Conspiracy at Disa.In October 1857 a conspiracy was discovered between the Thákor of Samda near Disa and some Native officers of the 2nd Cavalry and 12th Regiment Native Infantry to attack and plunder the camp at Disa and to murder the officers; but the evidence was not very clear, and before the trial could take place the amnesty had been published under which the suspected men were released. The peace of Northern Gujarát was much disturbed at this time by the Thákor of Rova, who plundered the Pálanpur and Sirohi
Gujarát Disturbances, 1857–1859. villages at the head of 500 men, and the Thákor of Mandeta was also in arms but was held in check by a detachment of the 89th Regiment and a squadron of cavalry at Ahmednagar near Ídar.[2] Conspiracy at Baroda.The two Thákors were acting in concert with some influential conspirators at Baroda of whom Malhár Ráo Gáikwár alias Dáda Sáheb was the chief. It was this man who afterwards became Gáikwár of Baroda and was deposed for the attempt to murder Colonel Phayre by poison.
Want of Combination.It is very remarkable that the sepoy war did not produce one man who showed any capacity for command. Every native regiment was in a state of mutiny and a large proportion of the civil population was ripe for revolt. If only one honest man had been found who could have secured the confidence and support of his fellow-countrymen, the fertile province of Gujarát would have been at his mercy; but amongst natives conflicting interests and mutual distrust make combination most difficult. In India a conspirator’s first impulse is to betray his associates lest they should anticipate him. The failure of every mutinous outbreak in Gujarát was due to this moral defect. This trait may be traced throughout the history of the war and should be studied by those who advocate the independence of India, and the capacity of the native for self-government. It is an apt illustration of native inability to organize combined operations that the most formidable conspiracy for the subversion of our power should have been delayed till October 1857. By this time the arrival of Her Majesty’s 89th Regiment and a battery of European artillery at Ahmedábád had rendered a successful revolt impossible. The mutinies of the Gujarát Horse and Grenadiers had been promptly suppressed and severely punished. The termination of the monsoon had opened the ports and reinforcements were daily expected. Had the outbreak occurred simultaneously with the mutiny of the Gujarát Horse, the Artillery, and the Second Grenadiers, Gujarát must have been lost for a time and every European would have been murdered.
Marátha Conspiracy.For many years Govindráo alias Bápu Gáikwár, a half brother of His Highness the Gáikwár, had resided near the Sháhibág at Ahmedábád. He had been deported from Baroda for intriguing against his brother and had been treated as a political refugee. This man with Malhárráo, another brother of His Highness the Gáikwár, Bháu Sáheb Pawár, and a Sardár who called himself the Bhonsla Rája, also related to His Highness by marriage, conceived the design to murder the Europeans in Baroda Ahmedábád and Kaira and establish a government in the name of the Rája of Sátára. To Bápu Gáikwár was entrusted the task of tampering with the troops in Ahmedábád, and frequent meetings of the Native officers were held at his house every night. The Bhonsla Rája, with a man named Jhaveri Nálchand, was deputed to the Kaira district to secure the aid of the Thákors of Umeta, Bhádarva, Kera, and Dáima, and of the Patels of Ánand and Partábpur.
Gujarát Disturbances, 1857–1859. Marátha Conspiracy.These landholders assured Bápu of their support and the Thákor of Umeta mounted some iron guns and put his fort in a state of defence. An agent named Maganlál was sent into the Gáikwár’s Kadi Pargana, where he enlisted a body of 2000 foot and 150 horse, which he encamped near the village of Lodra. The followers of the Kaira Thákors assembled in the strong country on the banks of the Mahi near the village of Partábpur with a detachment and advanced to the Chauk Taláv within five miles of Baroda. The massacre at Baroda was fixed for the night of October 16th. The native troops in Baroda had been tampered with and had promised in the event of their being called out that they would fire blank ammunition only.
Gathering at Partábpur,The Thákors had been encamped at Partábpur for several days, but owing partly to the sympathy of the people and partly to the terror which they inspired, no report was made to any British officers till the 15th October, when Mr. Ashburner, who was encamped at Thásra, marched to attack them with his new levies and a party of the Kaira police. There was, as usual, disunion in the ranks of the insurgents; they had no leaders they could depend upon, and they dispersed on hearing of the approach of Ashburner’s force without firing a shot. Ninety-nine men who had taken refuge in the ravines of the Mahi were captured and a commission under Act XIV. of 1857 was issued to Mr. Ashburner and Captain Buckle, the Political Agent in the Rewa Kántha, to try them. Ten of the ringleaders were found guilty of treason and blown from guns at Kanvári, nine were transported for life, and the remainder were pardoned. The turbulent villages of Partábpur and Angar in Kaira were destroyed and the inhabitants removed to more accessible ground in the open country. Their strong position in the ravines of the Mahi river had on several occasions enabled the people of Partábpur and Angar to set Government at defiance, and this was considered a favourable opportunity of making an example of them and breaking up their stronghold.
And at Lodra.In the meantime information of the gathering at Lodra had reached Major Agar, the Superintendent of Police, Ahmedábád. He marched to attack them with the Koli Corps and a squadron of the Gujarát Horse. Maganlál fled to the north after a slight skirmish in which two men were killed and four wounded, and was captured a few days afterwards by the Thándár of Sammu with eleven followers. They were tried by General Roberts and Mr. Hadow, the Collector of Ahmedábád, under Act XIV. of 1857. Three of them were blown from guns at Waizápur, three were hanged, and the rest were transported for life.
It is much to be regretted that Malhárráo Gáikwár and the Bhonsla Rája were allowed to escape punishment. There was very clear evidence of the guilt of the Bhonsla Rája, but His Highness the Gáikwár interceded for him, and Sir Richmond Shakespeare, the Resident, weakly consented that his life should be spared on condition that he should be imprisoned for life at Baroda, a sentence which, it is hardly necessary to say, was never carried out.
Gujarát Disturbances, 1857–1859. Partial Disarming.On the suppression of this abortive insurrection it was determined to disarm Gujarát, and in January 1858 strong detachments of the 72nd Highlanders and of Her Majesty’s 86th Regiment with the 8th Regiment Native Infantry, two guns under Captain Conybere, and a squadron of Gujarát Horse were placed at the disposal of Mr. Ashburner to carry out this measure. His Highness the Gáikwár had consented to a simultaneous disarmament of his country, but he evaded the performance of his promise. In the Kaira district and in the Jambusar táluka of Broach the disarmament was very strictly enforced; every male adult of the fighting classes was required to produce an arm of some kind. The town of Ahmedábád was relieved of 20,000 arms in the first two days, but the Highlanders and 86th Regiment were required for operations in Rájputána, and after their departure from Gujarát it was deemed prudent to postpone this very unpopular measure.
Náikda Revolt, Oct. 1858.After these events Gujarát remained tranquil for nearly a year till, in October 1858, the Náikda Bhils of Nárukot revolted under Rupa and Keval Náiks, and a few months later Tátia Topi’s scattered force being hard-pressed by Colonel Park’s column, plundered several villages of the Panch Maháls during its rapid march through that district.
Tátia Topi, 1858.In 1858, after his defeat at Gwálior, at the close of the mutinies in Northern India, Tátia Topi moved rapidly towards the Dakhan. The chiefs of Jamkhandi and Nárgund had been in treasonable correspondence with the rebel chiefs in the North-West and had invoked their aid. It is more than probable that if Tátia Topi had entered the Dakhan in force, there would have been a general insurrection of the Marátha population. Tátia’s march to the Dakhan soon assumed the character of a flight. He was closely pressed by two columns under Generals Somerset and Mitchell, and a very compact and enterprizing little field force commanded by Colonel Park. Colonel Park’s own regiment, the 72nd Highlanders, many of the men mounted on camels, formed the main fighting power of this force. His indefatigable energy in the pursuit of the enemy allowed them no rest, and eventually brought them to bay at Chhota Udepur. Fearing to face the open country of Berár with such an uncompromising enemy in pursuit, Tátia recrossed the Narbada at Chikalda and marched towards Baroda. He had, by means of an agent named Ganpatráo, for some time been in communication with the Bháu Sáheb Pavár, a brother-in-law of His Highness the Gáikwár, and had been led to expect aid from the Baroda Sardárs and the Thákors of the Kaira and Rewa Kántha districts. Immediately it became known that Tátia had crossed the Narbada, troops were put in motion from Kaira, Ahmedábád, and Disa for the protection of the eastern frontier of Gujarát. Captain Thatcher, who had succeeded to the command of the irregular levies raised by Mr. Ashburner in Kaira, was ordered to hold Sankheda with the irregulars and two of the Gáikwár’s guns. He was afterwards reinforced by Captain Collier’s detachment of the 7th Regiment N. I., which fell back from Chhota Udepur on the approach of the enemy.