CHAPTER XIV.

PAGE
Some Names which require a particular Explanation[1]
SECTION1. Names of Names[3]
2. Relative Terms[6]

Abstract Relative Terms[72]
3. Numbers[ 89]
4. Privative Terms[ 99]
5. Time[ 116]
6. Motion[ 142]
7. Identity[ 164]

CHAPTER XV.

Reflection[176]

CHAPTER XVI.

The Distinction between the Intellectual and Active Powers of the Human Mind[181]

CHAPTER XVII.

Pleasurable and Painful Sensations[184]

CHAPTER XVIII.

Causes of the Pleasurable and Painful Sensations[187]

CHAPTER XIX.

Ideas of the Pleasurable and Painful Sensations, and of theCauses of them[189]

CHAPTER XX.

The Pleasurable and Painful Sensations, contemplated as passed, or future[196]

volume 2 vi

CHAPTER XXI.

The Causes of Pleasurable and Painful Sensations, contemplated as passed, or future[201]
SECTION1. The immediate Causes of Pleasurable and Painful Sensations, contemplated as passed, or as future[201]
2. The Remote Causes of Pleasurable and Painful Sensations contemplated as passed, or future[206]
SUB-SECT.1. Wealth, Power, and Dignity, and their Contraries, contemplated as Causes of our Pleasures and Pains[207]
2. Our Fellow-Creatures contemplated as Causes of our Pleasures and Pains[214]
1.—Friendship[216]
2.—Kindness[216]
3.—Family[218]
4.—Country[226]
5.—Party; Class[227]
6.—Mankind[229]
3. The Objects called Sublime and Beautiful, and their Contraries, contemplated as Causes of our Pleasures and Pains[230]

CHAPTER XXII.

Motives[256]
SECTION1. Pleasurable or Painful States, contemplated as the Consequents of our own Acts[256]
2. Causes of our Pleasurable and Painful States, contemplated asthe Consequents of our own Acts[265]

CHAPTER XXIII.

The Acts of our Fellow-creatures, which are Causes of our Pains and Pleasures, contemplated as Consequents of our own Acts[280]

CHAPTER XXIV.

The Will[327]

CHAPTER XXV.

Intention[396]

ANALYSIS

ETC.

INTRODUCTION

“I shall inquire into the original of those ideas, notions, or whatever else you please to call them, which a man observes and is conscious to himself he has in his mind; and the ways whereby the understanding comes to be furnished with them.”

Locke, i. 1, 3.

PHILOSOPHICAL inquiries into the human mind have for their main, and ultimate object, the exposition of its more complex phenomena.

It is necessary, however, that the simple should be premised; because they are the elements of which the complex are formed; and because a distinct knowledge of the elements is indispensable to an accurate conception of that which is compounded of them.

The feelings which we have through the external senses are the most simple, at least the most familiar, of the mental phenomena. Hence the propriety of commencing with this class of our feelings.