But, given the power of exacting compulsory service and the availability of matériel, there was wanting another and most important factor, namely, something which could so co-ordinate and systematize the heterogeneous elements as to weld them into that for which they were intended, namely, an engine of war, endowed with the power of life, movement and destruction. There was wanted, in short, an organizer. It was one thing for the legislature to provide the law, the money, the men, the horses, the equipment, ordnance and transport, but he that was to transform these masses of incongruous material into the desired entity could only be born, not made.
Without the active sympathy of a Government, an organizer can accomplish but little. To prepare for war is a task which, in order that it may be properly fulfilled, exacts tribute in numberless directions. Its dimensions are of universal scope and variety, and, unless the State is prepared to meet the reasonable demand of its agent, his efforts are foredoomed to failure. As the goal is to transform the material at hand into a living thing, it devolves on a Government to see that means are forthcoming or the efforts of the artificer become lacking both in efficiency and usefulness. This lesson the Government of Natal had learnt far better than did Canning and his Council at the time of the Indian Mutiny. Instead of refusing offers of assistance from local volunteers, every expedient was adopted by Natal to encourage volunteering; instead of an unsympathetic ruler, the Colony found in the Governor, Sir Henry McCallum, an ideal helmsman, who, supported by a strong and capable Ministry[52] and a far-seeing Commandant, strained every nerve to suppress the Insurrection in a swift and vigorous manner, well knowing that clemency and indecision would help only to aggravate the situation and imperil the State.
On the Militia Act becoming law in 1904, the Government appointed its Commandant of Volunteers, Col. H.P. Leader, as the first Commandant of Militia. He, thereupon, temporarily assumed the rank of Brigadier General. A District Commandant was also appointed to each of the three military districts into which the Colony was then divided.
Assisted by these officers, his staff and the various commanding officers of corps, the Commandant took early steps to establish the system envisaged by the Act.
It will be remembered that May 31st, 1902, saw the conclusion of hostilities between England and the South African Republics. In that great conflict, Natal had thrown all her regular volunteer forces, numbering only about 2000 men, into the field.[53] Such forces, distinctly well-organized, were maintained at a high state of efficiency as long as the war lasted.
There can be no question but that the exacting discipline undergone by the troops during the Boer War prepared them and the rest of the Colony for the compulsory service imposed by the 1903 Act. But for the serious risks and trials of that war, even though commonly said to have "killed volunteering" in Natal, it is highly probable greater objection would have been offered than was done when the Militia bill was debated in Parliament. The War was, indeed, a blessing in disguise for Natal. It taught her manhood what defensive warfare was, as well as the necessity of establishing an adequate and constantly efficient force. In these circumstances, Leader found his task much easier than it would have been under ordinary conditions. His commanding and other officers were all ready and eager to co-operate. If he was crippled for the want of funds, owing to the Colony passing through a time of severe financial depression, an excellent spirit prevailed, men being anxious to enrol in the various corps and help forward the realization of the general purposes of the Act.
Among the District Commandants was Lieut.-Col. (now Colonel), H.T. Bru-de-Wold, D.S.O., C.M.G., V.D., J.P.[54] This officer, whilst discharging the ordinary duties of his post, observed, not long after peace had been concluded with the Boers, what, no doubt, a number of other colonists also did, namely, that there was a certain amount of restlessness and disregard of authority among the younger sections of the Natives of his district which, on its south-western side, bordered on Pondoland. He made a point of visiting European homesteads in various parts, where he found his observations frequently corroborated, whilst his attention was drawn to other suspicious indications. He took steps to gather, from all available sources, information regarding the tribes, including those living along the border in the Cape Colony. Their probable fighting strength was ascertained, as also tribal differences, distinctions being drawn between hereditary blood-feuds and those of a minor character. Those tribes that had established intimate relations by marriage, etc., or were off-shoots of existing older stocks, though commonly designated by different names, were also noted. These particulars were tabulated so as to show which group was likely to take the field against another in the event of hostilities, and so on. By degrees, there grew up in his mind the idea that an open rupture between the white and the black races would occur in the near future, and on such presentiment appearing more reasonable and palpable as time went on, he set himself to consider how far he would be ready should any such contingency arise in his particular district. He prepared mobilization schemes on a small scale, that is to say, assumed a revolt had broken out at a particular point within the Colony, and then devoted himself to utilizing all available resources so as to grapple with the imaginary outbreak in the most effective manner. These schemes, along with others on somewhat similar lines by the other district officers, were submitted to headquarters. Those by Bru-de-Wold evoked a special interest, with the result that he was invited to prepare others. This time, he was not limited to the resources of his own district, but was instructed to lay under tribute those of the entire Colony. This "day-dreaming," as persons devoid of a military sense may choose to style it, soon turned out to be, not only an amusing and engrossing pastime, but the thing of all others that the Colony stood most in need of at that particular juncture. That this view is correct, will become clearer the further we proceed.
On the post of Commandant being vacated by Leader in August, 1905, Bru-de-Wold was appointed thereto with the rank of Colonel.
But, although Col. Bru-de-Wold was so mindful of the necessity of preparing for war, it is only fair to remember that the foundations of Militia organization were laid whilst the first Commandant was still in office, not to refer to the various other and important contributory efforts in earlier days. The organization of the Volunteers during the Boer War, for instance, was everything that could have been desired, though, of course, it differed in character from a scheme which had in view hostilities with savages, who might rise in a number of places at the same moment. Royston had in view and prepared for possible hostilities with civilized forces living beyond the borders of the Colony, a very different undertaking to operating against barbarians residing within the Colony. "For the latter, one must have each division complete in itself, but, in organizing for a European war, one knows perfectly well that he must collect his men together in the bulk before there is to be any resort to arms at all. So long as one's brigade is organized as a brigade, that is sound. In Native warfare, however, there should be organization practically of the individuals, for each of these might be called on to deal with a Native enemy in his immediate vicinity. Just before the Rebellion, each little unit was absolutely complete and prepared to take the field as it stood."[55]
Manuals of instruction based on those of the Imperial army, but adapted to local requirements, were prepared and issued. In these, the various duties of each arm, on receipt of an order to mobilize, were fully and clearly set forth.