When, after having given in his own person an account of a supposed occurrence,—an historian, on another occasion, takes up the same occurrence; and, in the person of another individual, gives of that same occurrence another account different from, and so different from, as to be irreconcileable with it; can this historian, with any propriety, be said to be himself a believer in this second account which he thus gives? Instead of giving it as a true account, does he not, at any rate, in respect of all the several distinguishable circumstances in which it differs from the account given in his own person—give it in the character of a fable? a fable invented on the occasion on which the other person is supposed to speak—invented in the intent that it shall promote the purpose for which this speech is supposed to be made? Yet this account, which in the eyes of the very man by whom it is delivered to us, is but a fable, even those to whom in this same character of a fable it is delivered—this account it is that Christians have thus long persisted in regarding, supporting, and acting upon, as if it were from beginning to end, a truth—a great body of truth!—O Locke! O Newton! where was your discernment!

On such evidence would any Judge fine a man a shilling? Would he give effect to a claim to that amount? Yet such is the evidence, on the belief of which the difference between happiness and misery, both in intensity as well as duration, infinite, we are told, depends!


SECTION 5.

VISION III.—PAUL'S ANTERIOR VISION, AS REPORTED BY THE LORD TO ANANIAS.

By the nature of the acts which are the objects of it, the command, we see, is necessarily pregnant with information: but now comes the information given as such—the piece of information with which the command is followed. This information—in and by which another, an antecedent vision, is brought upon the carpet, and communicated—has been reserved for a separate consideration.

This information is in its complexion truly curious: to present a clear view of it, is not an altogether easy task. The information thus given by the Lord—given to this Ananias—this information, of which Paul is the subject, is—what? that, on some former occasion, neither time nor place mentioned, he, Ananias, to whom the Lord is giving the information, had been seen by this same Paul performing, with a certain intention, a certain action; the intention being—that, in relation to this same Paul, a certain effect should be produced—to wit, that of his receiving his sight. The Lord declares, Acts ix. 12, to Ananias, that Paul "had seen in a vision a man, Ananias himself, coming and putting his hand on him, that he (Paul) might receive his sight."

Well then—this action which the Lord thus informs Ananias that he, Ananias, had performed,—did he, at any time and place, ever perform it? Oh, no; that is not necessary: the question is not a fair one; for it was only in a vision that it was performed. Well then—if it was only in a vision that it was performed, then, in reality, it was never performed. The Lord said that it had been performed; but in so saying the Lord had said that which was not true. The Lord had caused him to believe this—the Lord knowing all the while that it was not true. Such is the deed, which, according to our historian, the Lord relates himself to have achieved.

But the intention, was that true? Oh, no; nor was there any need of its being so: for the intention, with which the act was supposed to be performed, was part and parcel of the divinely-taught untruth.