Minister of Bavaria had knowledge of the Austrian ultimatum before its delivery in Belgrade.