On the following day, Mackay, with about 420 men (chiefly N.C.), left for Helpmakaar with a convoy of 138 empty ox-waggons. The Carbineers were ordered back as it was possible an outbreak might any day occur in the northern portions of Natal. Nevertheless, having already done useful work at Nkandhla, they were very disappointed at having to leave that part, especially as fighting appeared to be imminent.
On the 12th, McKenzie made a reconnaissance to Insuze valley on the south-west of the magistracy.[191] In the course of the day, a large number of women and children were met with, but no information could be obtained from them as to the rebels' movements. After being questioned, they were allowed to return to their relations.
Another reconnaissance was made to Dhlabe on the western side of Mome on the 14th. The rebels indulged in a good deal of ineffective sniping from the forest. A few 15-pounder and pompom shells were fired into the Mome valley. The force camped for the night at the site of the old magistracy.
On the same day, three of Barker's squadrons reconnoitred along the base of Macala, with the object of trying to draw the enemy, who had been observed in force at that mountain. Bambata himself was reported to be there. This intelligence was proved later to have been correct. The rest of the force at Ntingwe co-operated with McKenzie's in destroying rebel kraals in the intervening district and capturing stock.
The destruction of these and other kraals, which, as explained in a previous chapter, are invariably of wattles, grass and poles, and therefore easily constructed, was imperative as, being numerous, they afforded shelter and food to the enemy. But for the adoption of such tactics, and the seizure of stock, especially in the vicinity of the great forests at Nkandhla and Qudeni, and other considerable ones at Kombe, Ensingabantu, Macala, etc., the campaign must have been unduly prolonged and resulted in far greater suffering to Natives at large than actually occurred.
The most humane method in dealing with savages is one which has for its object cessation of hostilities at the earliest possible date. To achieve this end, much must necessarily take place which appears offensive to civilized people at a distance, but which not less civilized persons on the spot know to be imperative. Difference of opinion on these matters is very marked and very regrettable, but it is useless endeavouring to justify tactics to those ignorant, often absurdly ignorant, of the elementary conditions under which any given war with savages has to be fought. That is not war which studiously avoids incommoding the enemy in any way. If there be obloquy, it must, therefore, be suffered to remain on the side of common-sense.
Next morning (15th) Barker, leaving sufficient men to guard the camp, moved to a position near Dhlolwana, about six miles to the south-west of Ntingwe and three from Macala. Whilst engaged burning kraals, he had a brush with about 500 rebels, who followed up on his returning to camp, four of them being killed. It would seem Barker lost an opportunity here of inflicting a heavy blow on the enemy. At the same time, it must be remembered he was playing a waiting game which, had he planned a countermove—as he certainly might have done on this occasion—might have been spoilt.
On the 16th, a few men were sent to decoy the enemy; he, however, refused to be drawn. McKenzie then heliographed Barker to take part early on the 17th with himself and Mansel in a large converging movement towards the enemy's headquarters at Cetshwayo's grave. Leuchars, then at Middle Drift, was invited to co-operate on the south.
During the night, Sub-Overseer Walters, in charge of a road party, was murdered in a tent at his camp by Natives at Mbiza stream, about eight miles north of Empandhleni. The murderers were arrested within a couple of days.