Another factor in the situation was the Chief's great age. There has been some uncertainty in regard to the point, some maintaining he was as much as 105, but, when it is borne in mind that he was a member of the Imkulu-tshane regiment, the cadets of which were recruited about 1830, and that these were about seventeen or eighteen years old when recruited, his age could not have been more than ninety-five at the time of the Rebellion, if quite so much.
It has already been shown that the Magistrate and the Commissioner at Empandhleni placed themselves in immediate communication with Sigananda, who, however, hypnotized by the prospect of co-operating with his old King's son, deliberately ignored all the orders received by him.
When the Commissioner became convinced (as he did on 16th April) that Sigananda had thrown in his lot with Bambata and was in open rebellion, in conjunction with sections of adjoining tribes, he represented the situation as very serious, and urged the immediate concentration within Natal of a large Imperial force, partly to compensate for the imminent withdrawal of local troops to cope with the Rebellion in Zululand, and partly to counteract a rumour that was circulating to the effect that the Imperial Government, disapproving of what had taken place, would not assist the colonial forces. Mansel advised the taking of similar action. The Ministry, however, deemed it expedient to deal with the situation as far as possible from Natal resources alone and, if it proved beyond the Colony's capabilities, to appeal for assistance to other portions of South Africa. "Fears having been expressed," says the Governor, "that if the Active Militia as a whole left for Zululand, the Natal tribes, who were still in a state of unrest, might possibly rise, and that the Reserve Militia were insufficiently organized to deal with them, it was determined to raise immediately a Special Service Contingent of mounted men under the command of Lieut.-Col. J.R. Royston, C.M.G., D.S.O.[176] ... Detachments of Infantry were sent to garrison Gingindhlovu and Eshowe, in order to keep open lines of communication viâ Fort Yolland."[177] At the same time, a reward of £500 was offered for the capture, dead or alive, of Bambata, and £20 in respect of each of his followers. This reward, intended to stimulate Natives whose loyalty was not assured, was, however, withdrawn before the end of April, on account of the considerable number of Europeans then being put in the field.
In raising the Special Service Contingent, known as "Royston's Horse," Royston was debarred from recruiting members of the Active Militia force. After advertizing in the local press, numerous applications were received from all parts of Natal and the rest of South Africa, with the result that the corps reached its full complement (550) within ten days, hundreds of applications having had to be refused. The great majority of the men came from Johannesburg, Durban and parts of the Cape Colony. Much difficulty was experienced in selecting officers, as also in obtaining clothing, boots, saddles, etc., as the Militia Department had very little in stock, except arms and ammunition. The corps being a mounted one, it became necessary for Royston to use the powers given him under martial law to commandeer horses where the owners refused to sell.
Dinuzulu's attitude, ever since the outbreak at Byrnetown, and, indeed, for months before, had, as has already been related, been regarded by many with suspicion. Such, however, was not the view of Mr., now Sir Charles, Saunders, who emphasized in one despatch after another his implicit belief in the Chief's loyalty and complete detachment from the rebellious proceedings at Nkandhla. The opinion of such an officer naturally carried great weight throughout Natal and Zululand, as it was commonly known he was not only an exceptionally competent Zulu linguist, with a life-long acquaintance with the Natives, their habits and customs, but had held important official positions in Zululand ever since the beginning of 1888, and these, especially during the preceding ten years, had brought him into frequent personal contact with Dinuzulu. Many were swayed by this testimony, fortified as it was by the fact that Mr. Saunders had just been on a visit of a day and two nights to Usutu kraal, having left there on 7th April, after communicating to Dinuzulu and his indunas the news of the disaster at Mpanza.
The Government, on the 17th, decided on the course reflected in the following telegram to the Commissioner: "Absolutely necessary that Dinuzulu should take some action to show his loyalty, of which you say you are assured. All information goes to show that Natives believe he is concerned in movement, and he must be made to show his hand." Dinuzulu was communicated with accordingly. The same afternoon, the Government asked if the Commissioner thought it advisable to order Dinuzulu and Mciteki[178] to come to Pietermaritzburg to assist in advising as to affairs in Zululand, and whether some other powerful Chief might be told to come as well. The Commissioner replied it would be fatal at that juncture to order Dinuzulu or the others to Pietermaritzburg. "Situation is most delicate and critical at present and requires the presence of any loyal Chiefs we can depend on amongst their own people."
Almost simultaneously with the announcement of Sigananda having joined Bambata, the following message was sent to Mr. Saunders by Dinuzulu on the 18th, in reply to that from the Government of the preceding day: "I am not surprised that the Natal Government should have doubt as to my loyalty in face of repeated and constant accusations to the contrary effect which have been levelled against me throughout South Africa. I can only say I am perfectly loyal and am most anxious to give proof of this in any way the Government may wish. I have assured you of my loyalty by words and actions repeatedly, but apparently this is doubted, and I now ask that Government suggest means by which my loyalty can be proved absolutely, and finally dispel the slurs which have been cast upon me, and which I keenly resent. I am perfectly ready to turn out the whole of my people, and send them to Nkandhla at once to operate in any manner you may think fit, either in entering the forest and capturing this dog Bambata, who has been allowed to enter Zululand and disturb the peace which we enjoyed long after Natal Natives had openly shown disloyalty. As you know, I am physically incapable of leading my people in person, being unable to move with freedom from my bed, but the impi would go down in charge of my chief induna, Mankulumana, and I myself am prepared to be conveyed to Nongoma and remain there alone with the Magistrate, whilst my people are operating in any way they may be required as a proof of my good faith in this matter. If Government say they wish me to go to Nkandhla, I will find means to reach there, notwithstanding the state of my health. If this assurance is not sufficient, I am sure that Government will indicate what is necessary for further proof of loyalty to our King."
When this message was received it was communicated to the press and, being naturally given great prominence, had a reassuring effect far and wide; so much so, that the end of the Rebellion appeared to many to be in sight. Little did anyone suppose at the time that this communication, to all appearance brimming over with the deepest loyalty and affection, had issued from one who was actually committing high treason at the moment he sent it.
The Government, most fortunately dissuaded by Mr. Saunders, decided not to accept the offer of a levy. Such, by the way, could not have exceeded 500 or 600 men. To have accepted, however, as was pointed out at the time, would not only have attracted to it thousands of Zulus from every part of the country, as well as from beyond its borders, but the very movements of such concourse as would have assembled would have caused a recrudescence of the alarming rumours and unrest of which the Colony had already had a surfeit, the net result of which would have been to greatly augment Bambata's forces, if Dinuzulu and 'his army' did not themselves join en bloc. The Commissioner was opposed to Dinuzulu being so called on, not because he doubted the Chief's loyalty, but, as he wired on the 19th, because "the country is in such a nervous state that if his people once commence to arm, people would flock to join him from all parts. This would not only cause a general panic, but would be made the greatest capital of by Bambata as absolute proof that Dinuzulu was arming to join him." At this time, moreover, Dinuzulu was in a somewhat poor state of health, "being enormously stout and suffering apparently from some dropsical and cutaneous disorder, which completely incapacitated him for any physical exertion."