[1455] Ibid., No. 1,359. Pierre Ramus was excluded from the College of Presles by this decree.
[1456] Ordonnance du Roy sur les defences de tenir Escolles, Principaultez, Colleges; ny lire en quelque art; ou science que ce soit, en public, privé ou en chambre, s’ilz ne sont congenuz et approuvez esté de la Religion catholique et romaine. Avec l’Arrest de la court du Parlement. Poictiers, B. Noscereau, 1570.
[1457] Claude Haton, II, 610 and 617.
[1458] Ibid., 629.
[1459] Ibid., 740.
[1460] The vidame of Chartres to the Marshal Montmorency, October 3, 1570. See Appendix XXVII. The scheme originated with the vidame de Chartres and the cardinal Châtillon (see La Ferrière, “Les projets de marriage d’une reine d’Angleterre,” Revue des deux mondes, September 15, 1881, p. 310); cf. Hume, Courtships of Queen Elizabeth, 115. In 1563 the prince of Condé had actually proposed the marriage of Charles IX and Elizabeth (Revue des deux mondes). August 15, 1881, p. 861.
[1461] C. S. P. For., No. 1,521, January 27, 1571. Walsingham to Cecil.
[1462] Such an offer, in the nature of things, could not have been accepted. Aside from the fact that France at this juncture was unwilling to further any cause advocated by Spain, there was too much practical advantage to France in maintaining the entente cordiale with the Turks. Turkish influence might be brought to bear upon the Emperor to neutralize his opposition to French enterprise in Poland; moreover, France had but recently concluded an advantageous commercial treaty with the Sultan. For accounts of the relations of France and Turkey at this time see Du Ferrier, Un ambassadeur liberal sous Charles IX et Henri III, 44-102; Flament, “La France et la Ligue contre le Turc (1571-73),” Rev. d’hist. dip., XVI, 1902, p. 619; Janssen, History of the German People, VIII, chap. v, “Turkish wars up to 1572.” The league of the Christian powers, whose efforts culminated in the famous engagement of Lepanto was formed in May, 1571. The king of Spain, the Pope and Venice were the principals thereof. Spain was to provide one-half of the forces, the Venetians one-third, and the Pope the remainder. The capture of Cyprus by the Turks in the spring of 1570 was the immediate cause of its formation (cf. La vraye et très fidelle narration des succès, des assaults, defences et prinse du royaume de Cypre, faicte par F. Ange de Lusignan, Paris 1580; Commentari della guerra di Cipro e della lega dei principi cristiani contro il Turco, di Bartolomeo Sereno, 1845; Herre, Europäische Politik in cyprischen Krieg, 1570-73, Leipzig, 1902—there is a review of this in English Hist. Review, XIX, 357; Miller, “Greece under the Turks 1571-1684,” English Hist. Review, XIX, 646). Europe expected a double attack on the part of Mohammedanism, both in the Mediterranean and by land against Hungary and Transylvania, as in 1530. Venice trembled for Zara in Dalmatia. These fears were not misplaced. The warlike preparations of the Sultan went so far as to offer pardon to all malefactors, except rebels and counterfeiters, who would serve in the galleys. The allied fleet lay at Candia during the winter of 1570-71 awaiting reinforcements. But there was a vast amount of anxiety and discontent among the allies, for nothing but the sense of a common peril could have united Venice and Spain, or Venice and the Pope. In the politics of Europe Venice was a neutral power, and neutrality in the religious politics of the time, in Philip II’s eyes, was almost tantamount to heresy. Moreover, as was inevitable, the tediousness of the preparations and the corruption of officials of the fleet was so great that men even died of hunger inflicted through fraud. Only Venice’s administration seems to have been efficient.
[1463] L’Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 150.
[1464] Négociations dans le Levant, III, 13.