By the 22nd, the Active Militia actually in the field, including detachments of departmental corps, numbered 1,102 (all ranks), with 156 Militia Reserves, stationed at Weenen, Estcourt and Krantzkop.
One would have thought that the invasion of Zululand by over 2,000 troops would have disturbed the aborigines far more than it did, especially as the object was to arrest Dinuzulu. The effect produced, however, was of an exactly opposite character. This can only be explained in one way, namely, that Dinuzulu was universally known by Natives to be really harbouring rebels and believed to be secretly planning the murders of various loyalists. They, in short, had had enough of Dinuzulu, and were only too glad to see the troops arrive and carry him off. There had been peace for some years when, in 1889, he was removed to St. Helena, and a similar prospect seemed once more to be within view. He had deceived the rebels by not actively and openly supporting them at Nkandhla, as he had promised to do, or was understood by them to have promised to do, and now he or his immediate attendants (presumably on his instructions), were causing loyalists to be shot down in cold blood. As that was not a rôle that had ever been played by a Zulu king, it is not surprising that the great majority were relieved and even rejoiced to get rid of the man.
With Zululand once more in a peaceful and settled condition, the Commandant left Nongoma with his staff and an escort of Natal Police (25) for Vryheid, viâ Ngome forest. After reaching Vryheid on the 22nd, simultaneously with the Carbineers, he proceeded by train to Pietermaritzburg, for the purpose of discussing the situation with the Government. The intention of the latter was that all firearms belonging to Chiefs known to be more or less associated with Dinuzulu were to be called in. For this purpose, as the Active Militia were demobilizing, it became necessary to form a Militia Composite Regiment. The Natal Carbineers were the last Militia corps to demobilize. This they did at Christmas, except about seventy men who had, at Vryheid, joined the force referred to.
One of the reasons for calling so strong a force into the field at the beginning of December was, as has already been observed, because the most powerful Natal Chief, Silwana, was believed to have assumed a menacing attitude. The evidence against him, though strong, was, however, much less conclusive than that against Dinuzulu. As the arrest of the latter Chief, as well as of his brother-in-law, Maboko, and his indunas, Makulumana and Mgwaqo, immediately created a profound impression throughout Natal and Zululand, the Government was of opinion that such incidents were sufficient to serve as a warning, not only to Silwana but to all similarly disposed Chiefs. The project, therefore, of invading his district was abandoned.[327]
The M.C.R., 500 strong, was placed under the command of Major Colin Wilson, N.F.A., with Major J.W.V. Montgomery, N.C., as Adjutant. Moving from Vryheid on the 2nd January, the force camped near Mr. C. Birkenstock's residence at Hlobane. Patrols were sent out to Ceza on the border of Zululand and to Ntabankulu. The Commandant arrived at the camp on the 7th. Further efforts were made in various directions to find guns that were unlawfully held. On the 14th, the regiment moved to Louwsburg in Ngotshe district, and from there, on the 17th, to Nyalisa police camp. At Louwsburg and Nyalisa (the latter place is some thirty miles from the Ubombo mountains), the Chiefs were ordered to bring in all their unregistered guns. The order was immediately complied with.
In addition to disarmament, useful work was done in these and other parts of the country in tracing rebels, cautioning those who had harboured them, as well as generally restoring public confidence. The troops received every encouragement and hospitality from the various Boer farms visited. The same occurred in Paulpietersburg and Luneberg districts during January and February. The determination that had been shown in calling in the firearms produced a salutary effect in every tribe, with the result that the weapons were promptly handed in by those from whom, at the conclusion of the Boer War, it was supposed they had all been taken. On no occasion was the slightest opposition met with, although, of course, there was sometimes considerable reluctance. This was no doubt due to the firmness, perseverance and discretion displayed by Sir Duncan McKenzie. The work, was, however, put a stop to before half of it had been completed. An opportunity more favourable to such enterprise will probably not again present itself for years. Illicit possession of firearms by barbarians is most effectively and satisfactorily coped with during the operation of martial law.
By the 17th February, some 130 unregistered firearms of various patterns had been handed in to the M.C.R. in Vryheid and Ngotshe districts alone, whilst the general aggregate for the Northern Districts and Zululand was over 400. Had the same policy been quietly and yet firmly pursued in parts of Zululand other than Nongoma district, it is certain better results would have been obtained than by leaving the matter to be dealt with by ordinary police methods. It was because the police were thought capable of carrying out this difficult duty under the common law, that the M.C.R. was disbanded at the end of February. And yet, on the 12th of that month, the total number of unregistered guns that had been collected without the direct assistance of the Militia, from the whole of Zululand, minus Nongoma, was but twenty-two. That result alone was sufficient to condemn the adoption of a policy of leniency. As it is, the uncollected arms remain for use on other occasions! It was to the unregistered firearms in possession of the Natives that all our gun-shot casualties during the Rebellion, and the various murders thereafter, were due.[328]
A very smart piece of work was carried out by the Police Reserves on the 1st January, 1908. Intelligence had been received at Nongoma that a number of rebel desperadoes were living in broken country at the junction of the Black Umfolozi and Mbekamuzi rivers. Dimmick took the N.P. Reserves out at 1.15 a.m. on the day in question. Fairlie, after the waggon drift had been reached (soon after 5 a.m.), was sent with a couple of troops down the left bank of the former river, whilst Dimmick, joined by Lindsay with a detachment from Mahlabatini, took up positions along the road between the two streams. Fairlie's report is: "Having crossed the Ivuna, near the junction of that river, and reached some high ground, I noticed some fires some three miles to my right front, on the north side of the Umfolozi, where it takes a big bend to the south. I sent to inform you (i.e. Dimmick) of this, also stating that Mciteki's men had not arrived as had been arranged,[329] and asking for reinforcements, as I concluded from the amount of smoke from the fires mentioned that the people we were in search of were in the vicinity. At 8.15 a.m. my messenger returned, but I waited until 9 a.m. for reinforcements; longer delay I considered would be inadvisable. I, therefore, proceeded with the men I had with me in the direction of the fires.... After going some distance, I linked the horses and went on foot, with about twenty-five men, and having traversed about two miles, sighted some shelters, which I advanced on in a half-circle. We were then sighted by the inmates, of whom I saw six. I called on them to stand in the Native language. This order was repeated by several Natives with me, and also by the Europeans who had a knowledge of the language. The inhabitants referred to made a bolt for it. Two were shot, and I am bound to conclude that the other four were wounded. We pursued some considerable distance without result, and then returned to the shelters and found two dead bodies. By the side of each was a magazine rifle, magazines charged and cut-offs open.[330] One had a cartridge half in the breech, and both appeared to have been fired recently." The killed turned out to be notorious rebels, for whom search had long been made. One of them, Mqumbeyana, was, it turned out, the man who was in command of the impi that attacked Royston's Horse at Manzipambana on the 3rd June, 1906. He is said to have killed a trooper on that occasion and seized his magazine rifle, possibly the very one in his possession when shot by Fairlie's party.
Other important miscellaneous work connected with the Rebellion or Dinuzulu's case was done by the Police during the year. They were, for instance, remarkably successful in capturing at Johannesburg and elsewhere, and bringing to justice, the murderers of Sitshitshili, Mpumela and two or three others previously referred to. These arrests were effected before the end of February, and prior to the withdrawal of martial law.