Attack of Fortified Places. Including Siege-works, Mining, and Demolitions. / Prepared for the use of the Cadets of the United States Military Academy

by James Mercur

71. Bringing up and Posting the Besieging Force.—The main besieging force, consisting principally of infantry, artillery, and engineers, with the siege train, follows closely after the investing force, and, upon arrival is encamped upon sites previously selected, sending out at once, however, such reinforcements and supports as are needed by the line of investment. Engineer and artillery parks are established outside the zone of fire of the works and in proximity to the main routes of communication. Branch railways and tram-roads running through the parks, storehouses, repair shops, etc. etc., are located and constructed. Sites for storage magazines for ammunition are carefully selected at the most secure places, and isolated when possible from the camps and parks by intervening elevations of ground. The cover of these magazines, so far as possible, is made up of wood and sand or earth free from stones large enough to be dangerous projectiles in case of explosion. Rooms for loaded shells and cartridges, and laboratories for making up ammunition are constructed upon similar principles. Carefully studied arrangements for the health and comfort of the men are made. Some of these are outlined in Chapter VII.

72. Fortifying the Camps, Parks, etc., etc.—In former sieges it was customary to completely surround the ground occupied by the besieger with a continuous line of works of simple trace and light profile called the “line of circumvallation;” and to construct between the camps and the work another line, either continuous or with intervals, called the “line of countervallation.” These lines were placed respectively at about 200 yards in rear and in front of the camps.

The principal object of the first was to prevent by a small force the entry of small reinforcing detachments and supplies; that of the second was to resist vigorous sorties by the defence, or sudden attacks from the outside by strong reinforcing parties. For this purpose the detached works of the line of countervallation were so disposed as to cover the main depots, parks, roads, etc., and to be in defensive relations with each other.

The great development of the line which must be occupied by the besieger, owing to modern methods of fortification and the range of rifled cannon, prohibits the construction of complete lines of circum- and countervallation. The besieger constructs in their stead one or more lines of detached works upon advantageous points, and covers the intervening ground more or less thoroughly by patrols, outposts, etc. He then so disposes his main force as to be able to concentrate enough to meet any sorties of the defence; and, if necessary, detaches a force, called an “army of observation,” sufficiently large to meet any relieving army and defeat it; or hold it in check until he can concentrate the besieging force with the army of observation, and meet the relieving army in a favorable position. As a rule, this position will be one well outside the besieger’s cordon of works; since the latter by its extent will necessarily be weak to resist a determined attack (Art of War, par. 258), and by its proximity to the work will render possible the co-operation of the garrison and the relieving army. This, under the circumstances assumed, would seriously endanger the besieging army.

In opposing sorties from the work, however, the conditions which fix the point of conflict are reversed, and place it as near the work as practicable. The shortening and strengthening of the line of investment by closing it in upon the work make it imperative to hold all ground gained; and this is generally best accomplished by intrenching the line of outposts with continuous shelter trenches, strengthened at intervals by batteries of field guns, and supported by field works of considerable strength, placed within accurate cannon range of each other, but not exposed to the direct fire of the guns of the place. Behind the shelter trenches the outposts, supports, and reserves, strengthened when necessary by troops from other points of the line, should be able to hold their own against all ordinary sorties. The main line of field works serves to resist a general attack made by the mass of the garrison.

Placing the first intrenchments further back exposes the outposts to the confusion resulting from falling back, frequently at night or in a fog, and also enables the besieged to seize upon ground from which it may be very difficult to dislodge them.

To allow the different parts of the line to be rapidly reinforced, good roads protected from the fire of the work, and well marked with sign-posts, etc., must be opened between the adjacent divisions of the besieging force, and all streams must be provided with bridges secure against floods, ice, etc.

73. Distance of the Line of Investment from the Work.—This will result from conflicting conditions. Reasons already given, which need not be repeated, lead to establishing it as near as practicable. On the other hand, the accurate fire of the heavy guns of the place, and vigorous sorties by the defence, cause much annoyance and great loss to a line drawn too near the work. The more recent sieges indicate about 3000 yards from the most advanced works, as the least distance for the line of investment in open country and with an active defence. It may be necessary in some cases to increase this to 4500 or 5000 yards; but with ground favorable to the attack, and a weak and demoralized defence, it may frequently be drawn nearer.

74. Strength and Composition of the Besieging Force.—In former sieges when the place held out until the inner keep was breached and carried by the regular progress of the siege, the ratio of the necessary strength of the attack to the defence was estimated at 7 or 8 to 1, this large ratio resulting from the excessive labor in the trenches and the losses incurred on the close attack. Modern writers (arguing largely upon theoretical considerations) have reduced this estimate to 4 or 5 to 1. No attack on a thoroughly-equipped and well-defended strong place having been carried through all the steps of a regular siege since the introduction of modern arms, absolute data upon this subject are lacking.

The besieging force at Strasburg was about 60,000, garrison about 20,000, total length of siege 49 days. The defence was very weak. Belfort, besieging force about 32,000, garrison about 16,000. After a siege of 100 days the approaches were at about 1200 yards from the works, which capitulated by reason of the general surrender of the French. At Metz the besieging force was 150,000 men; the garrison, demoralized by the previous defeat at Gravelotte, surrendered 173,000 men. At Paris the investing force was about 180,000, and the garrison nominally between 300,000 and 400,000, of which perhaps 30,000 were disciplined and effective soldiers; the remainder being made up of remnants of defeated regiments and bodies of the Garde Mobile and Garde Nationale. The investment of Paris was complete on September 19, 1870; its surrender from exhaustion of provisions took place January 29, 1871. Several sorties were made, but the general defence was paralyzed by the character of the troops and inhabitants. At Plevna the Turks had at the outset about 56,000 men, at the surrender 40,000. The Russian force suffered great losses in its assaults, but by continual reinforcement had at the end of the siege about 120,000 men. The defence by the Turks was desperate, but generally passive. One determined sortie was made immediately before the surrender. The surrender resulted from exhaustion of ammunition and provisions. The works were field works only.