Then the anonymous order, purporting to have come from some Native of high position, requiring the killing of pigs, white fowls, etc., and the discarding of utensils of European manufacture, could have had no other significance than that the Natives in general should unite against the white man's government. Such interpretation is patent to anyone. There was, moreover, abundant evidence that this propaganda had been widely spread. Messengers are known to have proceeded to different parts of the Transvaal and even to the neighbourhood of Salisbury, Rhodesia, preaching sedition wherever they went. In Natal the order had already been complied with by many people. Numerous instances occurred in the thickly populated belt of country between Krantzkop, Mapumulo and Stanger, especially on the Tugela side of that line. Others were not wanting in other parts of the Colony, such as Ixopo, Mid-Illovo, Weenen, etc. Not only had animals been either killed or sold at absurdly low figures,[102] but European utensils, e.g. pots, had been destroyed or thrown away. If some Natives had already manifested disaffection, only time and want of effective control by the Government were needed for others to do the same.
Thus the atmosphere, by the time of the outbreak, had become so charged with an unmistakably rebellious spirit, and with reports that the tribes generally were out of the control of their Chiefs, that it required but a successful outbreak or two, in places not readily accessible to European troops, to set the whole affair ablaze. And, in any such event, not only the peace of Natal, but of other portions of South Africa, would have been endangered. There is no getting away from this conclusion, because it follows directly from the widely prevalent facts above referred to. Clearly, the position was abnormal, and, being abnormal, it called for extraordinary action.
It was whilst these evidences of unrest and loudly and disrespectfully expressed dissatisfaction existed that the Magistrate of Umgeni division proceeded to carry out the new law. For any Magistrate to have refrained, from fear of outbreak, from collecting the poll tax, after giving proper notice, would have been the height of weakness, of which Natives, in such mood as they then were in, would not have been slow to take advantage. And yet when the Magistrate[103] proceeded in a normal manner to collect the tax, another section of the same tribe, on its own initiative, marched under arms and in open defiance of the law to await at a convenient spot an opportunity of throwing themselves on to and murdering the Magistrate. Being discovered, they returned to their kraals, well-knowing that, as they had broken the law, warrants would be issued for their arrest. Although unprovoked in any way, they continued to carry their weapons in defiance of law and order. Instead of surrendering or running away, as other offenders would have done, they banded themselves together[104] when the police appeared on the scene, and went into hiding. And when the police proceeded to make arrests, they resisted and murdered them. Why? Not because of any grievance against the Government peculiar to themselves, but one which they supposed had, by then, become common to the whole Black House.[105]
There were, however, other considerations. The Natal Police Field Force, about 100 strong, had some weeks before been divided into two. One detachment was sent on important duty to Zululand and the other to Mapumulo—an isolated district carrying a particularly large Native population, where, it will be remembered, the Magistrate had been openly defied. Owing to this fact, no ordinary police were available to deal with the Trewirgie affair. To have engaged for this duty special constables, many of whom would probably have been unable either to ride or to shoot, would have been almost as great folly as to have sent them out on foot armed with batons. But legal machinery to enrol even such auxiliaries was wanting. If, then, firearms were necessary, it was surely better to employ a disciplined force than put them into the hands of men who did not know how to use them.
The necessity for immediate concentration of a force at Trewirgie was obvious. To have delayed, say for 36 hours, would have been to court appalling disaster. Zulus are known to be precipitate in action when once the war-cry has been sounded from the hill-tops and the beacon-fires lit. Every battle of the Zulu War testified to their energy, rapidity and true martial instincts. The fact that the first blow had been struck in a cause common to a million others, already impatient to emulate the heroic deeds of their fellows, still further lessened any chances of delay on their part. Here is the language of one of them, uttered on the 13th February to friends within a couple of miles of Richmond: "You are cowards, sitting still when there's fighting on. I have a following of my own. Let us combine and kill the whites round about here."[106] Had the rebels got away with the renown of having attacked and defeated the police with loss, without overwhelming action being swiftly taken, the Rebellion must have spread in an alarming manner. That, at any rate, is the opinion of all persons on the spot best entitled to express it, men with life-long experience of those parts, including the Natives themselves.
The alternative, that of calling out the Militia in support of the police, assuming these to have been available, would certainly have been proper in the case of any ordinary riot, disturbance of the peace, or other emergency, but this was no ordinary outbreak, nor was it at all likely to confine itself to the locality in which it had occurred. Outbreaks of a more serious character, such as the one in question, were intended by the legislature to be dealt with by a Permanent Militia Force, provision for establishing which was included in the law. Such force, it was enacted, might be ordered out to any part of the Colony, "to act therein, either in aid of, or as the police force ... and when so acting every member of the Permanent Militia Force shall have the same authority as constables and otherwise."[107] This force, owing to the want of the necessary financial provision, had never been created. If, however, regular police had been employed, there would have been no one available to relieve them at their various posts. In this connection, it must be stated that, as the disaffection was general, it was obviously impossible to withdraw the police from the various out-stations.
Under all these circumstances, the Governor had no difficulty in deciding (a) "that men were in armed resistance to the authority of the Crown"; (b) "that such armed resistance could not be dealt with by the Military, acting merely in aid of the civil power in the ordinary manner"; (c) "that such armed resistance could not be promptly and effectively suppressed otherwise than by subjecting the inhabitants of the disturbed district to direct military control, and by inflicting summary punishment upon offenders against the peace."[108]
But, although of opinion that martial law was necessary, care was at the same time taken by the Government to provide for all criminal and civil cases pending in the various courts being proceeded with and determined in the ordinary way; where failure or inability to exercise jurisdiction occurred, the proceedings were to be suspended until withdrawal or amendment of the proclamation.[109]
The extension of martial law over the whole Colony instead of only the district in which the revolt had occurred,—to which, indeed, the Governor had at first wished to limit it,—arose solely out of the unrest and disaffection being so widespread. Alarming rumours were constantly being received from all quarters, showing that the entire Native population was more or less disaffected and that outbreaks of rebellion were possible anywhere and at any moment. As for the Ministers being panic-stricken, there was not only no sign of this at any time, but they, throughout the whole course of the Rebellion, enjoyed the fullest confidence of the public as well as of the Governor. The latter, on more than one occasion, called the attention of the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the cool and collected way in which they were grappling with the situation.
The truth is that, with such a personnel at the head of affairs, together with Sir Henry McCallum, the Colony was extremely fortunate. There is no question that it was owing largely to their able and firm administration that an insurrection, which, at one time, threatened to become universal, was suppressed as speedily and effectually as it was.