Know the Truth: A Critique on the Hamiltonian Theory of Limitation / Including Some Strictures Upon the Theories of Rev. Henry L. Mansel and Mr. Herbert Spencer

by Jesse Henry Jones

It was said above that some of the evil results of Mr. Spencer's system assumed in this chapter their worst phases. This remark is illustrated in the following extract: "We are obliged to regard every phenomenon as a manifestation of some Power by which we are acted upon; phenomena being, so far as we can ascertain, unlimited in their diffusion, we are obliged to regard this Power as omnipresent; and criticism teaches us that this Power is wholly incomprehensible. In this consciousness of an Incomprehensible Omnipresent Power we have just that consciousness on which Religion dwells. And so we arrive at the point where Religion and Science coalesce." The evils referred to may be developed as follows: "We are obliged to regard every phenomenon as a manifestation of some Power by which we are acted upon." This may be expressed in another form thus: Every phenomenon is a manifestation of some Power by which we are acted upon. Some doubt may arise respecting the precise meaning of this sentence, unless the exact signification of the term phenomenon be ascertained. It might be confined to material appearances, appreciable by one of the five senses. But the context seems to leave no doubt but that Mr. Spencer uses it in the wider sense of every somewhat in the Universe, since he speaks of "phenomena" as "unlimited." Putting the definition for the term, the sentence stands: Every somewhat in the Universe is "a manifestation of some Power by which we are acted upon." It follows, then, that there is no somewhat in the Universe, except we are acted upon by it. Our being arises to be accounted for. Either we began to be, and were created, or the ground of our being is in ourselves, our being is pure independence, and nothing further is to be asked. This latter will be rejected. Then we were created. But we were not created by Mr. Spencer's "some Power," because it only acts upon us. In his creation, man was not acted upon, because there was no man to be acted upon; but in that act a being was originated who might be acted upon. Then, however, we came into being, another than "some Power" was the cause of us. But the act of creating man was a somewhat. Every somewhat in the Universe is "a manifestation of some Power." This is not such a manifestation. Therefore the creation of man took place outside the Universe. Or does Mr. Spencer prefer to say that the creation of man is "a manifestation of some Power acting upon" him!

The position above taken seems the more favorable one for Mr. Spencer. If, to avoid the difficulties which spring from it, he limits the term phenomenon, as for instance to material appearances, then his assertion that phenomena are unlimited is a contradiction, and he has no ground on which to establish the omnipresence of his Power.

But another line of criticism may be pursued. Strictly speaking, all events are phenomena. Let there be named an event which is universally known and acknowledged, and which, in the nature of the case, cannot be "a manifestation of some Power by which we are acted upon," and in that statement also will the errors of the passage under consideration be established. The experience by the human soul of a sense of guilt, of a consciousness of ill-desert, is such an event. No "Power" can make a sinless soul feel guilty; no "Power" can relieve a sinful soul from feeling guilty. The feeling of guilt does not arise from the defiance of Power, it arises from the violation of Law. And not only may this experience be named, but every other experience of the moral nature of man. In this connection let it be observed that Mr. Spencer always elsewhere uses the term phenomenon to represent material phenomena in the material universe. Throughout all his pages the reader is challenged to find a single instance in which he attempts to account for any other phenomena than these and their concomitants, the affections of the intellect in the animal nature. Indeed, so thoroughly is his philosophy vitiated by this omission, that one could never learn from anything he has said in these pages, that man had a moral nature at all, that there were any phenomena of sin and repentance which needed to be accounted for. In this, Sir William Hamilton and Mr. Mansel are just as bad as he. Yet in this the Limitists have done well; it is impossible, on the basis of their system, to render such an account. To test the matter, the following problem is presented.

To account, on the basis of the Limitist Philosophy, for the fact that the nations of men have universally made public acknowledgment of their guilt, in having violated the law of a superior being; and that they have offered propitiatory sacrifices therefor, except in the case of those persons and nations who have received the Bible, or have learned through the Koran one of its leading features, that there is but one God, and who in either case believe that the needful sacrifice has already been made.

Another pernicious result of the system under examination is, that it affords no better ground for the doctrine of Deity's omnipresence than experience. Mr. Spencer's words are: "phenomena being, so far as we can ascertain, unlimited in their diffusion, we are obliged to regard this Power as omnipresent." Now, if he, or one of his friends, should happen to get wings some day, and should just take a turn through space, and should happen also to find a limit to phenomena, and, skirting in astonishment along that boundary, should happen to light upon an open place and a bridge, which invited them to pass across to another sphere or system of phenomena, made by another "Power,"—said bridge being constructed "'alf and 'alf" by the two aforesaid Powers,—then there would be nothing to do but for the said explorer to fly back again to England, as fast as ever he could, and relate to all the other Limitists his new experience; and they, having no ground on which to argue against or above experience, must needs receive the declaration of their colaborator, with its inevitable conclusion, that the Power by which we are here acted upon is limited, and so is not omnipresent. But when, instead of such a fallacious philosophy, men shall receive the doctrine, based not upon human experience, but upon God's inborn ideas that phenomena are limited and God is omnipresent, and that upon these facts experience can afford no decision, we shall begin to eliminate the real difficulties of philosophy, and to approach the attainment of the unison between human philosophy and the Divine Philosophy.

Attached to the above is the conclusion reached by Mr. Spencer in an earlier part of his work, that "criticism teaches us that this Power is wholly incomprehensible." We might, it is believed, ask with pertinence, What better, then, is man than the brute? But the subject is recurred to at this time, only to quote against this position a sentence from a somewhat older book than "First Principles," a book which, did it deserve no other regard than as a human production, would seem, from its perfect agreement with the facts of human nature, to be the true basis for all philosophy. The sentence is this: "Beloved, let us love one another, for love is of God; and every one that loveth, is born of God, and knoweth God."

But the gross materialism of Mr. Spencer's philosophy presents its worst phase in his completed doctrine of God. Mark. A "phenomenon" is "a manifestation of some Power." "In this consciousness of an Incomprehensible Omnipresent Power we have just that consciousness on which Religion dwells. And so we arrive at the point where Religion and Science coalesce." An "Incomprehensible Omnipresent Power" is all the Deity Mr. Spencer allows to mankind. This Power is omnipresent, so that we can never escape it; and incomprehensible, so that we can never know the law of its action, or even if it have a law. At any moment it may fall on us and crush us. At any moment this globe may become one vast Vesuvius, and all its cities Herculaneums and Pompeiis. Of such a Deity the children of men may either live in continual dread, or in continual disregard; they may either spend their lives clad in sackcloth, or purple and fine linen; bread and water may be their fare, or their table may be spread like that of Dives; by merciless mortification of the flesh, by scourges and iron chains, they may seek to propitiate, if possible, this incomprehensible, omnipresent Power; or, reckless of consequences, they may laugh and dance and be gay, saying, we know nothing of this Power, he may crush us any moment, let us take the good of life while we can. The symbols of such a Deity are the "rough and ragged rocks," the hills, the snow-crowned mountains Titan-piled; the avalanche starting with ominous thunder, to rush with crash and roar and terrible destruction upon the hapless village beneath it; the flood gathering its waters from vast ranges of hills into a single valley, spreading into great lakes, drowning cattle, carrying off houses and their agonized inhabitants, sweeping away dams, rending bridges from their foundations, in fine, ruthlessly destroying the little gatherings of man, and leaving the country, over which its devastating waters flowed, a mournful desolation; and finally, perhaps the completest symbol of all may be found in that collection of the united streams and lakes of tens upon tens of thousands of miles of the earth's surface, into the aorta of the world, over the rough, rocky bed of which the crowded waters rush and roar, with rage and foam, until they come suddenly to the swift tremendous plunge of Niagara.

It should be further noticed, that this philosophy is in direct antagonism with that of the Bible,—that, if Spencerianism is true, the Bible is a falsehood and cheat. Instead of Mr. Spencer's "Power," the Bible presents us a doctrine of God as follows: "And God said unto Moses, I am that I am. And he said, Thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel, I am hath sent me unto you."—Exodus IV. 14. This declaration, the most highly metaphysical of any but one man ever heard, all the Limitists, even devout Mr. Mansel, either in distinct terms, or by implication, deny. That other declaration is this: "Beloved, let us love one another: for love is of God; and every one that loveth is born of God, and knoweth God. He that loveth not, knoweth not God; for God is love."—1 John IV. 7, 8. Direct as is the antagonism between the two philosophies now presented, the later one appears in an especially bad light from the fact, that, being very recent and supported by a mere handful of men, its advocates have utterly neglected to take any notice of the other and elder one, although the adherents of this may be numbered by millions, and among them have been and are many of the ablest of earth's thinkers. True, the great majority of Bible readers do not study it as a philosophical treatise, but rather as a book of religious and spiritual instruction; yet, since it is the most profoundly philosophical book which has ever been in the hands of man, and professedly teaches us not only the philosophy of man, but also the philosophy of God, it certainly would seem that the advocates of the new and innovating system should have taken up that one which it sought to supplant, and have made an attempt, commensurate with the magnitude of the work before them, to show its position to be fallacious and unworthy of regard. Instead of this they have nowhere recognized the existence even of this philosophy except in the single instance of a quotation by Mr. Mansel, in which he seems tacitly to acknowledge the antagonism we have noted. In Mr. Spencer's volume this neglect is especially noteworthy. Judging from internal evidence, one would much sooner conclude that it was written by a Hindu pundit, in a temple of Buddha, than by an Englishman, in a land of Bibles and Christian churches. Now, although the Bible may stand in his estimation no higher than the Bahgavat-Gita, yet the mere fact that it is, and that it presents a most profound philosophy, which is so largely received in his own and neighboring nations, made it imperative upon him not only to take some notice of it, but to meet and answer it, as we have indicated above.

Another fault in Mr. Spencer's philosophy, one which he will be less willing to admit, perhaps, than the above, and, at the same time, one which will be more likely forcibly to move a certain class of mind, is, that it is in direct antagonism to human nature. Not only is the Bible a falsehood and a cheat, if Mr. Spencer's philosophical system is true, but human nature is equally a falsehood and a cheat. To specify. Human nature universally considers God, or its gods, as persons; or, in other words, all human beings, or at least with very rare exceptions, spontaneously ascribe personality to Deity. This position is in no wise negatived by the fact of the Buddhist priesthood of India, or of a class of philosophical atheists in any other country. Man is endowed with the power of self-education; and if an individual sees, in the religion in which he is brought up, some inconsistency, which he, thinking it, as it may be, integral, for philosophical reasons rejects, and all religion with it, he may educate himself into speculative atheism. But no child is an atheist. Not even Shelley became such, until he had dashed against some of the distorted and monstrous human theologies of his day. But counting all the Buddhists, and all the German atheists, and all the English atheists, and all the American atheists, and all other atheists wherever they may be found, they will not number one tenth of the human race. On what ground can the unanimity of the other nine tenths be accounted for? There appears none possible, but that the notion that God is a person, is organic in human nature. Another equally universal and spontaneous utterance of mankind is, that there is a likeness, in some way, between God and man. There are the grossest, and in many instances most degrading modes of representing this; but under them all, and through them all, the indelible notion appears. The unanimity and pertinacity of this notion, appearing in every part of the globe, and under every variety of circumstance, and reappearing after every revolution, which, tearing down old customs and worships, established new ones, can without doubt only be accounted for on the precise ground of the other,—that the notion is organic in man. A third utterance of the human race, standing in the same category with these two, is, that the Deity can be propitiated by sacrifice. This also has had revolting, yea most hideous and unrighteous forms of expression, even to human sacrifices. But the notion has remained indestructible through all ages, and must therefore be accounted for, as have been the others. Over against the I am, which human nature presents and the Bible supports; over against Him in whose image man and the Bible say man was created; and over against Him who, those two still agreeing witnesses also affirm, is moved by his great heart of Love to have mercy on those creatures who come to him with repentance, Mr. Spencer gives us, as the result of Science, an incomprehensible omnipresent Power; only a Power, nothing more; and that "utterly inscrutable." For our part, whatever others may do, we will believe in human nature and the Bible. On the truthfulness of these two witnesses, as on the Central Rock in the Universe, we plant ourselves. Here do we find our Gibraltar.

Mr. Spencer further says that on the consciousness of this Power "Religion dwells." Now, so far is this assertion from according with the fact, that on his hypothesis it is impossible to account for the presence of religion as a constitutive element of the human race. Religion was primarily worship, the reverential acknowledgment, by the sinless creature, of the authority of the Creator, combined with the adoration of His absolute Holiness; but since sin has marred the race, it has been coupled with the offering in some forms of a propitiatory sacrifice. But if the Deity is only Power; or equally, if this is all the notion we can form of him, we are utterly at a loss to find aught in him to worship, much less can we account for the fact of the religious nature in us, and most of all are we confounded by the persistent assertion, by this religions nature, of the personality and mercy of God, for Power can be neither personal nor merciful.