At 7.5 a.m. the "cease fire" was sounded, when the troops were directed to leave the ridges and drive down the slopes, as well as over the area and along the stream in the immediate vicinity of the bivouac, also between the neck and Dobo. Much of the ground was covered with shrubs, long grass or rushes, and, here and there, the banks of the stream were hollowed out through the action of the water. In carrying out the movement, several cases occurred of individual rebels feigning death, when, on being more closely examined, they suddenly jumped up and attacked, either by seizing their assailant's rifle, or lunging at him with an up-till-then carefully concealed assegai.
Having described how Barker (who happened to be nearest the enemy) carried out the instructions he had received from McKenzie, it is necessary now to see what action was being simultaneously taken by the latter. The infantry and artillery were moved from Nomangci at 3 a.m. and the mounted troops at 3.30 a.m. to co-operate with Barker by descending both ridges overlooking Mome gorge, with the principal object of cutting the enemy off from the stronghold on fleeing from Barker below.[235] The western side was occupied by N.C. (C squad), Z.M.R. (about 100), N.D.M.R. (about 100), R.H. (about 450), D.L.I. (about 140), N.F.A. (one 15-pounder), two pompoms, a Maxim detachment, and a Native levy. The eastern side was held by the Natal Rangers (with Maxim guns), under Lieut.-Col. J. Dick.[236]
As part of McKenzie's plan was to effect the capture of Sigananda, he dismounted the Z.M.R. and marched them and the D.L.I. in single file, together with the Native levy, down to the large forest known as Mvalasango (on the west of the waterfall), in which Sigananda was said to be, with the object of driving it. The men were lining the edge of this forest, extremely dense and steep at that part, and awaiting the order to move forward into the bush, under Lieut.-Col. J.R. Royston, when the loud and simultaneous fire already referred to burst from Barker's Maxim, artillery and rifles, about 2,500 yards further down. The first thought that flashed across McKenzie's mind was that Barker had trapped the rebels at the mouth whilst they were marching to enter. If such surmise were true, it became necessary at once to prevent fugitives from retreating towards Tate gorge and Macala. With this object in view, the troops were recalled and the order given to mount, the intention being to move down into the Insuze valley by way of Gcongco ridge which, as will be remembered, had been used on the occasion of the converging movement on Cetshwayo's grave. These movements, although extremely difficult in the mist and dark, were carried out with great rapidity and dash, but resulted only in the troops being presently wheeled to a position lower down the gorge than the one just vacated. McKenzie came to the decision to right about wheel whilst on the gallop, owing to seeing that the flash from the fire of Barker's 15-pounders, 1,400 feet below, was directed up the Mome instead of westwards as at first anticipated. To return to hold ground half-way between top and bottom of the gorge and 300 yards from the edge of Dobo, was a matter of but a few moments. On this hurried rush back, a solitary armed rebel was come upon and shot whilst attempting to escape in the mist.
Alive to the importance of swift movement, McKenzie dashed down the side of the gorge at a pace that excited at once the surprise and envy of his men. These could but follow to the best of their ability. He grasped the situation in an instant—his eye for country is proverbial. He saw that the main line of retreat, the disposition of forces then being what it was, must necessarily be up the Dobo, to the top of the ridge (down whose eastern slopes that forest grew), and from thence into as precipitous though narrower a ravine on the west. Stringent orders were thereupon given for that particular topmost part to be effectively guarded by Royston's Horse, who were, moreover, ordered to connect with Barker's left. So important did McKenzie deem this, and rightly so, that a staff officer was at once sent to see that the order he had already sent by another staff officer was, as a matter of fact, being properly executed.[237] His next act, as essential as the other, was to push troops down to check the rebels already making along the river banks towards the waterfall and the large dense forests in that neighbourhood. Detachments of the Z.M.R., N.D.M.R. and R.H., having once more dismounted, accordingly ran down to the Mome and there effectually cut off such fugitives as had not already made good their escape, compelling them to find refuge, though only for a time as it happened, in the pear-shaped or Dobo bush. At the same time, the N.C. Maxim (Sergt. Ross), was smartly got down to a suitable position and greatly assisted in preventing the enemy's escape.
The Rangers had originally been directed to hold the upper eastern ridge of the Mome and get in touch with Fairlie. On leaving Nomangci camp at 3 a.m., they were obliged to traverse a large section of forest along narrow paths, where they were delayed owing to the guides for a time losing their way, so much so, that when the action started, the men had barely emerged from the forest at the left rear of the waterfall. On hearing the fire, however, they pushed forward at a brisk pace to occupy the ground assigned them.
When the action was at its height, they were required to move down and assist men of N.C., Z.M.R., R.H. and other corps in cutting off the retreat. The necessary orders, however, could not be conveyed, as there was insufficient sunshine to use the heliograph. The semaphore was tried, but also proved unsuccessful. It is, however, doubtful, if, had the men come down, they would have been in time to be of material assistance.
After running down to check escapes along the banks of the Mome, the detachments of Z.M.R., N.D.M.R., N.C. and R.H. that had assembled there, when it was evident the fugitives had been cut off, were reinforced and then directed by McKenzie to drive, under the command of Lieut.-Col. Royston, down the Mome through the scrub and bush towards the lower part of Dobo. In the course of this drive, the notorious ringleader, Mehlokazulu, one of the men who started the Zulu War, was shot. He was wearing a new pair of riding trousers, shirt, socks and overcoat, whilst a pair of new tanned boots was being carried for him by one of his servants.
About 9 a.m. Barker got into communication with McKenzie by semaphore, when he received orders to move his guns to the ridge in immediate rear of the enemy's bivouac (where the neck referred to was), and to search Dobo thoroughly with shrapnel. The forest was accordingly shelled from top to bottom. The enemy, realizing that he had been caught in a trap, could do nothing else than conceal himself as effectually as possible among the numerous boulders, crevices and other hiding-places to be found there. The troops at the bottom, including Nongqai and levies, now began to drive the bush upwards. They had not proceeded many yards before Colonel McKenzie directed them to withdraw, climb the western face of the gorge immediately north of Dobo, and, joined on top by N.D.M.R., R.H., D.L.I. and B and C companies N.R. (which battalion had been ordered to come down from the opposite side of the gorge)[238] to drive downwards towards the Mome. The reason for operating in this way was because, by advancing upwards, the troops were at a disadvantage, as the rebels, most of whom still retained possession of their assegais, would have been able to throw with effect at men climbing under the greatest difficulties up so steep an incline.
It was already 2 p.m. when the drivers, purposely as numerous as possible, were in position. N.R., R.H., and D.L.I. took the left, N.D.M.R. the centre, with Nongqai and levies on the right. The rate of progress, owing to the exceptionally steep and rugged area, and to the enemy having concealed himself in various and most ingenious ways, was very slow. Steps, too, had to be taken to see that the line advanced in as uniform a manner as possible to prevent accidents. Occasionally Nongqai or levies on the right, more used to such movements than Europeans, got ahead, when they had to be halted to allow the rest to move up. With the constant interruptions that occurred, it is surprising the drive was conducted as well as it was.
After reaching a point about three-quarters of the way down, it was seen the Nongqai had again swung round in advance and partly overlapped. If their being in advance had been dangerous when higher up, it was more so now where the bush, narrowing as it approached the Mome, was only 250 yards across instead of 1,200. All this time, independent firing had been going on in various directions and many rebels were killed. Fairlie, who led the Nongqai, fearing accidents, decided to withdraw, leaving the rest of the bush to be completed by such troops as remained. He directed the "assembly" to be sounded. The effect of this unfortunate mistake was that, not only did all the Nongqai begin to leave, but also all the European troops and Native levy (though not so fast), for, hearing the call, the majority naturally supposed it had been ordered by the general officer commanding. Had the "assembly" not been sounded, the rest of the bush—only a small portion remained—must have been as thoroughly driven as that already done, with the result that many rebels, who had continually slipped further and further to the bottom end as they heard the drivers advancing, would not have escaped as they did. For all anyone knew at the time, Bambata and other important rebels were among those who escaped. When the bugle sounded, it was already late (4.30 p.m.), though not so late as those engaged supposed, nor too late for the drive to be completed. Exactly how many rebels escaped at that particular spot it is impossible to say. A hundred would probably be beyond the mark.