NOTE.
THE REBEL ORGANIZATION IN 1906.
State of affairs among the tribes.—On assuming the government of Natal, England found many disconnected tribes. This state of affairs has continued to exist to the present day, with the result that any attempts of Natives to organize among themselves have been confined chiefly to the limits of individual tribes. When Zululand was conquered, the principle of dissevering politically-connected tribes was followed, first by Sir Garnet Wolseley, later, and to greater extent, when the magistracies were established.
Although the policy of divide et impera has failed to destroy much of the natural affinity between tribes, there is no doubt it has also helped to drive others still further apart. The animosities between many of them are proverbial. The efforts of any Chief at organization have, moreover, been checked by a provision in the Code which prescribes penalties for "summoning an armed assembly of his tribe" or "classing or causing to be classed, the men of his tribe into companies or regiments," without the permission of the Supreme Chief. Notwithstanding this, various Chiefs have, for many years, divided their men into regiments and companies. In some cases, this has been done innocently by loyal men, in others by men not so loyal. No harm, however, arose out of the practice until the Insurrection took place, and even then the Government gained more, perhaps, from loyal Chiefs who happened to be semi-organized, e.g. Sibindi, Mveli, Sitshitshili and Mfungelwa, than it suffered from those who were openly disloyal, e.g. Bambata and Sigananda.
The Poll Tax Act was, of course, a powerful agent in breaking down the long-standing differences referred to, whilst the order to kill off pigs and white fowls further influenced large numbers to unite and rebel. It was never possible to determine in any satisfactory way how many were prepared to join those actually in the field, even though approximate estimates of the latter could always be arrived at. It is enough, at this stage, to say that about 150 men struck the first decisive blow and that, although probably 1,000 adherents were gained at Nkandhla within the next two or three weeks, further accessions were determined rather by the successes met with than by a feeling that the methods adopted were the best available for securing the end in view. As these successes were insignificant, the rebels that joined did so in small lots at a time. Had the troops met with two or three reverses, especially at the beginning, it is probable thousands would have gone over, only to be followed by thousands of others if the efforts of these again had proved successful.
Leaders.—Suitable and experienced leaders were wanting; not that capable men could not be found, but the most capable were the ones who best realized the difficulties of the undertaking and the poor chances of success. There is no doubt that many Chiefs espoused the cause whilst pretending to be personally loyal, and this when many members of their tribes had deserted to join the rebels.
Arms and ammunition.—As there was no law forbidding the keeping of assegais and shields, it may be assumed nearly every Native in the Colony was fully armed, though many would not have been in possession of war shields.
The law was strict in regard to firearms. Natives in general on the south-west side of the Tugela possessed no more than 200 registered guns, if so many. In Zululand, there were as many as 5,105 in 1897;[75] by 1904, they had not increased beyond 5,126—all of them registered. Of the latter, about 90 per cent. were of the old Tower musket, smooth-bore, and other obsolete types.
Apart from legally held guns, Dinuzulu was in possession of a number which he had failed to register, some of them obtained at the time of the Boer War. He also had large quantities of ammunition of various kinds, obtained at the same time and in other ways. How many other guns were owned by his late tribe or other tribes associated therewith, as well as other Zululand and Natal tribes, it is quite impossible to say.
These facts are given to show what would have been available had the Insurrection become universal. How far the foregoing arms were used against the troops it is difficult to judge. The majority of those that were used were of the Martini-Henry, Snider, Lee-Metford and Mauser types.
Food supplies.—But for the premature outbreak at "Trewirgie," the Rebellion would probably not have begun until after all the crops had been reaped, i.e. about May. To have waited until all the grain was in would have been but to act in accordance with custom. The rebels, therefore, were somewhat at a disadvantage in regard to grain supplies. Although the cattle disease, known as East Coast Fever, had already invaded Zululand in the north, it had not up to that time made its way across the Umhlatuze, consequently, abundant meat supplies (cattle as well as goats) were always obtainable in the vicinity of Nkandhla. The ways in which supplies were procured whilst fighting was going on at Nkandhla, will be set forth later.
FOOTNOTES:
[70] The main reason for outlining here a system suppressed in 1879 is that it was at a partial revival thereof that the rebels perpetually aimed. The character of their organization and warfare was generally in accordance therewith. Nor, seeing many of them had been obliged to conform thereto in earlier days, is this any cause for surprise. A description of the old and famous order becomes, therefore, the best and most illuminating introduction to their methods in 1906.
It will be remembered that when Tshaka set about conquering the various tribes of Zululand and Natal, some of the more important broke away and fled to far-off parts, e.g. Rhodesia, Lake Nyasa, Gasaland, etc. Having regard to the enormous prestige acquired by the Zulus, a prestige which outshone that of any other tribe in South Africa south of the Equator, not only did tribes adjoining those which had arrived find it in their interest to copy the habits and customs of the dominant race and learn their tongue, but more particularly to adopt the system by which the prestige had been won. Thus a description of the system has the added interest of perhaps throwing light on what, in point of fact, has become practically the basic idea or exemplar of all Native military organizations in South Africa.
Had a tolerably comprehensive sketch of the system and its connected customs been available, the present attempt would not have been made.
[71] Dingiswayo, Chief of the Mtetwa tribe (near St. Lucia Bay, Zululand), is, curiously enough, believed to have had one or more fundamental features of the system suggested to him, either from observing the organization of British soldiers, as might have been done in the Cape Colony at the beginning of the nineteenth century, or, at least, by obtaining a detailed account thereof from some person familiar therewith.
[72] At intervals, as the hair grew long, it would be removed, but only to enable it to be sewn closer to the head.
[73] The badge known as tshokobezi, worn especially by followers of Dinuzulu, is referred to later (p. 198, note).