It must nevertheless be conceded, that his mode of taking the property without leaving in the owner's hands invoices of the different articles, and certificates of having received them, could not be justified, nor could it have been intended by the commissioners. They could mean nothing more, than such things as would serve to Supply the army either with provisions or clothing, and these upon a fair security to the owners; for, by the articles of capitulation entered into with General Montgomery, the citizens were to be maintained in a free possession of their goods and effects of every kind, whereas packages containing silks, and other articles equally inapplicable to the object in view, were carried off indiscriminately. These circumstances, and his conduct to the court-martial, produced impressions, which the subsequent developements of his character contributed nothing to efface or diminish; and, viewed in the most favorable light, his honesty can be screened only at the expense of his judgment and delicacy.
I have dwelt the longer on this transaction, because it was the first important link in the chain of incidents, which led to his final ruin. Another, somewhat akin to it, occurred nearly at the same time. There had been a quarrel at Quebec between Arnold and Major Brown, who had marched to that place with General Montgomery. This enmity had its origin as early as the capture of Ticonderoga by Ethan Allen, when Brown was an officer under Colonel Easton, and of course opposed to the pretensions of Arnold on that occasion. From Quebec letters were written by Arnold to some of the members of Congress, containing severe reflections on his conduct, and open charges against him of having plundered the baggage and property of prisoners taken in Canada. When these particulars were made known to Brown by his friends, he demanded from General Wooster, and afterwards from General Thomas, a court of inquiry; but through the machinations of Arnold he was defeated in his purpose, till after the evacuation of Canada. He then applied in person to Congress for redress, and directions were sent to the commander in the northern department to grant a court of inquiry. Colonel Brown, for such was now his title, renewed his application to General Gates at Ticonderoga, but with no better success than before. As in the case of the court-martial, Gates chose to exercise a dictatorial authority, and protect his favorite.
Nothing more was done till the end of the campaign, when Colonel Brown presented his application in another form, demanding an arrest of General Arnold on a series of charges, in which he was accused of numerous misdemeanors and criminal acts during the course of his command. General Gates replied, that he would lay the petition before Congress. Being thus baffled in his attempts to obtain justice through the proper channel, Colonel Brown published a narrative of the whole affair, introducing his charges against Arnold, and commenting upon his conduct with much severity, and indeed with a warmth that indicated too great a degree of excited feeling. The result will be seen hereafter. It is a little remarkable, that, in the midst of all these censures, Arnold never solicited a court of inquiry on his own part, by which, if they were unjust and without foundation, he might at once have silenced his enemies, and which it would be natural to expect under such circumstances from a man, possessing a quick sense of honor, who was conscious of his innocence.
As soon as the army had retreated to Crown Point and Ticonderoga, no time was lost and no efforts were spared in pressing forward preparations for defence, both by land and water. The British would of course pursue their way over the Lake, the moment they could construct or collect at St. John's suitable vessels for the purpose. To baffle such a movement, or at least to embarrass it as much as possible, it was extremely important that the marine force should be put on the most respectable footing, and increased to the utmost limit, which the resources in hand would admit. Great inconveniences were to be encountered in effecting this object; few materials for ship-building were in readiness; shipwrights, carpenters, and many essential articles for fitting out the vessels were to be obtained from the seaports. Such was the promptness and energy, however, with which the work was prosecuted, that by the middle of August a little squadron was prepared to sail, consisting of one sloop, three schooners, and five gondolas. The sloop carried twelve guns, one schooner the same number, the others eight, and the gondolas three each. These vessels rendezvoused at Crown Point under the the command of Arnold, and before the end of the month he sailed with his whole armament down the Lake.
By his instructions from General Gates, he was to take his station at the Isle-aux-Têtes, where there was a narrow pass in the Lake, and beyond that point he was ordered in positive terms not to advance. The order stated, that, as the present operations were designed to be wholly on the defensive, the business of the fleet was to prevent or repel a hostile invasion, but not to run any wanton risks or seek an encounter within the enemy's territory. In all other respects the discretion of the commander was to be his guide. On his arrival at Windmill Point, four miles from Isle-aux-Têtes, he discovered the island to be occupied by the enemy, numbers of whom were likewise encamped on the shores of the Lake. This induced him to stop at Windmill Point, and moor his vessels in a line across the Lake, so as to prevent any of the enemy's boats from passing * Crown Point. Hence he charges Arnold with disobedience of orders at the outset, in having gone beyond that place. But the actual site of Isle-aux-Têtes was at the lower end of the Lake, almost in contact with the Canada line, and in the vicinity of what is now called Rouse's Point. It was intended that the fleet should be stationed as near the line as prudence would admit, and the orders were strictly obeyed.—Wilkinson's Memoirs, Vol. I. p. 81.
* General Wilkinson, by mistaking the position of Isle-aux-Têtes, has bestowed much unmerited censure upon Arnold. He supposes it to be at a place called Split Rock, which is but about twenty-five miles from Crown Point
The decks of his vessels were so low, that he thought it necessary to erect around them barricades of fascines, which should protect them from being boarded by superior numbers in small craft. While his men were on shore cutting fascines, they were attacked by a party of British and Indians, and before they could reach their boat three were killed and six wounded. This circumstance proved to him the inexpediency of remaining in a position, where he was exposed to perpetual annoyance from the enemy, without having an adequate force to act by land. In a few days he returned eight or ten miles to Isle-la-Motte, and took a station more advantageous and secure, as the island was beyond the reach of an attack from the main land, and his guard-boats would discover any approach by water.
Small scouting parties were sent down on each side of the Lake, from whom intelligence was from time to time obtained, but not with such accuracy as to enable Arnold to judge of the extent of the enemy's naval preparations at St. John's. Being so well informed, nevertheless, as to deem it unadvisable to hazard an action in a part of the Lake, where he would be obliged to engage a superior force in an open encounter, he withdrew his fleet still farther back, and anchored it in a line between Valcour Island and the western shore of the Lake.
Since leaving Crown Point his armament had been reinforced, so that it now consisted of three schooners, two sloops, three galleys and eight gondolas. Early in the morning of the 11th of October, the guard-boats gave notice, that the enemy's fleet was in sight, off Cumberland Head, moving up the Lake. It soon appeared advancing around the southern point of Valcour Island, and presented a formidable aspect, there being one ship with three masts, two schooners, a radeau, one gondola, twenty gunboats, four longboats, and forty-four boats with provisions and troops. The armed vessels were manned by seven hundred chosen seamen. Such an array was enough to convince the Americans, that they must rely mainly on their bravery and the advantages of their position. The wind was likewise in their favor, as some of the larger vessels could not beat up sufficiently near to engage in the attack. While the enemy's fleet was coming round the island, Arnold had ordered his three galleys, and a schooner called the Royal Savage, to get under way and advance upon the enemy. On their return to the line the schooner grounded and was afterwards destroyed, but the men were saved. At half past twelve the action became general and very warm, the British having brought all their gunboats and one schooner within musket-shot of the American line. They kept up a heavy fire of round and grape shot, till five o'clock, when they withdrew from the contest and joined the ship and schooner, which a head wind had prevented from coming into action.
During the contest Arnold was on board the Congress galley, which suffered severely. It received seven shot between wind and water, was hulled twelve times, the main mast was wounded in two places, the rigging cut in pieces, and the proportion of killed and wounded was unusually great. So deficient was the fleet in gunners, that Arnold himself pointed almost every gun that was fired from his vessel. The Washington galley was equally shattered; the first lieutenant was killed, and the captain and master wounded. All the officers of one of the gondolas, except the captain, were lost; and another gondola sunk soon after the engagement. The whole number of killed and wounded was about sixty. The enemy landed a large body of Indians, who kept up an incessant fire of musketry from the island and the opposite shore, but without effecting much injury.