[Footnote 104: "Destruction and Reconstruction," Taylor, p. 162, et. seq.]
CHAPTER XLVIII.
Assignment of General J. E. Johnston to the Command of the Army of
Tennessee.—Condition of his Army.—An Offensive Campaign
suggested.—Proposed Objects to be accomplished.—General
Johnston's Plans.—Advance of Sherman.—The Strength of the
Confederate Position.—General Johnston expects General Sherman to
give Battle at Dalton.—The Enemy's Flank Movement via Snake Creek
Gap to Resaca.—Johnston falls back to Resaca.—Further Retreat to
Adairsville.—General Johnston's Reasons.—Retreat to Cassville.—
Projected Engagement at Kingston frustrated.—Retreat beyond the
Etowah River.—Strong Position at Alatoona abandoned.—Nature of
the Country between Marietta and Dallas.—Engagements at New Hope
Church.—Army takes Position at Kenesaw.—Senator Hill's Letter.—
Death of Lieutenant-General Polk.—Battle at Kenesaw Mountain.—
Retreat beyond the Chattahoochee.—Results reviewed.—Popular
Demand for Removal of General Johnston.—Reluctance to remove him.—
Reasons for Removal.—Assignment of General J. B. Hood to the
Command.—He assumes the Offensive.—Battle of Peach-tree Creek.—
Death of General W. H. T. Walker.—Sherman's Movement to
Jonesboro.—Defeat of Hardee.—Evacuation of Atlanta.—Sherman's
Inhuman Order.—Visit to Georgia.—Suggested Operations.—Want of
coöperation by the Governor of Georgia.—Conference with Generals
Beauregard, Hardee, and Cobb, at Augusta.—Departure from Original
Plan.—General Hood's Movement against the Enemy's Communications.—
Partial Successes.—Withdrawal of the Army to Gadsden and Movement
against Thomas.—Sherman burns Atlanta and begins his March to the
Sea.—Vandalism.—Direction of his Advance.—General Wheeler's
Opposition.—His Valuable Service.—Sherman reaches Savannah.—
General Hardee's Command.—The Defenses of the City.—Assault and
Capture of Fort McAlister.—The Results.—Hardee evacuates Savannah.
On December 16, 1863, I directed General J. E. Johnston to transfer the command of the Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana to Lieutenant-General Polk, and repair to Dalton, Georgia, to assume command of the Army of Tennessee, representing at that date an effective total of 43,094. My information led me to believe that the condition of that army, in all that constitutes efficiency, was satisfactory, and that the men were anxious for an opportunity to retrieve the loss of prestige sustained in the disastrous battle of Missionary Ridge. I was also informed that the enemy's forces, then occupying Chattanooga, Bridgeport, and Stevenson, with a detached force at Knoxville, were weaker in numbers than at any time since the battle of Missionary Ridge, and that they were especially deficient in cavalry and in artillery and train-horses. I desired, therefore, that prompt and vigorous measures be taken to enable our troops to commence active operations against the enemy as early as practicable. It was important to guard against the injurious results to the morale of the troops, which always attend a prolonged season of inactivity; but the recovery of the territory in Tennessee and Kentucky, which we had been compelled to abandon, and on the supplies of which the proper subsistence of our armies mainly depended, imperatively demanded an onward movement. I believed that, by a rapid concentration of our troops between the scattered forces of the enemy, without attempting to capture his intrenched positions, we could compel him to accept battle in the open field, and that, should we fail to draw him out of his intrenchments, we could move upon his line of communications. The Federal force at Knoxville depended mainly for support on its connection with that at Chattanooga, and both were wholly dependent on uninterrupted communication with Nashville. Could we, then, by interposing our force, separate these two bodies of the enemy, and cut off his communication from Nashville to Chattanooga by destroying the railroad, both conditions were fulfilled. Of the practicability of this movement I had little doubt; of its expediency, if practicable, there could be none. I impressed repeatedly upon General Johnston by letter, and by officers of my staff and others, sent to him by me for the purpose of putting him in possession of these views, the importance of a prompt aggressive movement by the Army of Tennessee. The following were among the considerations presented to General Johnston, at my request, by Brigadier-General W. N. Pendleton, chief of artillery of the Army of Northern Virginia, on April 16, 1864:
1. To take the enemy at disadvantage while weakened, it is believed, by sending troops to Virginia, and having others still absent on furlough.
2. To break up his plans by anticipating and frustrating his combinations.
3. So to press him in his present position as to prevent his heavier massing in Virginia.
4. To defeat him in battle, and gain great consequent strength in supplies, men, and productive territory.
5. To prevent the waste of the army incident to inactivity.
6. To inspirit the troops and the country by success, and to discourage the enemy.