Bragg’s Army of Tennessee, except three divisions, was concentrated on the west side of the Chickamauga from Reeds Bridge almost to Dalton’s Ford, near Lee and Gordon’s Mills. The divisions had been shuffled around during the night, and remained so for the first day’s battle. Brig. Gen. Nathan Bedford Forrest’s cavalry held the right flank at Reeds Bridge; then, in succession toward the left (south), were Walker’s Corps; Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Cheatham’s Division (Polk’s Corps); Longstreet’s Corps (under Maj. Gen. John B. Hood); and Buckner’s Corps. On the east side of the stream and forming the right were Maj. Gen. Patrick R. Cleburne’s Division (Hill’s Corps), preparing to cross at Tedford’s Ford; Maj. Gen. T. C. Hindman’s Division (Polk’s Corps) opposite Lee and Gordon’s Mills; and Maj. Gen. John C. Breckinridge’s Division (Hill’s Corps) forming the extreme left opposite Glass’ Mill. Maj. Gen. Joseph Wheeler’s cavalry, stationed at the upper fords of the Chickamauga, held the left flank.

Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas, “The Rock of Chickamauga.” Courtesy National Archives.

Neither army knew the exact position of the other as they maneuvered for position during the night. The densely wooded area, covered with tangled undergrowth, brambles and cedar thickets, prevented easy movement or good observation, and many of the officers had difficulty keeping in touch with their own commands.

The armies were so close to each other, in some instances only a few hundred yards apart, that it was inevitable a clash would soon take place, but at what point no one could say.

SEPTEMBER 19—FIRST DAY.

Early in the morning of September 19, Thomas ordered Brannan forward to reconnoiter the Confederate forces which had crossed the Chickamauga. In this manner, Col. John T. Croxton’s brigade of infantry accidentally ran into some of Forrest’s cavalry, which were dismounted and serving as infantry, at Jay’s Mill near Reed’s Bridge. And so the battle began.

Croxton drove Forrest back, but reinforcements hurried to the latter forced Croxton to give ground. Suddenly the commanding generals realized that a major conflict was upon them, and they hurriedly sent troops into the fight as first one side and then the other gained the upper hand. Rosecrans, by rapid and forced marches, brought up his troops from Crawfish Springs. Bragg ordered his left wing divisions to cross to the west side of the Chickamauga. By mid-afternoon major fighting had spread along a jagged line some 3 miles in length. All the Union divisions, with the exception of Granger’s reserve force, became involved. The Confederate troops were also largely engaged, except Hindman and Breckinridge who crossed over during the late afternoon and night.

When the battle ended for the day, little progress could be shown by either side. The fighting had been furious and without much plan. Bragg’s troops had reached the LaFayette-Chattanooga Road but were not able to hold the position. Neither side could claim a victory. Bragg had failed to crush the Union left, and Rosecrans remained in possession of the roads to Chattanooga. The losses on both sides were heavy.

As night fell and darkness settled over the battlefield the fighting stopped, but there was little rest for the weary soldiers. Rosecrans brought the Army of the Cumberland into a more compact defensive line; Thomas’ Corps, heavily reinforced, formed the left in a bulge east of the LaFayette Road at Kelly’s Field.