Institutes of the Christian Religion (Vol. 2 of 2)

by Jean Calvin

IV. Respecting the title of universal bishop, the first contention arose in the time of Gregory, and was occasioned by the ambition of John, bishop of Constantinople. For he wanted to make himself universal bishop—an attempt which had never been made by any one before. In that controversy Gregory does not plead against this as the assumption of a right which belonged to himself, but resolutely protests against it altogether, as a profane and sacrilegious application, and even as the forerunner of Antichrist. He says, “If he who is called universal falls, the foundation of the whole Church sinks at once.” In another place: “It is a most melancholy thing to hear with any patience, that our brother and companion in the episcopal office should look down with contempt on all others, and be called sole bishop. But what does this pride of his indicate, but that the times of Antichrist are already at hand? For indeed he imitates him, who, despising the society of angels, endeavoured to usurp supreme power to himself.” In another place, writing to Eulogius, bishop of Alexandria, and Anastasius, bishop of Antioch, he says, “None of my predecessors would ever use this profane word. For if one patriarch be called universal, the name of patriarch is taken away from all the rest. But far be it from any Christian heart to wish to arrogate to himself any thing that would in the least degree diminish the honour of his brethren. To consent to that execrable term is no other than to destroy the faith. Our obligation to preserve the unity of the faith is one thing, and to repress the haughtiness of pride is another. But I confidently assert, that whoever calls himself universal bishop, or desires to be so called, in such aggrandizement is the precursor of Antichrist, because he proudly sets up himself above all others.” Again, to Anastasius, bishop of Antioch: “I have said that the bishop of Constantinople can have no peace with us, unless he would correct the haughtiness of that superstitious and proud title which has been invented by the first apostate; and to say nothing of the injury done to your dignity, if one bishop be called universal, when he falls, the whole Church sinks at once.” But his assertion that this honour was offered to Leo in the Council of Chalcedon has not the least appearance of truth. For there is not a word of this in the acts of that council. And Leo himself, who in many of his epistles censures the decree passed there in favour of the see of Constantinople, would certainly not have passed over this argument, which would have been the most plausible of all, if that honour had really been offered to him, and he had refused it; and, having otherwise an immoderate thirst for honour, he would not readily have omitted a circumstance so much to his praise. Gregory was mistaken, therefore, in supposing that title to have been given to the see of Rome by the Council of Chalcedon. I forbear to remark how ridiculous it is for him to assert that the holy council conferred such a title, which he at the same time declares was profane, execrable, abominable, proud, and sacrilegious, and even invented by the devil, and published by the herald of Antichrist. And yet he adds that his predecessor refused it, lest, by the dignity given to one individual, all other bishops should be deprived of the honour due to them. In another place he says, “No one has ever wished to be called by such a name; no one has arrogated to himself this presumptuous title; lest, by assuming to himself the exclusive dignity of supreme bishop, he might seem to deny the episcopal honour to all his brethren.”

V. I come now to the jurisdiction which the Roman pontiff asserts that he indisputably holds over all churches. I know what violent contentions there were in ancient times on this subject. For there has never been a period when the Roman see did not aspire to some authority over other Churches. And it will not be unsuitable to the present occasion to investigate the means by which it gradually rose to some power. I am not yet speaking of that unbounded empire which it has more recently usurped; that I shall defer to its proper place. But here it will be necessary to point out in a few words in what manner and by what methods it formerly exalted itself, so as to assume any jurisdiction over other Churches. When the Eastern Churches were disturbed and divided by the factions of the Arians, in the reign of Constantius and Constans, sons of Constantine the Great, and Athanasius, the principal defender of the orthodox faith, was driven from his see, that calamity constrained him to go to Rome, in order that, by the authority of the Roman see, he might in some degree repress the rage of his enemies, and confirm the faithful, who were in extreme distress. He was honourably received by Julius, then bishop of Rome, and prevailed on the bishops of the West to undertake the defence of his cause. Thus the pious in the Eastern Churches, finding themselves in great want of foreign aid, and seeing that their principal succour was to be obtained from the Church of Rome, readily ascribed to it all the authority that they possibly could. But all this amounted to nothing more than that communion with it was held in high estimation, and it was accounted ignominious to be excommunicated from it. This dignity was afterwards considerably augmented by men of wicked and abandoned lives; for to escape the punishments which they deserved, they resorted thither as to a common asylum. Therefore, if a priest was condemned by his bishop, or a bishop by the synod of his province, they immediately appealed to Rome. And the bishops of Rome received such appeals with culpable eagerness, considering it as a kind of extraordinary power to interfere in the concerns of distant Churches. Thus when Eutyches was condemned by Flavianus, patriarch of Constantinople, he complained to Leo that he had been treated with injustice. Leo, without any delay, but with equal temerity and expedition, undertook the patronage of a bad cause, issued bitter invectives against Flavianus, as if he had condemned an innocent man without hearing his defence, and by this ambitious conduct he for some time afforded considerable support to the impiety of Eutyches. It appears that similar circumstances frequently happened in Africa. For as soon as any wicked man was convicted before the ordinary tribunal, he flew to Rome, and brought various false accusations against his superiors; and the see of Rome was always ready to interpose. This presumption constrained the African bishops to pass a decree that no one should appeal beyond the sea on pain of excommunication.

VI. But however this might be, let us examine what jurisdiction or power the Roman see then possessed. Now, ecclesiastical power consists in these four things—the ordination of bishops, the calling of councils, the hearing of appeals, or jurisdiction, and corrective admonitions, or censures. All the ancient councils command bishops to be ordained by their own metropolitans; and they never direct the bishop of Rome to be called to this office except in his own province. By degrees, however, a custom was introduced for all the bishops of Italy to go to Rome to be consecrated, except the metropolitans, who did not suffer themselves to be subjected to this bondage. But when any metropolitan was to be ordained, the bishop of Rome sent one of his priests to assist at the ceremony, but not to preside. There is an example of this in an epistle of Gregory, respecting the consecration of Constantius, archbishop of Milan, after the death of Laurentius. I do not suppose, however, that this was a very ancient practice. It is probable that at first they sent legates to each other, from a principle of respect and affection, to witness the ordination, and testify their mutual communion; and that what was originally voluntary, was afterwards considered as necessary. However this may be, it is evident that in ancient times the bishop of Rome did not possess the power of consecrating bishops, except in his own province, that is, in the Churches dependent upon his see; as is declared by one of the canons of the Council of Nice. Consecration was followed by the sending of a synodical epistle; and in this the bishop of Rome had no superiority over others. It was the custom of the patriarchs, immediately after their consecration, to make a solemn declaration of their faith in a written communication to their brethren, professing their adherence to the doctrine of the holy and orthodox councils. Thus, by making a confession of their faith, they mutually approved themselves to each other. If the bishop of Rome had received such a confession from others, and not given it to other bishops in his turn, this would have been an instance of acknowledged superiority; but, as he was under the same obligation to give it as to require it, and was subject to the common law, it was certainly a token of equality, and not of dominion. We have examples of this in the epistles of Gregory to Anastasius and Cyriacus of Constantinople, and to all the patriarchs together.

VII. Next follow admonitions or censures, which, as the bishops of Rome formerly employed them towards others, they also received from others in their turn. Irenæus, bishop of Lyons, sharply reproved Victor, bishop of Rome, for having raised a pernicious dissension in the Church on subjects of no importance. Victor submitted to the reproof without any opposition. It was a liberty at that time commonly used by the holy bishops to exercise the privilege of brethren towards the bishop of Rome, by admonishing and reproving him whenever he committed any fault. He, in like manner, when occasion required, admonished others of their duty, and reproved them for their faults. For Cyprian, when he exhorts Stephen, bishop of Rome, to admonish the bishops of France, argues not from any superior authority, but from the common rights which priests enjoy among each other. If Stephen had then possessed any authority over France, would not Cyprian have said, You should chastise them, because they are subject to you? But he expresses himself in a very different manner. “This fraternal union,” says he, “by which we are connected together, requires us to administer to each other mutual admonition.” And we see with what severity of language, though otherwise a man of a mild disposition, he censures even Stephen himself, when he considered him assuming too much consequence. In this respect, also, there is yet no appearance of the bishop of Rome having been invested with any jurisdiction over those who were not of his province.

VIII. With respect to the calling of councils, it was the duty of every metropolitan, at stated seasons, to summon a provincial synod. There the bishop of Rome had no authority. But a universal council could only be called by the emperor. For if any one of the bishops had attempted this, not only he would not have been obeyed by those who were out of his province, but such an attempt would have led to immediate confusion. Therefore the emperor sent a summons to attend to all of them alike. Socrates, indeed, in his Ecclesiastical History, states that Julius, bishop of Rome, expostulated with the Eastern bishops, for not having invited him to the Council of Antioch; whereas the canons had forbidden that any thing should be decreed without the knowledge of the bishop of Rome. But who does not see that this is to be understood of those decrees which bind the universal Church? Now, it is no wonder if there was so much respect paid to the antiquity and eminence of the city, and to the dignity of the see, as to determine that no general decree respecting religion should be passed in the absence of the bishop of Rome, unless he refused to be present. But what is this towards dominion over the whole Church? For we do not deny that the bishop of Rome was one of the principal, but we will not admit, what the Romanists now contend, that he had the authority over all.

IX. There remains the fourth kind of ecclesiastical power, which consists in appeals. It is evident that he possesses supreme authority, to whose tribunal appeals are made. Many often appealed to the bishop of Rome; and he also attempted to assume the cognizance of causes; but he always became an object of derision whenever he exceeded his proper limits. I shall say nothing of the East, or of Greece; but it appears that the bishops of France strenuously resisted him, when he discovered an inclination to usurp authority over them. In Africa, this subject occasioned a long controversy. For when the Council of Milevum, at which Augustine was present, had denounced excommunication against all who should appeal beyond the sea, the bishop of Rome endeavoured to get this decree rescinded. He sent legates to state that this privilege had been given to him by the Council of Nice. The legates produced certain acts which they alleged to be the acts of the Council of Nice, and which they had brought from the archives of their Church. They were resisted by the Africans, who denied that the bishop of Rome ought to be credited in his own cause. They therefore determined to send to Constantinople, and other cities of Greece, to obtain copies liable to less suspicion. It was found that these copies contained no such passages as the Roman legates had pretended. So the decree was confirmed, which had taken the supreme cognizance of appeals from the bishop of Rome. This transaction discovered the scandalous impudence of the Roman pontiff. For when he had fraudulently substituted the council of Sardis for that of Nice, he was disgracefully detected in a manifest falsehood. But still greater wickedness and effrontery were betrayed by those who added to the acts of the council a forged epistle, in which a bishop of Carthage condemns the arrogance of his predecessor, Aurelius, for having dared to withdraw himself from obedience to the apostolic see, presents the submission of himself and his Church, and humbly supplicates for pardon. These are the glorious monuments of antiquity upon which the majesty of the Roman see is founded; while, under the pretext of antiquity, they advance such puerile falsehoods, as require not the least penetration to detect. “Aurelius,” says this famous epistle, “elated with diabolical audacity and obstinacy, was a rebel against Christ and St. Peter, and therefore deserved to be anathematized.” But what said Augustine? What said all the fathers who were present at the Council of Milevum? But what necessity is there for spending many words to refute that stupid fabrication, which even the Romanists themselves, if they have any modesty left, cannot look at without being exceedingly ashamed? So Gratian, the compiler of the decretal,—whether from wickedness or ignorance I know not,—after having recited that canon, that those who appealed beyond the sea should be excommunicated, adds this exception, unless they appeal to the see of Rome. What can be done with such men, who are so destitute of common sense as to make that one case an exception to a law, to guard against which every one sees that the law was made? For the council, in condemning appeals beyond the sea, only prohibited any one from appealing to Rome; and this admirable expositor excepts Rome from the general prohibition!

X. But to put an end at once to this question, a single transaction, related by Augustine, will be sufficient to show what kind of jurisdiction was anciently possessed by the bishop of Rome. Donatus, bishop of Casæ Nigræ, had accused Cæcilianus, bishop of Carthage. The accused was condemned without a hearing; for, knowing that the bishops had conspired against him, he would not appear. The matter was then brought before the Emperor Constantine. With a view to have the cause decided by an ecclesiastical judgment, he referred the cognizance of it to Melchiades, bishop of Rome, with whom he associated some other bishops from Italy, France, and Spain. If it was part of the ordinary jurisdiction of the see of Rome to hear an appeal in an ecclesiastical cause, why did Melchiades suffer any colleagues to be appointed with him at the pleasure of the Emperor? and, moreover, why did he himself undertake the business rather at the command of the Emperor than from his own authority? But let us hear what took place afterwards. Cæcilianus was victorious. Donatus of Casæ Nigræ was convicted of calumny. He appealed. Constantine referred the appeal to the bishop of Arles. He sat in judgment on the decision of the bishop of Rome. If the Roman see possessed the supreme jurisdiction, subject to no appeal, how did Melchiades submit to such an insult, as for the bishop of Arles to be preferred before him? And who was the Emperor that did this? It was Constantine the Great, of whom they boast that he not only devoted all his attention, but employed almost all the power of his empire, to exalt the dignity of their see. We see, then, how very far the bishop of Rome was at that time from that supreme dominion which he pretends to have been given him by Christ over all Churches, and which he falsely boasts of having exercised in all ages with the consent of the whole world.

XI. I know what numerous epistles, and rescripts, and edicts, there are, in which the pontiffs have confidently advanced the most extravagant claims respecting this power. But it is also known to every person, possessed of the least sense or learning, that most things contained in them are so extremely absurd, that it is easy to discover at the first glance from what source they have proceeded. For what man of sound judgment, and in his sober senses, can suppose that Anacletus was the author of that curious interpretation, which Gratian quotes under his name—that Cephas means a head? There are many such fooleries collected together by Gratian without any judgment, which the Romanists in the present day employ against us in defence of their see; and such phantoms with which they used to delude the ignorant in the darkest times, they still persist in bringing forward amidst all the light of the present age. But I have no intention to devote much labour to the refutation of such things, which manifestly refute themselves by their extreme absurdity. I confess that there are also genuine epistles of the ancient pontiffs, in which they extol the majesty of their see by the most magnificent titles. Such are some epistles of Leo; who, though he was a man of learning and eloquence, had likewise an immoderate thirst for glory and dominion; but whether the Churches at that time gave credit to his testimony when he thus exalted himself, is a subject of inquiry. Now, it appears that many were offended at his ambition, and resisted his claims. In one epistle he deputes the bishop of Thessalonica to act as his representative in Greece and other adjacent countries; in another he delegates the bishop of Arles, or some other bishop, to be his vicar in France. So he appoints Hormisdas, bishop of Seville, his vicar in Spain. But in all cases he mentions, by way of exception, that he makes such appointments on condition that they shall in no respect infringe the ancient privileges of the metropolitans. But Leo himself declares this to be one of their privileges, that if any difficulty should arise, the metropolitan was to be consulted in the first place. These delegations, therefore, were accompanied with this condition—that there was to be no interference with any bishop in his ordinary jurisdiction, with any metropolitan in hearing appeals, or with any provincial synod in the regulation of the Churches. Now, what was this but to abstain from all jurisdiction, and only to interpose for the settlement of disputes, as far as was consistent with the law and nature of ecclesiastical communion?

XII. In the time of Gregory, this ancient custom had already undergone a considerable change. For when the empire was convulsed and torn asunder, when France and Spain were afflicted with repeated and numerous wars and distresses, Illyricum laid waste, Italy harassed, and Africa almost ruined with incessant calamities,—in order to preserve the unity of the faith amidst such a violent convulsion of civil affairs, or at least to prevent its total destruction, all the bishops round about connected themselves more closely with the bishop of Rome. The consequence was, that the power as well as the dignity of that see was greatly increased. I am not much concerned, however, respecting the methods by which this was effected. It is at least evident, that it was greater at that period than in the preceding ages. And even then it was very far from an unlimited dominion, for one man to govern all others according to his own pleasure. But the see of Rome was held in such reverence, that its authority would repress and correct the refractory and obstinate, who could not be confined to their duty by the other bishops. For Gregory embraces every opportunity of protesting, that he as faithfully maintained the rights of others, as he required them to maintain his. “Nor under the influence of ambition,” says he, “do I withhold from any one that which is his right; but I desire to honour my brethren in all things.”—There is not a sentence in his writings which contains a prouder boast of the majesty of his primacy than the following: “I know no bishop who is not subject to the apostolic see, when he is found in fault.” But he immediately adds, “Where there is no fault to require subjection, all are equal by right of humility.” He attributes to himself the authority to correct those who have transgressed; if all do their duty, he places himself on an equality with them. But he assumed this authority to himself, and they who were willing consented to it, while others, who disapproved of it, were at liberty to oppose it with impunity; and this, it is notorious, was the conduct of the majority. Besides, it is to be remarked, that he is there speaking of the primate of Constantinople, who had been condemned by a provincial synod, and had disregarded the united judgment of the assembly. His colleagues complained to the emperor of his obstinacy. The emperor appointed Gregory to decide the cause. We see, then, that he made no attempt to interfere with the ordinary jurisdiction; and that the very thing which he does for the assistance of others, he does only at the command of the emperor.

XIII. This, therefore, was all the power which was then possessed by the bishop of Rome,—to oppose rebellious and refractory persons, in cases which required some extraordinary remedy, and that in order to assist, not to hinder, other bishops. Therefore he assumes to himself no more power over others than he grants to all others over himself, when he professes that he is ready to be reproved by all, and to be corrected by all. So in another epistle he commands the bishop of Aquileia to come to Rome to plead his cause in a controversy which had arisen between him and his neighbours, respecting an article of faith; nevertheless he gives this command, not from his own authority, but in consequence of the mandate of the emperor. Nor does he announce himself as the sole judge, but promises to assemble a synod to judge of the whole affair. But though there was still such moderation, that the power of the Roman see had its certain limits, which it was not permitted to exceed, and the bishop of Rome himself no more presided over others than he was subject to them, yet it appears how very displeasing this situation was to Gregory. For he frequently complains, that under the name of being a bishop, he was forced back to the world, and that he was more involved in secular cares than ever he had been while he was a layman; so that in that honour he was oppressed with the tumult of worldly business. In another passage he says, “Such a vast burden of occupations presses me down, that my mind is incapacitated for any elevation towards things above. I am tossed about with numerous causes, like so many waves; and after my former seasons of retirement and tranquillity, I am disquieted with the tempests of a tumultuous life; so that I may truly say, I am come into the depth of the sea, and the tempest has drowned me.” Judge, then, what he would have said, if he had fallen upon these times. If he did not fulfil the office of a pastor, yet he was employed in it. He refrained from all interference in the civil government, and acknowledged himself to be subject to the emperor in common with others. He never intruded into the care of other Churches, except when he was constrained by necessity. And yet he considered himself to be in a labyrinth, because he could not wholly devote himself to the exclusive duties of a bishop.