It may be contended, that the scope and tenor of these alliances were not altogether unfitted for the period when they were formed, and our circumscribed knowledge; but was it too late, when this knowledge was extended, to purify them from the dross which deteriorated the two grand principles of mutual benefit, on which all were grounded, viz. ‘perfect internal independence’ to them, and ‘acknowledged supremacy’ to the protecting power? It will be said, that even these corner-stones of the grand political fabric are far from possessing those durable qualities which the contracting parties define, but that, on the contrary, they are the Ormuzd and Ahrimanes, the good and evil principles of contention. But when we have superadded pecuniary engagements of indefinite extent, increasing in the ratio of their prosperity, and armed quotas or contingents of their troops, whose loose habits and discipline would ensure constant complaint, we may certainly take credit for having established a system which must compel that direct interference, which the broad principle of each treaty professes to check.
The inevitable consequence is the perpetuation of that denationalising principle, so well understood by the Mahrattas, ‘divide et impera.’ We are few; to use an Oriental metaphor, our agents must ‘use the eyes and ears of others.’ That mutual dependence, which would again have arisen, our interference will completely nullify. Princes will find they can oppress their chiefs, chiefs will find channels by which their sovereign’s commands may be rendered nugatory, and irresponsible ministers must have our support to raise these undefined tributary supplies; and unanimity, confidence, and all the sentiments of gratitude which they owe, and acknowledge to be our due, will gradually fade with the national degradation. That our alliances have this tendency cannot be disputed. By their very nature they transfer the respect of every class of subjects from their immediate sovereign to the paramount authority and its subordinate agents. Who will dare to urge that a government, which cannot support its internal rule without restriction, can be national? that without power unshackled and unrestrained by exterior council or espionage, it can maintain self-respect, the corner-stone of every virtue with States as with individuals? This first of feelings these treaties utterly annihilate. Can we suppose such denationalised allies are to be depended upon in emergencies? or, if allowed to retain a spark of their ancient moral inheritance, that it [126] will not be kindled into a flame against us when opportunity offers, instead of lighting up the powerful feeling of gratitude which yet exists towards us in these warlike communities?
Like us they were the natural foes of that predatory system which so long disturbed our power, and our preservation and theirs were alike consulted in its destruction. When we sought their alliance, we spoke in the captivating accents of philanthropy; we courted them to disunite from this Ahrimanes of political convulsion. The benevolent motives of the great mover of these alliances we dare not call in question, and his policy coincided with the soundest wisdom. But the treaties might have been revised, and the obnoxious parts which led to discord, abrogated, at the expense of a few paltry lacs of tribute and a portion of sovereign homage. It is not yet too late. True policy would enfranchise them altogether from our alliance; but till then let them not feel their shackles in the galling restraint on each internal operation. Remove that millstone to national prosperity, the poignant feeling that every increased bushel of corn raised in their long-deserted fields must send its tithe to the British granaries. Let the national mind recover its wonted elasticity, and they will again attain their former celebrity. We have the power to advance this greatness, and make it and its result our own; or, by a system unworthy of Britain, to retard and even quench it altogether.[[2]]
Never were their national characteristics so much endangered as in the seducing calm which followed the tempestuous agitations in which they had so long floated; doubtful, to use their own figurative expression, whether ‘the gift of our friendship, or our arms,’ were fraught with greater evil. The latter they could not withstand; though it must never be lost sight of, that, like ancient Rome when her glory was fading, we use ‘the arms of the barbarians’ to defend our conquests against them! Is the mind ever stationary? are virtue and high notions to be acquired from contact and example? Is there no mind above the level of £10 monthly pay in all the native legions of the three presidencies of India? no Odoacer, no Sivaji, [127] again to revive? Is the book of knowledge and of truth, which we hold up, only to teach them submission and perpetuate their weakness? Can we without fresh claims expect eternal gratitude, and must we not rationally look for reaction in some grand impulse, which, by furnishing a signal instance of the mutability of power, may afford a lesson for the benefit of posterity?
Is the mantle of protection, which we have thrown over these warlike races, likely to avert such a result? It might certainly, if imbued with all those philanthropic feelings for which we took credit, act with soporific influence, and extinguish the embers of international animosity. ‘The lion and the lamb were to drink from the same fountain’; they were led to expect the holy Satya Yug, when each man reposed under his own fig-tree, which neither strife nor envy dared approach.
When so many nations are called upon, in a period of great calamity and danger, to make over to a foreigner, their opposite in everything, their superior in most, the control of their forces in time of war, the adjudication of their disputes in time of peace, and a share in the fruits of their renovating prosperity, what must be the result; when each Rajput may hang up his lance in the hall, convert his sword to a ploughshare, and make a basket of his buckler? What but the prostration of every virtue? It commences with the basis of the Rajput’s—the martial virtues; extinguish these and they will soon cease to respect themselves. Sloth, low cunning and meanness will follow. What nation ever maintained its character that devolved on the stranger the power of protection! To be great, to be independent, its martial spirit must be cherished; happy if within the bounds of moderation. Led away by enthusiasm, the author experienced the danger of interference, when observing but one side of the picture—the brilliant lights which shone on their long days of darkness, not calculating the shade which would follow the sudden glare.
On our cessation from every species of interference alone depends their independence or their amalgamation—a crisis fraught with danger to our overgrown rule.
Let Alexander’s speech to his veterans, tired of conquest and refusing to cross the Hyphasis, be applied, and let us not reckon too strongly on our empire of opinion: “Fame never represents matters truly as they are, but on the contrary magnifies everything. This is evident; for our own reputation and glory, though founded on solid truth, is yet more obliged to rumour than reality.”[[3]]
We may conclude with the Macedonian conqueror’s reasons for showing the [128] Persians and his other foreign allies so much favour: “The possession of what we got by the sword is not very durable, but the obligation of good offices is eternal. If we have a mind to keep Asia, and not simply pass through it, our clemency must extend to them also, and their fidelity will make our empire everlasting. As for ourselves, we have more than we know what to do with, and it must be an insatiable, avaricious temper which desires to continue to fill what already runs over.”[[4]] [129]