Face to Face with Kaiserism

by James W. Gerard

Secondly, questions of the most expedient settlement of disputes between individual Powers or groups of such where no fundamental principles of nationality or similar rights are concerned, and

Thirdly, questions which concern all the nations through their common interest in general security and protection against the disturbance of international peace and traffic.

Both the Allies and the Central Powers agree to the idea of settling these latter questions in a better way than before; i.e., by an International League of the Nations to enforce peace. But both want the creation of this League to be settled after the war. It can, however, with good reason be upheld that there is in this a fault against logic which would have to be paid dearly by them as well as by the neutral world. Both base a number of their demands on the necessity of protecting themselves against renewed onslaughts by their opponents. Now such protection might be a necessary thing under the present state of an International Law which has been outraged and partly been made inane by themselves and has partly turned out not to meet the conditions of modern warfare as they result from the modern weapons of destruction. But it would be made unnecessary or its requirements be greatly reduced if the League of the Nations, such as is in principle accepted by them, did already exist or had its rules and regulations already laid down in detail. Is it reasonable to allow this contradiction to cause now innumerable deaths and mutilations of human beings and unbounded destruction of material wealth instead of seeking means to dissolve it as early as possible? Ought not all our wits be exerted to find this earlier solution?

There are within the means of the neutrals, if acting together, two ways to bring the war to an earlier end than that to be expected from the free decision of the belligerents. The one is to drop all considerations of neutrality such as at present regarded and, without directly supporting the one section to the detriment of the other, withdraw from both of them all supplies in food, raw material, half and wholly manufactured goods, not minding which section would by this be more damaged than its opponents. In fact, it would most likely be a decidedly unneutral measure against the one section which now benefits more than the other by these supplies, and because of this and from other reasons there is little probability that it would find general acceptance. The other way is to reduce the justification of the continuation of the war by minimising the objects for which it is led in the belief of the great masses of the people engaged as much as in the eyes of the outside world.

Both belligerents, to say it again, put in the first line of their requirements security against renewed attacks, protection against the continuation of the insecurity of peace. Both admit that the proposed League of the Nations has become a necessity; both admit that it might indeed protect mankind against new wars and a state of incessantly endangered peace. Why then wait and let the disaster go on instead of proceeding at once to lay the foundation of this League?

The step is not so impossible as it might appear. Supposing one neutral state took the matter in hand and, after having ascertained the consent of the other neutrals or at least a majority of them—which it is almost sure to obtain—would invite all the nations, the belligerents included, to a conference or a congress at a neutral place for the discussion and the arrangement of the principles and rules of the proposed League of the Nations. Would the belligerent nations refuse to send their delegates to such a conference? Could they do it without damaging their case before the world of the neutrals and the masses of their own people? It is most improbable that they would do such a thing. And even if they did they would not by this put the conference to naught. It would be there and would give palpable substance to an idea which until now lived, in spite of great and most ingenuous work spent on it, politically only in the sphere of lofty speculation or projects.

And the conference could do more. Starting from the maxim which finds such impressive accentuation in President Wilson's note that war in general must not, and the present war in particular can not, be regarded as the private affair of the individual states that engage in it, the conference could also take into consideration some questions of consequence connected with the present war. It could, e.g., whilst laying the foundations for the security of countries against wilful attacks lay down opinions about the just settlement of disputed questions of nationality and the liberation of nations or part of such from allegiance to a state or empire of different or mixed nationalities. It seems to become a necessity to make clear whether a Power or coalition of such can be justified to put in the list of their war aims the liberation of nationalities without sufficient proof that the latter all want to sever their connection with the state or empire to which they just belong.

The Tcheques in Austria and the Finns in Russia strive for their full autonomy within these empires, but they have very little shown of a desire to become a separate state. An opinion that wars for abstruse benefits never asked for can under no circumstances be regarded as liberation wars would wrong nobody because it would apply to all, but it may contribute much to have designs given up which otherwise would uselessly cause bloodshed and prolonged enmities.

The conference would also be justified in taking measures to procure an impartial expert opinion on the origin and the legal conduct of the war and the general principles of national and international right involved.

If the conference would invite neutral experts in international law of general renown to investigate the questions indicated above and draw up reports it would not by this offend in the smallest degree against the requirements of impartiality. But the reports could, if based on careful examination and considerately worded, contribute very much to soften the excited minds in the countries engaged and facilitate the preliminaries of a genuine peace.