Confessions of a Railroad Signalman

by James O. Fagan

Working along these lines, however, the progress made by the authorities in eliminating the causes of these accidents and in improving the conditions has so far been very insignificant. There seems to be an inclination in all quarters to let things run their natural course, and to wait for the time when these accidents shall have become mechanically impossible.

But the writer of this book has very different ideas on the subject. He has studied the actual results that have been obtained from these block-signal systems, and at the same time he has paid particular attention to the behavior and responsibility of the men in regard to these accidents. The study referred to has not been a matter of a month or two, but of many years. For unknown reasons some of my critics have seen fit to question the nature of my experience as a railroad man. Fortunately it is an easy matter to give an account of my qualifications. The mere fact that one has had a varied and lifelong experience as an engineman or a conductor would be only partially significant. But a man who has been a telegraph operator and towerman for twenty-seven years and part of the time chief clerk to a railroad superintendent has certainly some claims to an all-round knowledge of his subject. The extent of the territory covered by this experience is even wider than one would suppose. For a telegraph operator is, of necessity, one of the best-posted men in the service. He has occasion to observe, and he is more or less obliged to understand, nearly every move that an engineman, conductor, or brakeman has occasion to make in the routine of his work. He has every opportunity to observe just how trainmen of all classes obey the rules and the signals. Add to this opportunity to become conversant with the practical side of railroad life, the knowledge that is derived from attending to the correspondence of a superintendent and the general work of the office. This includes supervision of pay-rolls, the hiring and examination of men, the investigation of accidents, the tracing of trouble of every description, and the handling and movements of both freight and passenger trains. In a general way this has been the nature of my experience, which I think has been eminently practical and not “academic.” Consequently, although some of my statements and conclusions may be questioned by railroad men who have had equal or greater experience, I nevertheless think that, in the interests of the public safety, I should be favored with a full and patient hearing.

Addressing the great body of American railroad men, I have no hesitation in saying that the service with which we are connected rests to-day under the shadow of a great shame. The situation cannot be looked upon in any other light, and it remains with us as a body, and as individuals, to apply the remedy. In order that my standpoint and the reasons for my conclusion may be thoroughly understood, I think it will be profitable, as well as interesting, to give a short history of the personal investigation and study which, for many years, I have steadily pursued in the interests of better and safer railroad service.

Manifestly, in order to treat my subject in the widest and fairest manner, all sentimental or personal scruples must be thrown aside. In explaining my position I can in no way be a respecter of persons or traditions. To me the management of a railroad is merely part of the subject-matter which I am called upon to consider, and an organization of railroad men is nothing more or less, so far as my investigation is concerned, than a combination of units constituting a certain influence which I feel myself at perfect liberty to criticise in the interests of the larger social body represented by the traveling public. The death roll and the record of suffering in preventable accidents in the United States is justification, repeated a hundred times over, for any and every conceivable probe into personal conduct or the policy of organizations.

But in holding up the conduct of others to criticism, it is but reasonable that I should begin with my own conduct and work in the matter. By what methods and means, for example, have I arrived at the conclusion that on our railroads the interests of the community have become secondary to those of the employee and his organization? This, of course, must be looked upon as a very serious statement, and it certainly calls for the earnest consideration of intelligent railroad men. In order to understand the nature of my evidence on the subject, it will be necessary to go back with me to the time when my attention was first directed to railroad accidents.

In the year 1892 a very serious accident occurred near the signal tower where I was employed. Although I was not on duty at the time I was naturally very much interested in the case, and I paid particular attention to the evidence that was brought forward at the hearing in the effort that was made to hold an engineman responsible for the disaster.

A passenger train, standing at a “home signal,” which was set at danger, was telescoped from the rear by a freight train, running practically at full speed. About 1500 feet from the home signal a distant signal was located. This signal, in the cautionary position at the time, was a distinct notification to the freight engineman to proceed cautiously and to prepare to stop before arriving at the home signal. An additional reason for such caution arose from the fact that the night was dark and extremely foggy. The explanation of this accident was to me extremely simple. The signals were all right, and so were the rules for that matter; but, from one end of the road to the other, these distant signals were dead letters. In the daytime, with apparently a clear track, absolutely no significance was attached to them; consequently I was not surprised at this disaster in a fog. But the incident was brought home to me in such a dreadful way that it started a line of thought and an investigation into the safety problem on our railroads, that has lasted until to-day.

But once started in my study, there was no turning back. Within sight of the interlocking tower where I worked there was a freight yard of considerable dimensions; the main lines of the railroad ran through this yard, and cross-over switches connecting one side with the other were protected by what are called yard protection signals. These protection signals, which are located about 1200 feet from the cross-overs, must be thrown to the danger or stop position before the switches can be changed. Once in a while, however, I noticed that the signal in question was put up to danger after an engine had passed, which of course disclosed a very serious state of affairs, for the engine in question was almost certain to get into trouble at the cross-overs. Taking note of this danger, I called it to the attention of the management. The result was, a rule calling for flag protection as well as signal protection at this particular point, but no attention was paid to other yards on the system where the conditions were more or less similar. As a matter of fact, it was not until a serious wreck had occurred that a general rule on the subject was put into force. This rule ordered the employee, after he had placed the signal at the stop position, to wait a sufficient time to allow a train that might have passed the signal to arrive at the cross-overs and thus to proceed in safety.

Now I would like railroad men in general to pay particular attention to my criticism of their conduct in relation to this rule and to other illustrations that follow. Here is a necessary law, put into force by the management for the safety of travel and the good of the service. It is a direct appeal to the common sense and honor of employees. Nevertheless, in a short time after the order was issued, it was a dead letter. True, very frequently in clear weather the rule is absolutely unnecessary; but when the weather is foggy, or at places where there is a curve, the failure to observe the rule is liable to result in a wreck. In one month I was a witness to eighteen breaches of the rule on a single division of a railroad.

It must be understood that I am now describing my actual experience with men, management, and rules, and the reasons that induced me to follow the matter up and to inquire if the work I am describing can be termed typical of American railroads.