If it were impossible for the Kaiser, with all the exceptional facilities of the German Empire, to arrest his mobilization for “technical” reasons, it was infinitely more difficult for the Czar to arrest immediately his military preparations. The demand of Germany was not that Russia should simply cancel the mobilization order. It was that Russia should “cease within twelve hours all warlike measures,” and it demanded a physical impossibility.
In any event, mobilization does not necessarily mean aggression, but simply preparation, as the Czar had so clearly pointed out to the Kaiser in the telegram already quoted. It is the right of a sovereign State and by no code of ethics a casus belli. Germany’s demand that Russia should not arm to defend itself, when its prestige as a great European power was at stake and when Austria was pushing her aggressive preparations, treated Russia as an inferior, almost a vassal, State. Its rejection must have been recognized by the Kaiser and his advisers as inevitable, and, on the theory that a man intends the natural consequences of his acts, it must be assumed that the Kaiser in this mad demand at that time desired and intended war, however pacific his purposes may have been when he first took the helm.
Such will be his awful responsibility “to the last syllable of recorded time.”
How well prepared Germany was, the sequel developed only too surely. On the following day—August 2d—its troops invaded Luxemburg and an abrupt demand was made upon Belgium for permission to cross its territory.
Upon the declaration of war, the Czar telegraphed to King George of England as follows:
“In this solemn hour, I wish to assure you once more I have done all in my power to avert war.”
Such will be the verdict of history.