Were they somewhat more advanced towards prosperity, the crown demesne redeemed from dissipation and sterility, and the chiefs enabled to bring their quotas into play for protection and police, recourse should never be had to bodies of mercenary troops, which practice, if persevered in, will inevitably change their present form of government. This has invariably been the result, in Europe as well as Rajasthan, else why the dread of standing armies?

Employment of Mercenaries.

General Duties of the Pattāwat, or Vassal Chief of Rājasthān.

If, at any former period in the history of Marwar, its prince had thus dared to act, his signiory and rights over it would not have been of great value; his crown and life would both have been endangered by these turbulent and determined vassals. How much is comprehended in that manly, yet respectful sentence: “If he accepts our services, then he is our prince and leader; if not, but our equal, and we again his brothers, claimants of and laying claim to the soil.” In the remonstrance of the sub-vassals of Deogarh, we have the same sentiments on a reduced scale. In both we have the ties of blood and kindred, connected with and strengthening national policy. If a doubt could exist as to the principle of fiefs being similar in Rajasthan and in Europe, it might be set at rest by the important question long agitated by the feodal lawyers in Europe, “whether the vassal is bound to follow the standard of his lord against his own kindred or against his sovereign”: which in these States is illustrated by a simple and universal proof. If the question were put to a Rajput to whom his service is due, whether to his chief or his sovereign, the reply would be, Raj ka malik wuh, pat[[31]] ka malik yih: ‘He is the sovereign of the State, but this is my head’: an ambiguous phrase, but well understood to imply that his own immediate chief is the only authority he regards.

This will appear to militate against the right of remonstrance (as in the case of the vassals of Deogarh), for they look to the crown for protection against injustice; they annihilate other rights by admitting appeal higher than this. Every class looks out for some resource against oppression. The sovereign is the last applied to on such occasions, with whom the sub-vassal has no bond of connexion. He can receive no favour, nor perform any service, but through his own immediate superior; and presumes not to question (in cases not personal to himself) the propriety of his chief’s actions, adopting implicitly his feelings [157] and resentments. The daily familiar intercourse of life is far too engrossing to allow him to speculate, and with his lord he lives a patriot or dies a traitor. In proof of this, numerous instances could be given of whole clans devoting themselves to the chief against their sovereign;[[32]] not from the ties of kindred, for many were aliens to blood; but from the ties of duty, gratitude, and all that constitutes clannish attachment, superadded to feudal obligation. The sovereign, as before observed, has nothing to do with those vassals not holding directly from the crown; and those who wish to stand well with their chiefs would be very slow in receiving any honours or favours from the general fountain-head. The Deogarh chief sent one of his sub-vassals to court on a mission; his address and deportment gained him favour, and his consequence was increased by a seat in the presence of his sovereign. When he returned, he found this had lost him the favour of his chief, who was offended, and conceived a jealousy both of his prince and his servant. The distinction paid to the latter was, he said, subversive of his proper authority, and the vassal incurred by his vanity the loss of estimation where alone it was of value.

Obligations of a Vassal.

[1]. Literally ‘terrace,’ or ‘altar.’

[2]. [Headman and accountant.]

[3]. They were considered a sort of jury, bearing a close analogy to the judices selecti, who sat with the praetor in the tribunal of Rome (Hallam).