We next proceed to the case of Fortitude, Courage. We have seen that Fortitude is the name of that class of acts, in which a good is aimed at by the risk of a 291 great evil. There is a grand class of cases in which the good aimed at is not the peculiar good of the Individual or Individuals by whom the act, or series of acts, is performed, but a good common to others, to a whole People; as, for example, when another hostile People is encountered and overcome. Of course, in such a case, we have a strong association of our own pleasures, or exemption from pains, with other men’s courage, whether we are sharing with them in the danger, or exempted from it by their acts. This association is such as to constitute, and we know by experience does constitute, a very strong AFFECTION. Even when the good sought by the act of courage is only the good of the individual, we have a sufficient association with it of pleasurable ideas to constitute it an AFFECTION. We have, first of all, an agreeable association with the balance of good which the act is calculated to produce to the actor. And next we have a very powerful association of pleasure with the state of mind in which the Idea of a great evil is controlled by the Idea of a greater good. When the motive exists to do us good in a man who has such a mind, he will not be deterred by the prospect of an inadequate evil. When we encounter danger in company with such a man, we shall not be exposed to greater danger by his deserting us.
As other men’s acts of Justice and Beneficence are directly beneficial to them who are the objects of them, it is impossible that every man should not have pleasurable associations, first with the acts of Justice and Beneficence of the men, whose sphere of action extends to himself, and then with the acts of Justice and Beneficence of all men. And as the benefits which 292 spring from such actions are very great, the AFFECTION, generated by association of the Ideas of those Benefits, is proportionally strong.
Of all the MOTIVES, competent to our nature, those belonging to this class are by far the most important. As there is nothing in which I am so deeply interested, as that the acts of men, which regard myself immediately, should be acts of Justice and Beneficence, and those which regard themselves immediately, should be acts of Prudence and Fortitude, it follows, that I have an interest, proportionally deep, in all those acts of my own, which operate as causes of those acts in other people.
Of acts of other men, which are useful to us, a great number can be bought by wealth, or commanded by power, or elicited by dignity. The mode of the operation of those causes has already been explained, and the motives into the composition of which they enter, form a different class. The acts of beneficence, of justice, of fortitude, and of prudence, performed by other men in our behalf, are, to a vast extent, such as can neither be bought, nor commanded. What means have we of increasing to the utmost, the number of those acts; diminishing to the utmost, the number of those of an opposite tendency?
Those means are of two sorts: 1st, Similar actions on our part; 2dly, The manifestation on our part, of the disposition to perform similar actions.
1. It is interesting here to observe, by what a potent call we are summoned to Virtue. Of all that we enjoy, more is derived from those acts of other men, on which we bestow the name VIRTUE, than from any other cause. Our own virtue is the principal 293 cause why other men reciprocate the acts of virtue towards us. With the idea of our own acts of virtue, there are naturally associated the ideas of all the immense advantages we derive from the virtuous acts of our Fellow-creatures. When this association is formed in due strength, which it is the main business of a good education to effect, the motive of virtue becomes paramount in the human breast.
2. We strongly act upon other men, when we manifest on our parts, a disposition to perform acts in their favour, in consequence of the acts performed by them in favour of others. This disposition we manifest, when we praise those acts; or, as we otherwise phrase it, when we declare our approbation, or admiration, of them.
It is to be observed, that all our names for those acts;—Prudence, Fortitude, Justice, Beneficence, Virtue; are names of Praise. They are names, not merely of the acts, but of the acts associated with the ideas of the benefits resulting from them; and further associated with the idea of those acts of ours, which are the causes of such acts; acts of similar utility on our part to the Authors of the acts which are useful to us.
Praise, also, is extensive in its operation. The acts of any individual can afford a retribution for the virtuous acts of a very small number of men. His Praise can extend to all men; and its effects are most important. Not only does it indicate the affection of him who is the author of it, toward him who is the object; but it points out him who is the object of it, to all other men, as the proper object of a similar affection in them. This indication has some tendency 294 to propagate the favourable affection or disposition towards the object of the applause; but it has a much greater tendency to propagate the praise; and when praise is sounded from many lips, that is, when a disposition is expressed by many persons favourable to the man who has been the author of the applauded acts, a number of acts in his favour are the natural consequence.
That we have pleasurable associations of great potency, with this manifestation of the favourable disposition of others towards us, is matter of common and constant experience. It is called, in its more remarkable states, the LOVE OF FAME, and is known to operate as one of the most powerful motives in our nature. One of its cases is a remarkable exemplification of that high degree of association, which has been already explained, and to which we have frequently had occasion to advert, in explaining other phenomena; the degree which constitutes belief, and which gives to that belief, even when momentary, and instantly overruled by other associations, a powerful effect on our actions.