There was, indeed, nothing else to be done. Owing to Dinuzulu having been authoritatively informed of the intention of the troops, the necessity for stratagem had completely disappeared.
A small infantry force, consisting of D.L.I. and two guns N.F.A. (C battery), was accordingly dispatched, under Brevet Lieut.-Col. J. Dick, D.L.I., to Melmoth, to augment the Police already at that post. The object of this movement was that the two bodies should combine and proceed, as they eventually did, to Emtonjaneni heights, to be in readiness to co-operate with the troops at Nongoma in the event of Dinuzulu offering resistance. The Z.M.R. were mobilized and ordered to join Dick's force.
The remainder of the troops were directed to go by rail to Somkele and from there by march route to Nongoma. By this time, however, the rail transport that had conveyed the troops to Gingindhlovu was on its way to Durban, and delay resulted from its having to be recalled.
On the afternoon of the 4th, the Commandant, leaving the troops under the command of Lieut.-Col. W. Arnott, and accompanied by Sir Charles Saunders, Chief Commissioner Clarke, N.P., and a small staff, proceeded by train to Somkele to interview the Chiefs of that locality, and thereafter to move on to Nongoma and personally conduct negotiations with Dinuzulu. It was expected the troops would come on during the night and reach Somkele the following morning. As, however, provision on the Gingindhlovu-Somkele section had been made with the object of running only one train a day, it was impossible to transport the brigade to Somkele as expeditiously as was desired. The regiments consequently arrived at Somkele with considerable intervals of time between them.
Responsibility for failure to convey the troops, etc., with reasonable rapidity, cannot in any way be regarded as falling on the railway authorities who, during this expedition, as well as throughout the operations in 1906, did everything that could possibly have been done to ensure success. Had a few days' notice been given on the occasion in question, there would probably have been nothing to complain of.
As Somkele is very unhealthy both for man and beast (malaria and horse-sickness), especially in December, the brigade was ordered to leave as soon as possible after arrival, proceed to high ground in the vicinity of Hlabisa, and from thence to Nongoma. Owing, however, to the difficulties already referred to, also to rain and bad roads, it was impossible to carry out the new plan. The regiments moved more or less independently of one another. N.C., B.M.R., U.M.R. and N.F.A. reached Nongoma on the 10th, and the remainder of the brigade on the following day.
In the meantime, the Commandant had had interviews on the 5th and 6th with Chiefs at Somkele and Hlabisa. They were told that, as troops would soon be passing through their wards, with the object of putting an end to unrest in other parts of the territory, there was no occasion whatever for alarm. They were very grateful for the warning, and hoped every success would be met with in ascertaining and punishing the wrong-doers.
The Commandant arrived at Nongoma on the 6th, to find 170 N.P., under Dimmick, already on the spot.
On Saturday the 7th, three messengers, including Mankulumana, arrived from Dinuzulu, notwithstanding that the Government had on the 3rd clearly directed the latter "to proceed at once to the Nongoma magistracy and there await the arrival of Mr. Clarke (Chief Commissioner of Police)." They came to say that Dinuzulu did not know what offence he had committed to necessitate his surrendering. He desired to know his alleged offence, and who the informant was. The messengers were considerably surprised to find Sir Duncan McKenzie at Nongoma, as Dinuzulu's instructions were that Mankulumana should apply through the Magistrate and Commissioner for permission to see the Governor, of whom they felt the information above referred to should properly be sought. It was explained that Dinuzulu would have made the journey himself, but was prevented from doing so through having a bad knee. They added that he feared being taken by surprise, as had happened when Sitshitshili was murdered. He could not understand why fortifications had been constructed at Nongoma[321]; if such were necessary, why was not notice of the impending danger given him, in order that he, too, might avail himself of the protection? He denied the rumoured accusation of arming his people. All he had done was to summon boys in the usual way to hoe and weed his gardens.[322] He could not understand how the Government could have gone the length of thinking he was arming against it.
In reply, the Commandant said it was quite unnecessary to send a messenger to Pietermaritzburg, as he was in a position to answer all the questions that had been put. The charge was high treason, and had been laid by various witnesses, whose statements were in the Government's possession. The best thing the Chief could do, seeing that martial law had been proclaimed in Zululand, was to surrender before the troops got to Nongoma. To enable him to come in, as he said he was unwell, a suitable conveyance would be placed at his disposal.