[173.] The wise forethought essential to regulative training requires in the first place that the teacher shall rather tolerate an inconvenient discussion than check a frank expression of opinion, provided the objections of the pupil are indubitably sincere, and his vanity, we will say, is not flattered too much by the unexpected consideration accorded to his remarks. The same foresight is to be exercised in cases where it proves impossible to convince the pupil at once. Here the final judgment, instead of being insisted upon, should rather be postponed; it will always be easy to point out to the pupil his lack of adequate knowledge and to refer him to future studies. The positiveness that usually characterizes the assertions of boys and young men, generally has its roots in their great ignorance. They have not the least inkling of how many opinions have been held and disputed. Instruction will gradually cure them of their excessive self-confidence.
Only in a pure despotism would the enforcement of unquestioning obedience to authority be admissible. No country aspiring to political liberty could tolerate such a system. Even if all political considerations were dismissed, the development of subjective character alone would demand a condemnation of such a method. But in a country like ours, where men are both personally and politically self-governing, education to leadership is not second to education to obedience. There comes a time, therefore, when argument is in place, provided its purpose is to clarify the pupil’s insight into prudence or duty. It will not be too much to insist upon obedience without argument with all pupils so far as the ordinary school virtues—regularity, punctuality, silence, and industry—are concerned. Old and young can see their necessity. When it comes to the more intricate phases of conduct, the grounds for authority, if it is still exercised, may be revealed through dialogue. It is the constant effort of training to establish regulative principles in the minds of the older pupils, so that within the range of their capacity they may become self-governing. In other words, the moral plateaus of Kant are to be attained, not at a bound, but by a gradual progress in moral autonomy. Herein we see the superiority of Herbart’s conception of moral training. What Kant gave up as an unsolvable problem, can be seen to be only a natural process. Says Kant, “How a law can of itself directly determine the will is for human reason an insoluble problem, for it is identical with the problem how a free will is possible.”[19] The difficulty with Kant’s theory was that he admitted no psychological means for attaining the free directive power of the mind. He could only say to the child: “You are free; be free. You are morally autonomous; exercise your power; be a free, self-governing citizen.” Kant regarded natural impulses, emotions, desires, pleasures, interests, as impure, hence to be rejected. They are indeed to be rejected as the final ends of character, but what Kant did not recognize is that they are the psychological means for attaining character. Primarily these feelings, far from being radically bad, as he thought, are radically good, since they help to furnish the necessary conditions of survival, both for the individual and for the race. Hunger, fear, courage, combativeness, prudence, sexual instinct, inquisitiveness, love of adornment, frugality, and a hundred other elemental passions have preserved the race from destruction in the past. A new set of social and intellectual impulses will in the future provide the instruments of survival, now that the field of evolution is transported from the jungle to the city. It is through intellectual insights that new ideals are formulated; it is through these elemental feelings that the active powers of the mind are stirred up to motor efficiency for their realization. From being biological means for physical survival, the feelings of man have now become psychological means for civic survival. Psychologically, therefore, men are not born free; they become free. To become free they must have opportunity to exercise freedom; at first within definite but widening limits while they are under the tuition of the school; later within the limits set by civil society; at last absolutely, when they have recognized that what is rational law in society is the law of their own being.
[19] “Selections,” p. 284.
[174.] But the matter of greatest importance from the point of view of training is consistency or inconsistency of action. One who lightly sets up maxims must be made to feel the difficulty of living up to them. In this way a mirror is held up to the pupils, partly in order to put to rout untenable maxims, and partly to reinforce valid principles.
Among the untenable maxims we include also those which, although in accord with prudence, would offend against morality. If the pupil does not see already that they cannot be maintained, the application, by exhibiting their objectionable consequences, must bring to light their true character.
[175.] Regulative training often calls for rousing words from the teacher. He has to remind the pupil of happenings in the past and predict future consequences in case his faults should continue; he has to induce him to look within himself for the purpose of tracing the causal connection of his actions to its source. If, however, this was done earlier, with a view to moral education, no long speeches are now needed. Moreover, the teacher’s remarks become calmer and briefer the more effective they have been, the more he is justified in expecting independent judgment on the part of the pupil, and finally the more fully the latter has entered upon that period during which he looks about him to observe the words and actions of strangers. For, at the time when he has begun to compare the new with the old, his receptivity for the old is very weak, and soon vanishes completely; unless, indeed, the old had been deeply impressed beforehand.
The purpose of the “rousing word” is to stimulate the mind to exercise its dynamic force to moral ends. The pupil must not be permitted to assume the attitude of negation, or to be a mere passive observer, or an innocent, devoid alike of power and significance, but he must be roused into a responsible character, an efficient participant in life’s activities. Successful appeal may be made to insights already acquired, but theoretically held; to dispositions implanted, but not yet actively exercised; to the application of old habits to new uses. Even where appeal must be made against objectionable conduct, it is better to apply the “inhibition of substitution” to that of “negation.”[20] While protesting against the evil, point the way to the right road.
[20] James, “Talks on Psychology,” p. 192.
[176.] Fourth. The pupil is to be kept in a quiet frame of mind; his intellect in a state suitable for clear apprehension. To outbursts of passion this applies absolutely; not so generally to emotions. Above all, tranquillity is the condition for the formation of theoretical judgments and hence also, although not exclusively so, for laying the foundation of morality.
Every desire may develop into passion, if the soul is so often and so long in a desiring state that thoughts become focussed in the object longed for, whereby plans shape themselves, hopes arise, and ill-will toward others strikes root. Accordingly, watchful attention must be given to all persistent and recurrent desires.