While at Ulithi the troops were taken ashore on the little island of Mog Mog for rest and rehabilitation. During the staging period assault troops were transferred to LST’s for the last part of the journey. On 27 March the Sixth Marine Division left Ulithi, loaded in 13 APA’s, 24 LST’s and one LSD, and encountered heavy rains and cooler weather as the convoy moved north.
4. OKINAWA
Easter Sunday, 1 April 1945, was Love-Day for the Okinawa operation. With the bright clear dawn came enemy planes but the invading armada—over 1400 ships—drove off or destroyed the attacking planes. From the transports the troops could only see small portions of the island; the preliminary bombardment from the naval task force and the bombs from our planes, diving through the clouds, raised a haze of smoke and dust that covered most of the area behind the landing beaches.
Forming into long waves, the Fourth and Twenty Second Marines, loaded in amphibious tractors, churned toward the beaches, over the coral reef, and landed at 0837. Every man went in with the expectation that this beachhead, like Tarawa, Saipan, and Iwo, would be a bloody one; they were surprised but not entirely relieved to find virtually no enemy opposition to the landing. Rapidly, units organized and moved inland and up across the terraced fields that led to Yontan Airfield. By noon the Fourth Marines had seized Yontan and the Twenty Second Marines were advancing as rapidly on the left. By late afternoon the two regiments had reached a line tentatively set to be reached on the second day and as yet had not found the enemy. To the left of the Twenty Second Marines lay a little peninsula jutting out to the northwest, named Zampa Misaki. It seemed likely that an enemy force might be there; General Shepherd requested III Amphibious Corps to release from its reserve one battalion of the Twenty Ninth Marines. The First Battalion was released to division and placed to protect the division’s left flank. Troops dug in for the night with mixed emotions. Everyone was extremely grateful that the landing had not been a bloody one; still there was a certain apprehension felt: Where was the enemy? When would he attack?
Love-Day had been successful beyond the wildest hopes; the division was ashore safely, in a good position, and had already secured its first objective. Yontan Airfield was firmly in our hands and had not been badly damaged. The enemy defensive positions constructed to guard the field were strangely empty. Casualties were negligible; the landing had been easy.
Now the Sixth Marine Division moved rapidly to cut the island in two. In conjunction with the First Marine Division which was making the main effort, the Fourth and Twenty Second Marines drove quickly to the east and, despite some opposition from small isolated enemy pockets, reached the east coast on 4 April. Turning to the north, the division began to seize the Ishikawa Isthmus. Averaging nearly 7000 yards each day the troops pushed up the isthmus and by 7 April had reached Nago at the base of Motobu Peninsula.
5. BATTLE FOR MOTOBU
It was General Shepherd’s plan to have the Twenty Second and Fourth continue the drive up the mainland of Okinawa until Hedo Misaki was seized. To destroy the enemy known to be on Motobu, the General committed the Twenty Ninth Marines, which had been in Corps reserve during the first four days of the operation. For the time being, the Fourth Marines was held as a reserve near the base of the peninsula. Patrolling continued.
Many captured enemy soldiers and civilians had stated that the main Japanese defensive force was in southern Okinawa but that a force of about 3000 men, commanded by a Colonel Udo, was somewhere up north, probably on Motobu. Aerial observation and photo terrain studies confirmed indications that there was a sizeable enemy force on the peninsula. On 8 April the Twenty Ninth Marines moved out in three columns, one along the south coast, one along the north coast and one up the center toward the town of Itomi. At first progress was rapid and there were few contacts made; it was noted, however, that all inland trails were mined or blocked. The coast roads had numerous roadblocks and tank traps. By 10 April the Third Battalion, Twenty Ninth, was at Toguchi and had been hit by enemy artillery fire near Awa. Near Toguchi, on the Manna road, it had contacted Udo’s force. West of Itomi the First Battalion was also in contact with what was apparently the same force. Meanwhile the Second Battalion had captured the enemy midget submarine base at Unten Ko but had encountered no appreciable resistance.
During the next three days the battalions were in almost constant contact with Udo’s forces. Ambushes were frequent but the enemy could not be engaged in any decisive action. It was clear that he was engaged in guerrilla-type warfare and wanted to harass our troops but was trying to avoid a meeting engagement. By 13 April the enemy position was definitely fixed as being in the Mt. Yaetake area; it was known that he had considerable artillery, mortars, and a few naval guns emplaced in hidden positions in the wild and rugged mountain mass.