For a mile or two there was occasional firing into the bush to keep off the enemy, who, it was supposed, might be following. They shouted obscene epithets at the police from a distance. The camp was not reached till about midnight. As a matter of fact, the rebels, afraid of being hit, did not follow, notwithstanding that one man was heard to shout out from a hill "Bapakati!" (They are hemmed in!)
As far as could be seen, in addition to assegais, shields and knobsticks, the enemy had about a dozen guns.
The ladies, after giving up the carriage, walked most of the way back to camp, a distance of about six miles.
Reviewing the two foregoing incidents, it is, in the first place, difficult to understand why the first expedition took place in the way it did. In view of Bambata's attitude, firstly, on the 22nd February, in connection with the poll tax; secondly, his refusal to attend at headquarters when summoned, and quitting Natal for Zululand; and, thirdly, his arresting Magwababa, who had just been formally appointed as his acting successor, it seems as if the occasion was one which required far stronger action than that which was taken. In arresting Magwababa, Bambata did not do so out of personal spite, although the relations between the two had for long been strained, but because, supported by Dinuzulu, he was determined, if possible, to bring about a general rebellion.
When the Chief Commissioner arrived on the scene, he knew Bambata and his men were under arms; he knew that, after the attack on the Magistrate's party, Bambata did not pursue, otherwise one or more of the fugitives must have been killed. Moreover, there was no good ground for suspecting an attack on the Keate's drift station. As it was, the European residents referred to in the wire on which Mansel acted were perfectly safe where they were, especially as Bambata had, at the most, no more than 150 to 200 men, while the station was protected by about twenty rifles.[141]
There thus being no immediate necessity for removing the "European residents," it would seem the column should not have been marched off merely to relieve an unthreatened post at the imminent risk of being attacked on a road it was impossible to defend in the dark. The situation certainly called for immediate action, not, it would seem, in the direction of relieving Keate's drift, but of getting within striking distance of the enemy and, after ascertaining his probable strength and position, attacking him. It is, however, easy to be wise after the event.
In going to Keate's drift, the mistakes were made of returning the same day after an apparently unavoidably late start, and of returning by the way that was used on the forward journey. It is a maxim in Native warfare not to come back by the way one goes out. In this case, just because it was impossible to do otherwise than return to camp by the road (except by making a long detour), it would, no doubt, have been wiser to have adopted the precaution of doing so in the day-time. As there was an advanced guard when the column proceeded to the drift, the enemy, of course, knew the kind of formation to look out for.
The body of Sergeant Brown was not recovered until some days later,[142] when it was seen lying on its back at right angles across, and in the middle of, the road where the fight had been. It had been purposely put there by the rebels, and had about it no fewer than twenty-seven assegai wounds. The whole of the moustache and upper lip had been cut off and carried away, as also the left forearm. A deep incision, in the form of a cross, had also been made for some purpose at the side of the left biceps. Deceased's helmet, too, had been taken, as also his boots, tunic and breeches, whilst the way in which the stomach and intestines had been ripped open, showed those present that they were at war with savages indeed.
The horrible mutilation of this poor fellow's body was, however, not done from sheer wantonness, but for a particular object, viz. to obtain pieces of the flesh for medicinal purposes. This practice, so revolting from a civilized person's point of view, is one usually followed by Zulus and other South African races. Indeed, according to their superstitions, to act thus is an indispensable accompaniment of warfare.
On an inspection being made at the scene of the ambuscade, it was noticed the bottom strands of the wire fence had been lifted to the top one, and there tied. This had been done in several places, evidently to enable the enemy to pass through quickly, whilst, at the same time, sufficient to check horses.