Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind

by James Mill

IN contemplating pains and pleasures as future; in other words, anticipating them, or believing in their future existence; we observe, that, in certain cases, they are independent of our actions; in other cases, that they are consequent upon something which may be done, or left undone by us.

Thus, in certain cases, we foresee that a painful sensation or sensations will be given us, but that something may be done by us which will prevent it: Again, that a pleasurable sensation, or sensations will be given us, but not unless something be done by us, of which the sensations are the consequence.

It is necessary that those two cases, a pain to be prevented, and a pleasure to be obtained, by our own actions, should be distinguished from one another; but as they both rank under the title of a good, and, as it will shorten our phraseology to name them 257 together, we shall speak of the removal of pain, in the present section, at least, under the denominations of a pleasure.

We have seen what is the state of consciousness, produced by the contemplation of a pleasurable sensation as future; that it is called Joy, if the pleasure is contemplated as certainly future, in other words, believed; that it is called Hope, if the sensation is contemplated as not certainly future, that is, if the anticipation does not amount to belief.

We have also seen what is our state of consciousness, when we contemplate the cause of a future pleasure, and the pleasure, together. It is a mixture of Love, and Joy; Love as regards the cause; Joy as regards the sensation.

The association which constitutes those States of Mind (AFFECTIONS, as they are commonly called) it is hardly necessary to repeat. The anticipation of a future sensation, is merely the association, the result of prior sensations, of a certain number of antecedents and consequents. I anticipate, for example, the pleasing sensation of light, at a certain hour to-morrow morning. The meaning is, that with my sensations of the present moment, are associated those of the next; with those of the next those of the following; and so on, till sleep; after sleep, waking, and then the anticipated sensation.

When the cause is contemplated along with the sensation, the association which constitutes the process of anticipation is the same, till we arrive at the link which immediately precedes the sensation. Thus, if instead of the pleasurable sensation of light, the pleasure of breakfast, is my anticipation of to-morrow 258 morning; in that case, the idea of the pleasure of eating is associated with the idea of the food, not as with an ordinary antecedent, but that peculiar antecedent which is called a cause.

When the idea of the Pleasure is associated with an action of our own as its cause; that is, contemplated as the consequent of a certain action of ours, and incapable of otherwise existing; or when the cause of a Pleasure is contemplated as the consequent of an action of ours, and not capable of otherwise existing; a peculiar state of mind is generated which, as it is a tendency to action, is properly denominated MOTIVE.

The word MOTIVE is by no means steadily applied to its proper object. The pleasure, for example, which is the consequent of the act, is apt to be regarded as alone the impelling principle, and properly entitled to the name of Motive. It is obvious, however, that the idea of the pleasure does not constitute the motive to action without the idea of the action as the cause; that it is the association, therefore, to which alone the name belongs.

As every pleasure is worth having; for otherwise it would not be a pleasure; the idea of every pleasure associated with that of an action of ours as the cause, is a motive; that is, leads to the action. But every motive does not produce the action. The reason is, the existence of other motives which prevent it. A man is tempted to commit adultery with the wife of his friend; the composition of the motive obvious. He does not obey the motive. Why? He obeys other motives which are stronger. Though pleasures are associated with the immoral act, pains are 259 associated with it also; the pains of the injured husband; the pains of the injured wife; the moral indignation of mankind; the future reproaches of his own mind. Some men obey the first, rather than the second motive. The reason is obvious. In them, the association of the act with the pleasure, is, from habit, unduly strong; the association of the act with the pains, is, from want of habit, unduly weak. This is a case of bad Education; and one highly unfortunate, for the value of the pleasures in question is infinitely outweighed by the value of the pains. The business of a good education is to make the associations and the values correspond.