[216] The sun rose, on the day in question, at about 6.45 a.m.
[217] Mackay camped at Isandhlwana on the night of the 27th. He operated at Malakata on the morning of the 28th, and at Hlazakazi at 1.30 p.m. on the same day.
[218] On Sibindi's levy getting within about three miles of the kraal of Nyoniyezwe, the minor for whom Sibindi was acting, they started to sing their ancient, tribal war-song. Up to that moment, the women had been in hiding in various places, owing to uncertainty as to whether the impi they had, two or three hours before, seen descending to the Buffalo from the direction of Mpukunyoni, was the enemy, or men of their own tribe. The sun had, in the meantime, set, and it had begun to get dark. On recognizing the old familiar song, and realizing that their men were returning triumphant, they forthwith emerged from their respective hiding-places and kraals, and, one and all, wherever, on the bush-covered mountain, they happened to be, accorded their heroes so weird and fantastic a greeting as will not quickly be forgotten by the European troops who had the privilege of hearing and witnessing it. At least sixty to seventy women, faces smeared with light-coloured clay, and carrying little hand-brooms, with leaves bound round their ankles, approached the advancing column, shrieking at the top of their voices as they ran about: "Ki, ki, ki, ki, ki, ki, ki, ki,—Kuhle kwetu!" (Oh! joy in our homes!) The oft-repeated cries were heard in all directions. Not only did this serve as a welcome to the warriors, but as an alarm to all of the tribe who were too far off to hear the famous war-song.
[XIII.]
FURTHER OPERATIONS BY ZULULAND FIELD FORCE.—ACTION AT MANZIPAMBANA.—ENEMY DECIDES TO MOVE IN FORCE TO MOME.
Hitherto McKenzie's efforts to come into conflict with the enemy had met with comparatively little success, and this in spite of the fact that the Zululand Field Force had been over three weeks on the spot. Ever since the force arrived, the men had, indeed, been kept particularly busy. Reconnaissances had been carried out time after time in Insuze valley and at Nkandhla by McKenzie, and in the neighbourhood of Macala and Qudeni by Barker, four columns had made a converging movement on Cetshwayo's grave (the enemy's headquarters), then had come Sigananda's negotiations for surrender, the reconnaissance to Macala, followed by further activity in the directions of Tate, Mome and Komo. In the course of the operations, many rebels had been come across, but as they were nearly always in small parties, it was impossible for those unacquainted with the peculiar conditions to repress feelings of disappointment with the results that had been achieved by the end of May, especially as intelligence went to show that Bambata and Company were at the head of at least 1,000 men, and that these numbers were constantly increasing. Where was this ever-vanishing impi? What was the best way of making it fight? That was the problem McKenzie was called on to solve. He had not merely to be ready to fight when it suited him to do so, but to hunt for the rebels and make them fight, however much in favour of the latter locality and time might happen to be. His difficulties were, therefore, primarily and, indeed, almost entirely of a strategical character. He, of course, knew of the rebels' perpetually shifting from one place to another on purpose to avoid a conflict, and, at the same time, of always being on the alert to take advantage of detached sections of the troops. That such were their methods had of itself required time to ascertain. The methods were novel. There was nothing of that kind during the Zulu War.[219] Sometimes the enemy would be at Nkandhla, at others at Macala. At each of these places there were dense forests and rocky hiding-places. The intervening country, moreover, was exceedingly rough, but so well known to the rebels that they could travel over it by night with the greatest ease. In these circumstances, in addition to robbing them of all food supplies to be found about Nkandhla, the O.C. came to the conclusion that the only policy was to drive the forests in as thorough and systematic a manner as possible. But to carry this out effectively with the men at his disposal was out of the question. That, at any rate, was the view of General Stephenson and other competent authorities. Hence he was compelled to adopt procedure which he felt might easily fail in actually cornering the enemy. However, in order that the best might be done, he decided to undertake and persevere with the drives. These it was necessary to carry out section by section, as it was quite impracticable, owing to their magnitude and interconnection, to attempt the whole of the forests in one day. If the enemy's strategy was to keep shifting about, the troops could at least help him to shift about a little more, and perhaps rather more than he had intended to do.
Whilst the troops, after operating at Tate gorge, were taking a much-needed rest on the 31st May, Mansel and Barker were summoned to Nomangci. Colonel McKenzie then proceeded with these and other officers to the heights above Mome valley, where the proposed drives were to begin, and explained the plans he had in mind for the following day.