[139.] In instruction the presence of interest cannot be simply assumed; just as little can good intentions on the pupil’s part always be presupposed in training. One thing, however, must be taken for granted: the pupil must not have come to feel that the discipline is weak and the instruction poor. Any defect in either direction must therefore be traced to its source and remedied. When pupils feel free to do as they please, when they think they have good cause to blame the teacher for their failure to make progress, his manner will be of no avail; and futile attempts only make matters worse.
[140.] In some cases training becomes blended with government to such an extent that it can scarcely be distinguished from the latter. As an example, we may mention the large educational institutions conducted on a military basis, where the individual pupil is carried along by the general system, rather than made the object of special care. In other cases, training and government remain farther apart than is necessary; an instance of this is when a strict father keeps himself at a distance, and leaves the business of training, within the prescribed rigid limits, to the tutor of his children. At all events, a distinction must be made between the two concepts, training and government, in order that the teacher may know what he is doing, and may notice what is perhaps lacking; we are justified in adding, in order that he may save himself useless effort. For training is not uniformly effectual, regardless of circumstances; the teacher needs to be watchful in this matter in order that the opportune moment for doing what can be done may not escape him.
[ CHAPTER II
The Aim of Training]
[141.] While the aim of instruction was rendered sufficiently determinate, as we saw above ([17], [64], [65]), by the injunction, be perfect, the aim of training, which supplements educative instruction, comprehends virtue as a whole. Now virtue is an ideal, the approximation toward which is denoted by the term morality. Again, since, generally speaking, a child passes on from mere capacity for culture to culture itself, from the indeterminate to fixedness of knowledge, the approximation to virtue consists likewise in development toward stability. Where conduct in moral affairs vacillates, there is a deficiency; where something morally hateful becomes confirmed, there is a defect. Excluding both, we define the aim of training properly as moral strength of character.
“Training” means such will-training as conduces to the formation of good character; “government” means such training as conduces to good order. The first is for a permanent, the second for an immediate, purpose. In government we can appeal both to a positive and a negative means. The positive means is interest in a study and the affairs of the schoolroom; the negative means is inhibition of disturbing impulses. As Professor James, in his “Talks on Psychology,”[13] points out, this inhibition may be of two sorts,—that of forcible suppression, and that of substitution. A teacher who uses negative means of inhibiting mischief or inattention, employs command or punishment. This method, though sometimes seemingly unavoidable, often results in mental strain, if not permanent alienation between teacher and pupil. The method of substitution attempts to secure inhibition of the undesirable state of mind by giving rise to a set of favorable ideas strong enough to displace it. “If, without saying anything about the street disturbances,” which may be distracting the attention of your pupils, “you open a counter attraction by starting some very interesting talk or demonstration yourself, they will altogether forget the distracting incident, and, without any effort, follow you along.” Training, however, has a more difficult task. It must succeed in implanting what may be called regulative principles in the mind. It must furthermore succeed in establishing habits of conduct that will enable the pupil to become self-governing. That is, we must establish in him habits of feeling and action that will enable him to substitute the higher for the lower good, or, at least, instantly to inhibit the temptation to evil. This is a task not for a day or a year, but for the whole school period.
[13] James, “Talks on Psychology,” p. 193, Henry Holt & Co., New York, 1899.
[142.] In succeeding chapters character and moral conduct will each have to be differentiated more minutely. For our present purpose we need only to remind ourselves that the determinateness of the will, which is called character, depends not only on willing, but also on not willing. The latter is either a deficient or a denying willing, which repels or rejects. Stern methods of governing, which bar access to everything that might lead astray, are likely to produce a deficient will rather than the permanence of formed strength; with the end of school days, the dreaded opportunities arrive after all, and the pupil may quickly undergo a change beyond recognition. The task of training must therefore be thought of as embracing both affirmative willing and rejecting.