The number of officers and other ranks returned as killed and wounded is small, but most of the missing turned out afterwards to be either killed or wounded.
During this fighting our Medical Officer, Captain A. C. Bateman, M.C., was killed. Among personalities connected with the Battalion there was none more striking or lovable than "the Doc." Posted in the early months of 1916, he served continuously with us until the fateful 28th March, 1918, when he was reported as having been wounded and taken prisoner by the enemy. As no more was heard of him after that date it can only be inferred that he succumbed to his injuries, and gave up his brave life in the service of his country. As a Battalion Medical Officer he was unrivalled, and his ability in diagnosis and treatment was widely commented on by all ranks. Sympathetic and kindly to "lame dogs," and to the "nervy," he was a terror to "lead-swingers." Providence seemed to have endowed him with a special faculty for discovering these. In a battle he was ever in the thick of things doing his duty, and more than his duty. It therefore gave high satisfaction in all quarters when he was awarded the Military Cross in recognition of the gallantry and efficiency he displayed at Ypres in July, 1917.
But all who knew him will think of him first as the best of comrades—a very prince of good fellows. His rich Hibernian humour, his infectious laugh, his droll ways were unfailing medicaments for weary men, and in every social gathering he was the life and soul of the company. One wonders if the French War Office has it on record how two British doctors who had been enjoying Paris leave, and were in danger of being late in rejoining their units, solemnly presented their compliments to the Minister of War, along with a polite request that they might without delay have the use of a car to take them to Albert. On the request being acceded to that dignitary was warmly shaken by the hand, and assured that no want of his, if made known to them, would go unsupplied! Such was Bateman. Irrepressibly gay when all around him was dismal and difficult, he brought sunshine into our lives, and as often as men of the 7th Battalion meet together his name is sure to be mentioned in terms of affectionate praise.
The engagement was probably the heaviest fight the Battalion ever took part in. One realised the difference between attacking and being attacked. We felt all the horrible uncertainty as to what would be the result of the next move by the enemy. We believed there was practically no one between us and the sea, and that we had to hold the position at all costs. Nobly did the officers and men carry out these instructions. Unfortunately, as was proved later, practically all the missing were never heard of again, only some 50 or 60 were accounted for as prisoners, and most of these were wounded.
We know now, through General Ludendorf's Memoirs, that it was the failure of the German Divisions at Arras that brought their big offensive to a standstill. It is interesting to read his description and to note how it coincides with our experience. He states:—
"At the shortest range the artillery was to be supplemented by trench mortars. After a short artillery bombardment, lasting only a few hours, the infantry should advance to the assault. This short artillery preparation was expected to paralyze the enemy's artillery by means of gas spread over a large area and to keep his infantry in their dug-outs. At the beginning of the assault the artillery, while continuing to keep down that of the enemy, was to put down a barrage in front of the infantry and pave a way for it like a giant roller. The infantry had to keep close up to this wall of projectors. The enemy, who would come out of his dug-out after the barrage had passed, would be, surprised by our infantry, assisted by 'auxiliary' or companion arms under the protection of artillery.... We had 20 to 30 more Divisions than the enemy. We thought of carrying out the attack with 50 or 60 Divisions. The Army had thrown off its depression. Morale was completely restored, and we intended starting a War movement. If the blow at the centre succeeded the strategic results might indeed be enormous, as we should separate the bulk of the English Army from the French and crowd it up with its back to the sea.... The 17th Army was to capture the decisive heights East and North of Arras. I attached the greatest importance to this attack, to have the high ground in our possession was bound to be decisive in any fighting in the plain of the Lys. In spite of employing extraordinary masses of artillery and ammunition, the attack of the 17th Army on both banks of the Scarpe was a failure."
To shew the amount of artillery sometimes used, apart from trench mortars, he states in another place:—
"In the offensive battle it was necessary to bring up a 100 guns to each kilometre (1100 yards) of front."
The following day the C.O. received the following letters:—
"My dear Colonel,