[198] Particularly was this the case at Ezigqileni, the principal kraal of the care-taker of Cetshwayo's grave. This small kraal (close to the Nkunzana river), a few hundred yards from the grave, contained no fewer than nineteen large grain pits, that is, about five times as many as the average for a kraal of that size.
[199] Report. September, 1906.
[200] It will presently be seen that Sigananda did not come in, at any rate, not on the day he had said he would do so.
[201] Among the other officers were: Major A.B. Boyd-Wilson, second in command; Lieut.-Col. J.J. Furze, T.L.I. (temporarily assuming the rank of Major), commanding Right Half; and Captain O. Schuller, T.L.I., Adjutant.
[202] Consisting of 100 N.C. (this squadron—under Capt. G.R. Richards—is the one that arrived with Murray-Smith on the 24th), 100 Z.M.R., 300 R.H., 120 N.D.M.R., 20 T.M.R., 25 M.I., D.L.I., and 300 Natives.
[203] Report. September, 1906.
[204] His column then consisted of the whole of N.C., Right and Left Wings (excepting D squadron); a section, N.F.A.; and the Estcourt, Ladysmith, Dundee, and Newcastle Reserves.
Mackay, of course, knew that Helpmakaar was an important strategical post, but, with the recent removal of Kula, the still more recent smashing up of Mtele's and Nondubela's factions by Murray-Smith, and his own operations round about Mahlaba (see p. 267), he decided to recommend his moving to Nqutu district in order to drive on to McKenzie the local and other rebels known to be there. Believing the recommendation had been approved by the Commandant, which, however, was certainly not the case, he took with him the troops referred to. This meant that Helpmakaar became practically evacuated, for the N.M.R., until recently posted at Helpmakaar, got orders from the Commandant on the 25th, when at Nkandhla, to join the U.F.F. at Greytown as speedily as possible. Had Mackay known that his action involved the almost total evacuation of Helpmakaar, he probably would not have taken with him as many troops as he did.