VI. THE AMERICAN MARINE IN FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC COMMERCE.

In colonial days maritime industries held an important place. The location of the colonies adjacent to the ocean, their dependence upon the mother country for manufactures and upon the West Indies for tropical products, their need of foreign markets for their timber, fish, tobacco, and food products, and their abundant supply of lumber for shipbuilding, all tended to make them a seafaring people. This fondness for the sea was especially intense in New England, where the returns of agriculture were relatively meagre. The long Revolutionary War destroyed many ships and interfered seriously with ocean commerce, but the struggle gave the colonists what was of more value than ships,—a spirit of venture and hardihood. Hundreds of ships and thousands of seamen engaged in privateering, and when the war ended the maritime instincts of the Americans were stronger than they had been when the declaration of political and commercial independence was declared in 1776.

The imbecility of the general government under the Articles of Confederation and the restrictions placed upon interstate traffic prevented any considerable maritime progress between the Peace of Paris and the inauguration of a truly national government under the Constitution. But a stable government, sound credit, and uniform national laws for the regulation of commerce gave the maritime instincts of the Americans a chance to assert themselves, and the tonnage of our ships grew rapidly larger. Our tonnage registered for the foreign trade was only 123,893 tons in 1789; by 1795 it had grown to 549,471 tons; in 1800 it amounted to 667,107 tons; during the next five years it increased to 744,224 tons, and by 1810 it had reached 981,019 tons. Such a growth as this in twenty years, from such small beginnings, was truly remarkable.

The American ships soon crowded most foreign vessels out of our commerce. In 1790 we carried only 40.5 per cent of our imports and exports; but by 1795 we had secured 90 per cent; and, with the exception of a short period during and immediately following the War of 1812, it was not till fifty-two years later that as much as one fourth of our foreign trade was carried under foreign flags. Moreover, we not only carried our own commerce, but we also entered largely into the carrying trade of other countries. The great European war crippled the commercial activities of European countries, and made it easier for our ships to gain control of our own commerce and to secure employment as carriers for foreign merchants. During the fifteen years from 1793, the year of the outbreak of the European war, to 1808, when the blockade of European ports and the capture of American ships and seamen led us to attempt to prohibit our ships temporarily from engaging in foreign trade, our merchant marine rose from a position of obscurity to a place of great prominence on the high seas.

As long as ocean commerce was carried in wooden vessels, the maritime interests of the United States continued to prosper. The War of 1812–15, the panic of 1819, and the competition of foreign vessels after the restoration of peace in Europe, gave our marine a setback, so that it was not until 1847 that our tonnage in the foreign trade exceeded the figures for 1810; but during the period of fifteen years, from 1846 to 1861, our tonnage increased 150 per cent. When the Civil War, which proved so disastrous to the shipping interests of the United States, broke out in 1861, our tonnage registered in the foreign trade equaled 2,496,894 tons,—the highest point it has ever reached. The American sailing clipper was for nearly half a century the mistress of the seas. As J. R. Soley says: “It was in these ships that for nearly half a century not only the largest freights of the world were carried, but the finest and most profitable as well. Merchants having valuable cargoes to export would wait for the sailing of a favorite clipper, and merchants with goods to import would instruct their correspondents to wait in like manner.” As late as 1850 the higher grades of commodities were almost always shipped in the stanch and speedy American clipper ship.

Since 1861 the American marine in the foreign trade has played a rôle of decreasing importance. Three causes account for this. About the middle of the century our commercial rivals began to substitute iron ships for wooden; but we were not able to adopt the better material in the construction of our ships because of the high cost of iron in this country at that time. Great Britain could build the iron ships much cheaper than we could, and she soon began to displace us in the carrying trade of the other countries. And it was not long before she began also to carry a large share of our own foreign commerce.

The second cause for our maritime decline was the Civil War. In 1861 our tonnage registered for the foreign trade was 2,500,000 tons; by 1866 it had fallen to 1,387,756 tons, a loss of over a million tons. During the war period, nearly 800,000 tons of our shipping were sold abroad; 110,000 tons were captured by Confederate cruisers; and other casualties occurred. Of course there were no ships built for our merchant marine during the stormy years of the war.

Why, it may be asked, did we not restore our ships after the war and regain our former proud place on the high seas? For the simple, though possibly unsatisfying, reason that we did not find it profitable to do so. Capital is invested where the prospects for profit are best, and the inducement to put money into American ships for the foreign trade was not strong. It still cost more to build ships in our country than it did in Europe, and the expenses of operating them when constructed were greater. Moreover, our rivals had gotten possession of the lion’s share of the world’s carrying trade, and would not release any portion of their business without a keen struggle. At the same time the American capitalist was offered many opportunities for the investment of his property in domestic enterprises. During the quarter of a century which followed the war, we devoted our energies and capital to building our railroads, opening the West, exploiting our mineral and forest resources, and building the mills and factories whose products are now rapidly entering foreign markets in all parts of the world. America’s economic activities were industrial rather than commercial.

The result of these general causes has been the decline of our shipping in the foreign trade from two and a half million tons in 1861 to less than three quarters of a million tons in 1898; but it seems that the low-water mark has been reached and that the tide is turning. The man who writes the history of our merchant marine on the high seas during the first half of the twentieth century will, in all probability, write a record of rapid progress. We have already made much headway in substituting steel for wooden ships; and America’s foremost iron manufacturer, Mr. Andrew Carnegie, says that steel ships can now be built as cheaply on our Atlantic coast as they can be built on the Clyde. Furthermore, the opportunities for investment in domestic industries are becoming fewer and less alluring, and there are good reasons for thinking American capitalists will be disposed from now on to put their ventures in ships to sail foreign seas.