The British and the Gáikwár, 1805.This grant led to the consolidation of all previous engagements into a single treaty, which was signed in April 1805. Previous agreements were confirmed and the whole brought into consonance with the treaty of Bassein. Districts yielding 11,70,000 rupees per annum were made over for the support of the subsidiary force, and arrangements were also made for the repayment of the cash loan advanced by the British Government in 1802, when the liquidation of the arrears due to the Arabs was a matter of urgent political necessity. The British contingent was to be available in part for service in Káthiáváḍa, whenever the British Government thought such an employment of it advisable.
Finally, the British Government was constituted arbiter in all disputes of the Gáikwár, not alone with foreign powers, but also in the adjustment of his financial transactions with the Peshwa his paramount power. These transactions, which ranged back from the capture of Dámáji in 1751, had never been the subject of a formal investigation, and were by this time complicated by the numerous engagements with third parties into which both governments had been obliged to enter at their various moments of distress. Bájiráv, who was apparently intriguing for a Marátha coalition against his new protectors, was careful not to bring before the notice of the chiefs, whose esteem he wished to gain, a provision which exhibited him as in any way dependent upon the arbitration of a foreign power. He therefore granted the farm for ten years to the Gáikwár, as much by way of remanding for a time the proposed inquiries and settlement of their respective claims as for the purpose of diverting the attention of the British to the administration of this new appanage, whilst leaving him free scope for his intrigues in the Dakhan. He used, moreover, every pretext to defer the consideration of the Gáikwár question until he could make use of his claims to further his own designs. His success in preventing a discussion of these transactions is apparent by the fact that in the financial statement of the Gáikwár’s affairs made by Colonel Walker in 1804, no mention of the Poona demand is to be found.
The Maráthás, a.d. 1760–1819. No important event took place during the next year or two. Bábáji relinquished the command of the force in Káthiáváḍa in favour of Vithalráv Deváji, whilst he himself took part in the civil administration at Baroda. The Resident, too, seems to have been likewise engaged in internal matters and in securing the country against an invasion by Kánhoji, now a fugitive at the court of Holkar.
1807.In 1807 the Resident made over Ába Shelukar, late Sar Subhedár of the Peshwa, to the British Government, by whom he could be prevented from engaging in fresh conspiracies. After this Colonel Walker was at last enabled to leave Baroda in order to assist in the settlement of the Káthiáváḍa tribute question, an object he had long had in view, but which the necessity for his continuous presence at the Gáikwár’s capital had hitherto prevented him from undertaking.
Káthiáváḍa Tribute.The changes with regard to the collection of the tribute from the chiefs of Káthiáváḍa that were carried out in 1807 deserve a special description. Firstly, they placed the relations of the tributary to the paramount power on quite a new basis. Secondly, by them the British influence over both parties concerned was much increased and the connection between the governments of Bombay and Baroda drawn closer. Thirdly, they were subsequently, as will be seen hereafter, the subject of much discussion and delay in the settlement of the questions at issue between the Peshwa and the Gáikwár. And lastly, their effect was most beneficial to both the chiefs and their subjects in removing the uncertainty that had hitherto pervaded the whole revenue administration of Káthiáváḍa.
Before entering on the details of the settlement itself, some description is necessary of the social and political state of the peninsula at the time the changes were introduced.
State of Káthiáváḍa, 1807.The greater part of the population of Káthiáváḍa consisted of two classes, chiefs and cultivators, called Bhumiás and ryots. The power of the chief ranged from the headship of a single village up to absolute jurisdiction over several score. The ryots were usually tenants long resident in the province. The chiefs were in almost every case foreigners, invaders from the north and north-east; Muhammadan adventurers from the court of Ahmedábád; Káthis animated by the love of plunder and cattle-lifting; and Miánás and Vághelás who had settled on the coast on account of the facilities it afforded for their favourite pursuits of wrecking and piracy. More numerous than any others were the Rájputs, driven south by the disturbed state of their native kingdoms or by the restless spirit of military adventure to be found in a class where one profession alone is honourable. There is a certain uniformity in the building up of all these chieftainships. A powerful leader, with a sufficient band of followers, oppressed his weaker neighbours till they were glad to come to terms and place themselves under his protection, so as both to escape themselves and to take their chance of sharing in the plunder of others. It frequently happened in the growth of one of these states that the bháyád or relations of the chief (who are sure to be numerous in a polygamous society) were influential enough to assume, in their turn, a partial independence and to claim recognition
The Maráthás, a.d. 1760–1819.
State of Káthiáváḍa, 1807. as a separate state. As a rule, however, they continued to unite with the head of the family against external foes, and only disagreed as to domestic administration. It is also noticeable that though so addicted to the profession of arms, the Rájputs cannot be called a military race; they possess few of the true military virtues; hence the slowness of their advance, and their failure in competition with perhaps less courageous though more compact and pliable races. In Káthiáváḍa fortified strongholds, formidable enough to an army moving rapidly without siege trains, arose in all directions, and even villages were surrounded by a high mud wall as a protection against cattle-lifters.
The groundwork of these states being itself so unstable, their relations with each other were conducted on no principle but the law of the stronger. General distrust reigned throughout. Each chief well knew that his neighbours had won their position as he had won his own by the gradual absorption of the weaker, and that they were ready enough whenever opportunity offered to subject his dominions to the same process. The administration of his territory consisted merely in levying, within certain limits sanctioned by long usage, as much revenue as would suffice to maintain himself and his forces in their position with regard to the surrounding states. When a foreign enemy appeared there was no co-operation amongst the local chiefs in resistance. It was a point of honour not to yield except to a superior force. Each chief, therefore, resisted the demands made upon him until he considered that he had done enough to satisfy the family conscience and then, agreeing to the terms proposed, he allowed the wave of extortion to pass on and deluge the domains of his neighbour. It should be remembered that the peninsula had never been subjugated, though overrun times innumerable. The evil of invasion was thus transitory. To a chief the mere payment of tribute tended in no wise to derogate from his independence. In his capacity of military freebooter he acknowledged the principle as just. His country had been won by the sword and was retained by the sword and not by acquiescence in the payment of tribute, so that if he could avoid this extortion he was justified in doing so. If he weakened his state in resisting foreigners, he knew that his neighbours would certainly take advantage of the favourable juncture and annex his territory. It was his policy therefore, after resistance up to a certain point, to succumb.
The Revenue Raid System.Owing to this local peculiarity and to the general want of union in the province, both the Mughals and Maráthás found it advantageous to follow a system of successive expeditions rather than to incur the expense of permanently occupying the peninsula with an army which would necessarily have to be a large one. There is every reason to believe that in adopting the raid system the Musalmáns were only pursuing the practice of their predecessors, who used to take tribute from Jodhpur to Dwárka.
Some of the subhedárs of Ahmedábád divided their tributary district into three circuits of collection and personally undertook the
The Maráthás, a.d. 1760–1819.
The Revenue Raid System. charge of one each year. This was the mulakgiri land-raiding system. Besides this chief expedition, there was the smaller one of the Bábi of Junágaḍh and the still more minute operations of the Rával of Bhávnagar against some of his weaker neighbours. The great Ahmedábád expedition had long been an annual grievance and was conducted with some show of system and under special rules called the Raj-ul-Mulak. Three of these rules are of importance, and seem to have been generally acquiesced in before the great incursions of Bábáji and Vithalráv at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The first was that the paramount power (by which was meant the foreign government which was strong enough to enforce tribute from all the chiefs) had authority to interfere in cases of dismemberment, or in proceedings tending to the depreciation of the revenue or to the dismemberment of any tributary state. It was again an acknowledged rule that whilst the mulakgiri expedition of the paramount power was in motion no other army should be in the field throughout the whole province. The third provision was not so well established, but it appears to have been understood that the tribute from each state should be regulated by some standard of former date. In practice, however, the measure of the Marátha demand was simply the power to enforce payment.