This second speech of the Chancellor made a better impression and somewhat affected the more extreme members of the Reichstag, but it came too late to prevent the passage of the vote of censure by the remarkable majority of two hundred and ninety-three to fifty-four. Only the Conservatives voted against it. A few days later, when the Social Democrats demanded that the Chancellor take the consequence of the vote of distrust and resign, the attitude of the members of all the other parties, who had been favourably impressed by the second speech of the Chancellor, showed that they were not yet prepared to go the length of holding that a vote of distrust in the Reichstag must necessarily mean the resignation of the Chancellor.

Public excitement gradually calmed down, and a complete change of the officials at Zabern helped to bring about a normal condition of affairs. The Viceroy, Count Wedel, and Secretary of State Zorn von Bulach, resigned and were replaced by von Dallwitz and Count Rödern.

However, the everlasting question came up again a little later during the regular budget debate of the Reichstag. The Chancellor made his speech, giving a review of the political international situation. He was followed by Herr Scheidemann, leader of the Social Democrats, who mercilessly attacked the Chancellor and stated that if the Chancellor still thought that he was the right man at the helm, he, Scheidemann, would show that the contrary was the case. He then enumerated what he called the many political failures of the Chancellor, the failure of the bill to amend the Prussian franchise law, and stated that the few bills which had been passed, such as the bill giving Alsace-Lorraine a real constitution, had been carried only with the help of the Social Democratic party. The speaker then once more rehashed the incidents of the Zabern matter, referred to the attitude of the Emperor, who, he said, had evidently been too busy with hunting and festivities to devote time to such trivial matters as the Zabern Affair, and also said that, if the Chancellor had refused to withdraw, the only possible conclusion from the vote of the two hundred and ninety-three Reichstag members, who were certainly not influenced by personal feelings against the Chancellor, was that the Chancellor must be sticking to his post only because of the mistaken idea of the Emperor's authority and because he must believe in the fetish of personal government. Scheidemann begged that the same majority which had passed the vote of censure should now follow it up by voting down the Chancellor's salary and thus force him out of office.

The Chancellor immediately replied, saying that he needed no advice from Herr Scheidemann, and that when the government had consented to change the rules of the Reichstag he had expressly reserved the authority either to regard or disregard any resolution passed after an interpellation, and that formerly, after discussing an interpellation and the answer of the government, no vote could be taken to approve or reject a resolution expressing its opinion of such course of action. Such resolutions might be considered as valuable material, but it had been agreed that they could have no binding effect either upon the government or any member of it, and that nobody had ever dreamed that by a mere change of business rules the whole constitution of the Empire was being changed and authority given to the Reichstag to dismiss ministers at will; that in France and Great Britain conditions were different, but that parliamentary government did not exist in Germany; that it was the constitutional privilege of the Emperor to appoint the Chancellor without any assistance or advice from the Reichstag; that he, the Chancellor, would resist with all his might every attempt to change this system; and that he, therefore, refused to resign because the resolution had no other effect than to make it evident that a difference of opinion existed between the Reichstag and the government.

This debate took place on December ninth, 1913, and, with the exception of the Social Democrats and the Polish deputies, the leaders of all parties supported the view of the Chancellor. The motion to strike out the Chancellor's salary was voted down, only the Social Democrats and Poles voting in favour of it.

It is unquestioned, however, that this Zabern Affair and the consequent attitude of the whole nation, as well as the extraordinary vote in the Reichstag, greatly alarmed the military party.

It was perhaps the final factor which decided the advocates of the old military system of Germany in favour of a European war. Usually in past years when the Reichstag in adjournments had risen and cheered the name of the Emperor, the Social Democrats absented themselves from the Chamber, but when the Reichstag adjourned on May twentieth, 1914, these members remained in the Chamber and refused either to rise or to cheer the Emperor. The President of the Reichstag immediately called attention to this breach of respect to the Emperor, upon which the Socialists shouted, "That is our affair," and tried to drown the cheers with hoots and hisses at which the other parties applauded tumultuously.

This occurrence I know greatly incensed the Emperor and did much, I believe, to win his consent to the war.

CHAPTER V

PSYCHOLOGY AND CAUSES WHICH PREPARED THE NATION FOR WAR