* In some accounts he is called Hanyost Schuyler, which I am inclined to think was the true name; but historians have adopted the other.
A friendly Indian, wily by nature and skilled in artifice from habit, proposed that bullets should be shot through Cuyler's coat, which would give the greater plausibility to his story. Thus prepared he entered the forest, and in a little time fell in with one of the enemy's scouts, to whom he related the disaster of his having been taken and condemned as a spy, adding that he was about to be executed when he found means to elude his guards, but was pursued so closely as to be shot several times through his clothes, and had escaped with the utmost peril of his life. The same account he repeated to St. Leger, as soon as he came to the camp, and said that Arnold was advancing by rapid marches at the head of two thousand men. A second messenger followed close upon his heels, who magnified the number to three thousand, with the additional embellishment of their being very near at hand. The success of the stratagem was complete. A panic spread among the Indians, and two or three hundred decamped immediately. The chiefs insisted on a general retreat, and no arguments could prevail on them to remain. In a short time the whole camp was in confusion, and St. Leger was obliged to move off so precipitately, that fifty-nine tents were left standing, and various articles of baggage and camp equipage were scattered in every direction. The faithless savages, not contented to desert their friends, seized the opportunity to steal and plunder whatever came in their way. Cuyler concealed himself and got safely into the fort.
Thus was raised the siege of Fort Schuyler, and thus terminated St. Leger's expedition, from which great advantages had been expected by the British government in aid of General Burgoyne. Almost immediately after sending to Gates for a reinforcement, Arnold resolved to march forward with such troops as he had; and the news of St. Leger's retreat met him twenty-two miles from the fort. This movement, which was reported by the scouts, gave credit to the exaggerated statements of the messengers. He advanced to the fort, where he continued but a short time, and then returned to General Gates's army, having been absent twenty days. Colonel Gansevoort, who commanded at Fort Schuyler, sustained the siege with firmness and bravery. Lieutenant-Colonel Willett, the second in command, distinguished himself in a sortie from the garrison, and by other acts of military enterprise, which, the British Annual Register said, merited the praise even of an enemy.
The left wing of Gates's army was now at Loudon's Ferry, on the south bank of the Mohawk River, five miles above its confluence with the Hudson. The command at that post was assigned to Arnold. Two brigades and Morgan's battalion of riflemen were stationed there, to prevent General Burgoyne from crossing the Mohawk, should his march be continued thus far towards Albany. This event, however, was not destined to happen. The fatal defeat at Bennington, and the entire failure of the western expedition, had weakened his strength, depressed his hopes, and taught him caution. He lingered at Saratoga, and the American army, elated by their good fortune and encouraged by the reviving spirit of the country, retraced their steps and encamped on Behmus's Heights.
In this encampment Arnold still retained the left division of the army, consisting of the same regiments as at Loudon's Ferry. On the morning of the 19th of September, seven days after the camp had been formed, intelligence was brought that parties of the enemy were advancing within two or three miles of the lines. Arnold expressed his opinion to General Gates, that troops should march out and attack them; and he accordingly received orders to send Morgan's riflemen and Dearborn's light infantry, and to support them if necessary. An action was brought on, which lasted from half past twelve o'clock till night, and was fought wholly by detachments from Arnold's division, except one regiment only from another brigade. Wilkinson says, that no general officer was on the field of battle during the day; but when, towards evening, Gates and Arnold were together in the front of the camp, and Colonel Lewis came in from the scene of action and stated that its progress was undecisive, Arnold exclaimed, "I will soon put an end to it," and set off in a full gallop from the camp. Under the apprehension that he would do some rash thing, as Wilkinson goes on to say, Gates despatched an officer after him and ordered him back. It thus appears, that he was neither ordered out, nor permitted to go out, to take any part in the action. To a man, whose element was fighting, and whose ambition for military glory was equalled only by his bravery in acquiring it, this check upon his aspirations must have been keenly felt, whatever motives for imposing it may have actuated his superior in command.
A serious misunderstanding arose at this time between Gates and Arnold, which several circumstances conspired to foment. In the first place, a part of Arnold's division was withdrawn without his knowledge, and he was put in the ridiculous light, as he called it, of presuming to give orders, which were contravened by the general orders of the commander-in-chief. This is supposed to have been owing to the officious interference of Wilkinson, who was adjutant-general to the army, and who insisted on the returns of a part of Arnold's division being made directly to him, and influenced Gates to sustain his demand, which was done in general orders, without giving notice to Arnold. Again, it was ascertained, that in his official communication to Congress, respecting the battle, Gates had said nothing of Arnold or his division, but merely stated that the action was fought by detachments from the army. Arnold complained of this neglect as ungenerous, not more in regard to himself than to the troops under his immediate command. "Had my division behaved ill," said he, "the other division of the army would have thought it extremely hard to have been amenable for their conduct." High words and harsh language passed between the two generals, and Gates went so far as to tell Arnold, that he thought him of little consequence in the army, that when General Lincoln arrived he should take away his command of a division, and that he was ready to give him a pass to leave the camp whenever he pleased.
A correspondence followed; haughty and arrogant on the part of Gates, intemperate and indiscreet on that of Arnold. The latter demanded a pass for himself and suite to join General Washington. It was granted; but he changed his mind when he had taken time for reflection, rightly perceiving the hazard to which he would subject his reputation by voluntarily retiring from the army when another action might be hourly expected. He remained, although deprived of his command, and without any employment in the camp. Gates took the division under his own immediate charge, General Lincoln in the meantime being put in command of the right wing.
Which party in the dispute was the most blamable, it would be difficult now to decide. That Gates was overbearing is certain; that Arnold was impetuous and presuming may as little be doubted. He probably relied too much on the professions of friendship, and acts of indulgence, which the same commander had manifested in his favor the year before at Ticonderoga. There is room to believe, also, that a spice of jealousy mingled with Gates's feelings on this occasion. Colonel Varick, writing from camp to General Schuyler, three days after the action, said, "He seems to be piqued, that Arnold's division had the honor of beating the enemy on the 19th. This I am certain of, that Arnold has all the credit of the action. And this I further know, that Gates asked where the troops were going, when Scammell's battalion marched out, and, upon being told, he declared no more troops should go; he would not suffer the camp to be exposed. Had Gates complied with Arnold's repeated desires, he would have obtained a general and complete victory over the enemy. But it is evident to me, he never intended to fight Burgoyne, till Arnold urged, begged, and entreated him to do it." After the convention of Saratoga, Colonel Varick again wrote as follows in a letter from Albany. "During Burgoyne's stay here, he gave Arnold great credit for his bravery and military abilities, especially in the action of the 19th, whenever he spoke of him, and once in the presence of Gates." From this testimony it may be inferred, that the causes of the quarrel did not grow altogether out of the relations of rank in which the two parties stood to each other. Personal motives had their full share of influence at least with one, and perhaps with both.
When the second battle of Behmus's Heights commenced, on the 7th of October, Arnold, having no command, was discovered to be in a state of high excitement and apparent irritation. He continued in camp for some time, but at length, without instructions or permission, rode off in a full gallop to the field of battle. This being told to Gates, he sent Major Armstrong after him with orders. As soon as Arnold saw Armstrong, anticipating the purport of his message, and doubtless remembering the peremptory order to return while on his way out to the former action, he put spurs to his horse and quickened his speed. Armstrong pursued, tracing the erratic movements of Arnold, and keeping up the chase for half an hour, without being able to approach near enough to speak to him. And in fact, Arnold received no orders during the day, but rode about the field in every direction, seeking the hottest parts of the action, and issuing his commands wherever he went.
Being the highest officer in rank, that appeared on the field, his orders were obeyed when practicable; but all accounts agree, that his conduct was rash in the extreme, indicating rather the frenzy of a madman, than the considerate wisdom of an experienced general. He threw himself heedlessly into the most exposed situations, brandishing his sword in the air, animating his troops, and urging them forward. But the brilliant manouvre with which the engagement was closed, the assault of the enemy's works and driving the Hessians from their encampment, was undoubtedly owing in the first case to Arnold. He gave the order, and by his personal bravery set an example to the troops, which inspired them with ardor and hurried them onward. He was shot through the leg whilst riding gallantly into the sally-port, and his horse fell dead under him. The success of the assault was complete, and crowned the day with victory.