Mr. Harris proceeds to shew some of the conclusions, resulting from the account which he had thus rendered of Time. “In the first place,” he says, “there cannot (strictly speaking) be any such thing as time present.” We will draw from this a conclusion, which Mr. Harris appears not to have seen, or does not choose to acknowledge; That, if there be no such thing as Time present, neither can there be any such thing as Time past. For what is the past, but that which has been present? But if there be no such thing as time present, or time past, there can be no such thing as time future. Time, therefore, is an impossibility.
Mr. Harris himself, indeed, goes a certain way toward this conclusion. “If no Portion of time,” he says, “be the object of any Sensation; further, if the Present never exist; if the past be no more; if the Future be not as yet; and if these are all the parts, out of which Time is compounded: how strange and shadowy a Being do we find it? How nearly approaching to a perfect non-entity?”[7*]
[7*] It is but justice to Aristotle, to say, that he expressed the right conclusion much more distinctly than Harris thought proper to do. His mode of inferring, as translated by Harris, is as follows: That, therefore, Time exists not at all, or at least, has but a faint and obscure existence, one may suspect from hence. A part of it has been, and is no more; a part of it is coming, and is not as yet; and out of these is made that Time, which is without end, and ever to be assumed farther and farther. Now, that which is made up of nothing but non-entities, it should seem was incapable ever to participate of Entity.—(Author’s Note.)
127 Mr. Harris then says, “Let us try, however, since the senses fail us, if we have not faculties of higher power, to seize this fleeting Being.” What then is it he does in the search of those “faculties of higher power?” It will be seen, from the following quotation, that he merely describes a few cases of actual succession; and says, that from them, by the help of memory, and imagination, we come by the idea of Time. But the Memory and Imagination of successions present to us nothing but the successions themselves. If then the Memory and Imagination of successions, give us the idea of Time, the idea of Time can only be some part or the whole of the idea of the successions.
“The World has been likened to a variety of Things, but it appears to resemble no one more than some moving spectacle (such as a procession or a triumph) that abounds in every part with splendid objects, some of which are still departing, as fast as others make their appearance. The Senses look on, while the sight passes, perceiving as much as is immediately present, which they report with tolerable accuracy to the Soul’s superior powers. Having done this, they have done their duty, being concerned with nothing, save what is present and instantaneous. But to the Memory, to the Imagination, and above all, to 128 the Intellect, the several Nows or Instants, are not lost, as to the Senses, but are presented and made objects of steady comprehension, however, in their own nature, they may be transitory and passing.
“Now it is from contemplating two or more of these Instants under one view, together with that Interval of Continuity, which subsists between them, that we acquire insensibly the Idea of TIME. For example: The Sun rises: this I remember: it rises again: this too, I remember. These Events are not together; there is an Extension between them—not however of Space, for we may suppose the place of rising the same, or at least, to exhibit no sensible difference. Yet still we recognise some Extension between them. Now what is this Extension, but a natural day? And what is that, but pure Time? It is after the same manner, by recognising two new Moons, and the Extension between these; two several Equinoxes, and the extension between these; that we gain Ideas of other Times, such as Months and Years, which are all so many Intervals, described as above; that is to say, passing Intervals of Continuity between two Instants viewed together.
“And thus it is THE MIND acquires the Idea of TIME. But this Time it must be remembered is PAST TIME ONLY, which is always the first Species, that occurs to the human Intellect. How then do we acquire the Idea of TIME FUTURE? The answer is, we acquire it by Anticipation. Should it be demanded still further, And what is Anticipation? We answer, that, in this case, it is a kind of reasoning by analogy from similar to similar; from successions of events, that are past already, to similar successions, 129 that are presumed hereafter. For example: I observe, as far back as my memory can carry me, how every day has been succeeded by a night; that night, by another day; that day, by another night; and so downwards in order to the Day that is now. Hence, then, I anticipate a similar succession from the present Day, and thus gain the Idea of days and nights in futurity. After the same manner, by attending to the periodical returns of New and Full Moons; of Springs, Summers, Autumns, and Winters, all of which, in Time past, I find never to have failed, I anticipate a like orderly and diversified succession, which makes Months, and Seasons, and Years, in Time future.”
It is to be observed, that, in the above passage, Harris, beside Memory and Imagination, introduces the name of Intellect, as concerned in generating the idea of Time. But it will be seen that he makes no use of it, whatsoever, in giving his explanation, nor mentions any other operations than those of, memory for the past, and anticipation for the future. Indeed, it appears from a passage of his work, immediately following, that when Mr. Harris, in this inquiry, uses the word Intellect, he means nothing but Anticipation and Memory. “There is nothing,” he says, “appears so clearly an object of the MIND or INTELLECT only, as the Future does, since we can find no place for its existence any where else. Not but the same, if we consider, is equally true of the Past.”[8*] Here we see, that 130 both the Future, and the Past, are said to be objects of the INTELLECT only. But the future is the object of anticipation, the past of memory; and both memory, and anticipation, as we have seen, are cases of association.
[8*] Ibid. He goes on to say, that, from this same doctrine, that Time exists only in the mind, some philosophers inferred, that if mind did not exist, neither could Time. Πότερον δὲ μὴ οὔσης ψυχῆς εἴῃ ἂν ὁ χρόνος, ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις. (Aristot. Nat. Auscult. 1. iv. c. 20.) Themistius, who comments the above passage, expresses himself more positively. Εἰ τοίνυν διχῶς λέγεται, τό τε ἀριθμητὸν, καὶ τὸ ἀριθμούμενον, τὸ μὲν, τὸ ἀριθμητὸν δηλαδὴ, δυνάμει, τὸ δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ, ταῦτα δὲ οὐκ ἂν ὑποσταίῃ, μὴ ὄντος τοῦ ἀριθμήσοντος, μήτε δυνάμει μήτ’ ἐνεργείᾳ,—φανερὸν ὡς οὐκ ἂν ὁ χρόνος εἴῃ, μὴ οὔσης ψυχῆς. (Them. p. 48. Edit. Aldi.)—(Author’s Note.)
In the cases of succession which he adduces, as examples, to shew, in what manner we acquire, he says, “insensibly,” the idea of time, he tells us, there is sensation of the consequent, memory of the antecedent, and beside these, “contemplation of two or more instants under one view, together with that Interval of continuity, which subsists between them.” But the contemplation of two instants, one prior, another posterior, in one view, with the interval between them, is a circumlocution for memory. It denotes obscurely, and imperfectly, that union, in one idea, of all the parts of a train, to which the name memory is affixed. From this contemplation, he says it is, “that we acquire the idea of Time.” The real meaning is thus shewn to be, that we acquire it from memory. Mr. Harris, therefore, at the bottom, agrees with Dr. Reid; and the same observations by which we shewed 131 the imperfection of Dr. Reid’s account, are equally applicable to that, of Mr. Harris. The case, in truth, is, that neither of them does any thing more than merely state the fact, without an attempt to explain it. That we cannot have the idea of time, without the observation of successions; and that memory is joined with sense in the observation of successions,—is the matter of fact. What TIME is, distinct from the memory and the sensations, they ought to have told us, but have not. They would not have found it difficult, had they been familiar with the distinction (of such infinite importance, in all accurate inquiries into the human mind) between the mode of signification of concrete words, and the mode of signification of abstract ones; the latter, in its more complicated cases, of not very easy comprehension. Unfortunately, we have no concrete term, corresponding with Time. Hence a great part of the difficulty of conceiving distinctly the meaning of the abstract. Time, also, is not the abstract name of any one train, but of all trains; as redness is not the name of one red, but of all reds. And there is this further complication, that the word “time” is never applied to any train, in particular; as time of a race, time of a battle, and so on; without the predominating association of that particular train, whatever it be, minutes, hours, or days, which we are accustomed to employ, as the measure of other successions. Without much and accurate practice, therefore, in conceiving the meaning of abstract terms, especially in the more complex and intricate cases; it is extremely difficult steadily to contemplate either TIME, as the 132 abstract name of all successive, or SPACE, as the abstract name of all simultaneous order.[9*]