Between the 15th and 23rd, Sigananda sent messages to many neighbouring loyally-disposed Chiefs, urging them to rebel. Although a number of malcontents threw in their lot with the rebels, including members of the tribe of Siteku (Dinuzulu's uncle) and Chief Gayede (of Natal), the majority of the people remained loyal or neutral. Several, as far off as Mahlabatini, went further and offered their services to the Government against Bambata and Sigananda.
Two or three stores, close to the forests, were looted during this period (that at Sibudeni, as early as the 16th), besides cattle belonging to loyalists.
The two messengers that had been sent to Dinuzulu got back on the evening of the 23rd. Unfortunately, there was a difference between them as to the purport of 'the Prince's' message. One man, the senior, said Dinuzulu had denied all knowledge of Bambata's doings, and had remarked: "they have already begun fighting; let them do just what they want, it is no affair of mine. I do not want to be mixed up in the business." The other man, agreeing whilst in Sigananda's presence, afterwards went among the rebels and encouraged them by declaring that Dinuzulu's real wish was that they should fight the white man. The construction put on the communication by the latter messenger was that which, readily finding favour, was accepted. These men, moreover, had heard of the Government having arranged with Dinuzulu on the 17th to allow Mankulumana to go and act as "peace-maker," a matter that will be noticed later. The second messenger interpreted Mankulumana's mission into his having been "bought by the Europeans"; his coming, therefore, was simply to try and hoodwink Bambata.
Mankulumana arrived at Empandhleni on the 23rd, and after interviewing the Commissioner for Native Affairs, proceeded, on the following morning, to see Sigananda.
FOOTNOTES:
[144] Gabangaye, with a large following, formed a portion of the Native contingents that assisted the Imperial troops.
[145] These men had received orders to mobilize only the morning before.
[146] The Reserves, with part of the U.M.R., one Maxim detachment, and one field gun, passed the night at Wintershoek; the Police, with one troop U.M.R. and Maxim detachment, camped at Botha's quarries.
[147] See "The Causes, Superstitions and other Characteristics of the Matabele Rebellion, 1896." Appendix X.