On the afternoon of the 12th, the Commissioner reported that the forest was being driven by Sigananda's people. He was of the opinion that, although a strong force might be necessary, the sending thereof should be resorted to only after diplomatic measures had failed. It was on this day that Mansel and his men arrived at Empandhleni.
On the 15th, Mr. Saunders pointed out that, unless Sigananda accounted satisfactorily for Bambata and his followers by the following night, there would be no doubt that the tribe was in collusion with Bambata, and that it would be necessary to take strong measures forthwith to punish it. He agreed with Mansel and Vanderplank that, if operations were to be conducted against Bambata, a very much larger force than the one already there would be required. He added that he was in constant touch with Dinuzulu and had no reason for suspecting that Chief's loyalty, or that he was assisting or encouraging Bambata.
The Commissioner reported on the 16th that he had had no message from Sigananda for some days. The messengers he had sent on the preceding day had returned to say the Chief had nothing to report. It was at this moment Mr. Saunders arrived at the conviction that Sigananda was acting in concert with Bambata, and had been deliberately harbouring him all along. He, thereupon, dropped all further communication with the Chief, and recommended strong measures being taken as soon as possible to severely punish him and his tribe. This, however, it was added, could only be done by considerably strengthening the European force and obtaining the assistance of loyal Natives. He reiterated his belief that Dinuzulu was not implicated in any way. At 6.15 p.m., information came in from different sources that Bambata, with the assistance of Sigananda, intended to attack the magistracy the same night. Sigananda had, by then, been joined by portions of Ndube's, Mpumela's and Gayede's tribes, the last-named a Natal Chief. At 7.30 p.m. the situation was reported as still more serious, especially as members of different tribes, including that of Siteku (Dinuzulu's uncle) had joined Sigananda. It was felt a large force should be sent up as speedily as possible to reinforce the loyal levies and restore public confidence. The rebel force estimated then to be at Nkandhla was 500 to 1,000.
As the supplies at Empandhleni appeared to be running short,[155] arrangements were promptly made by the Commandant for the dispatch of a convoy of forty waggons of provisions from Dundee, accompanied by an escort of 400 Natal Carbineers,[156] and one section B Battery, Natal Field Artillery (Lieut. F.H. Acutt), under Lieut.-Col. D.W. Mackay. Such force could not, however, leave before the 20th.
The policy of calling on Sigananda, unaided by European troops, to arrest a well-armed body of desperadoes,[157] who had succeeded in taking possession of the great local stronghold, is not an easy one to defend, especially when it is borne in mind that Natives in all parts of Natal and Zululand had, for three or four months past, loudly complained of the poll tax, many in Zululand having still to pay. Only a fraction of what was due by Sigananda's people had been collected. It was known the majority considered it a tax that could not be borne in addition to other obligations. Moreover, the news of the Byrnetown outbreak in February; of the hostile demonstrations at such places as Mapumulo, Umzinto, Mid-Illovo, Durban, Pietermaritzburg, and at their own magistracy; of the movements of the Militia in the western and eastern portions of Natal; as well as of the successful assaults on the Magistrate's party on the 3rd, and on the large body of Police on the 4th, was all calculated to greatly unsettle the Native mind.
It was well known that, according to Zulu law, anyone harbouring a criminal was liable to the severest punishment, especially if the offender were a rebel. The principle of communal responsibility was applied, as a matter of course, by which the arrival of a stranger, reputed to be a criminal, had to be reported to the next senior officer. In this case, Bambata had gone, not to live at any particular kraal, but taken possession of the stronghold universally acknowledged to be that of Sigananda and his ancestors, and which fell well within the district assigned by Government for the occupation of that tribe. It, therefore, devolved on that Chief to inform his Magistrate. How he did this has already been seen. The attitude assumed by the Magistrate, and soon affirmed and adopted by the Commissioner, was that, as Bambata had taken refuge in the forests, Sigananda himself became personally responsible for his apprehension, notwithstanding that the outlaw had arrived with about 150 men, who, on the whole, were probably better armed, and known from the outset to be better armed, than any local levies could have been.
The order issued to Ndube, Mpumela and other Chiefs to "assist" in arresting the ringleader would also appear to have been wrong in principle, in the absence of arrangements for a European officer or force to be present to take charge of and support the levies.[158] After all, Bambata had struck his blow, not at the black man, but at the white. It was, therefore, the duty of the white man to at least assist the levies, and especially Sigananda.
There was, indeed, no evidence of previous collusion between Bambata and Sigananda. "At that time," wrote the Commissioner, "there was no ground for suspecting that Sigananda and his people would not loyally co-operate in effecting Bambata's capture."[159] Later on, allegations were made of Sigananda being in league with Dinuzulu, and of Bambata having been directed by Dinuzulu to start the Rebellion, but it must be remembered no one believed more implicitly in, and more staunchly and consistently defended, Dinuzulu's loyalty than did Mr. Saunders. When, on the 6th April, at Usutu kraal, he informed Dinuzulu and his indunas of the attack on the Police in Mpanza valley, he says "their frank demeanour left no doubt in my mind that these expressions were perfectly genuine, and that Dinuzulu and his people were not in any way associated with Bambata and his doings."[160] Even under these circumstances, assuming Dinuzulu to have been loyal, it is somewhat surprising to those who know anything of Native character and the facts, to find Sigananda and other Chiefs repeatedly pressed between the 9th and 16th to arrest a man who, from a purely Native point of view, had done no more than offer a vigorous protest to paying a tax which every Native, throughout the length and breadth of the country, also strongly resented.
By 6.45 p.m. on the 9th, practically the whole of the Zululand Mounted Rifles (105) had arrived at Empandhleni—mobilized under the authority given by law in such emergencies. This force was, on the 12th, increased to about 350 by the arrival of the Natal Police and Nongqai under Mansel.[161] The latter assumed command on arrival, and decided to remain in lager. All these men had assembled for a purpose. What was that purpose if not to arrest Bambata? If Mansel's object was to 'contain' the enemy, can it be said that there was any 'containing' between the 12th and 28th April (the day he moved to Fort Yolland) with the enemy comfortably ensconced in a forest and the Police as comfortably behind entanglements eleven miles off at Empandhleni?